鍾凱研 v. The General of the Salvation Army
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 302/2023 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 19 December 2023.
1. The Applicant was formerly employed by the Putative Respondent (“The Salvation Army”). She began her employment with The Salvation Army on 1 April 2005, and her fixed term contract was renewed each time until it was not further renewed and it expired on 30 September 2022. The Applicant is no longer an employee of The Salvation Army.
Cited by 2 cases · Cites 4 cases
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HCAL 302/2023 [2023] HKCFI 3273 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 302 OF 2023 ________________________
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_________________ D E C I S I O N _________________ A. Introduction 1.The Applicant was formerly employed by the Putative Respondent (“The Salvation Army”). She began her employment with The Salvation Army on 1 April 2005, and her fixed term contract was renewed each time until it was not further renewed and it expired on 30 September 2022. The Applicant is no longer an employee of The Salvation Army. 2.By a Form 86 dated 27 February 2023, the Applicant seeks leave to apply for judicial review against the decision of Senior Human Resources Officer Ms Sharon Lau Wing Shan (“Ms Lau”) dated 28 November 2022 (“Appeal Decision”), dismissing the Applicant’s appeal against the decision of ex-Social Services Director Ms Li Siu Fan (“Ms Li”), who issued a written warning to the Applicant for her performance in the course of her employment with The Salvation Army (“Written Warning”). 3.I gave directions for The Salvation Army to file an Initial Response to the application, and for the Applicant to file a Reply. After some slippage in the original timetable, both documents were filed in the form of affirmation evidence, the last one being on 27 September 2023. I also indicated that, depending on the contents of those documents, I would decide whether to deal with the application for leave to apply for judicial review on paper, and if so to proceed to do so without further notice to the parties. 4.Having considered the materials, I am of the view that this application can appropriately be disposed of on paper. (The Form 86 did not ask for an oral hearing, and I do not think the request made at the end of the Applicant’s Reply affirmation requires an oral hearing to be fixed.) B. Background Facts B.1 The events that led to the Written Warning 5.Most of the events can be found documented in some form in the materials, including the supervision records and correspondence. 6.On 5 June 2019, Mr Sin Leung Kai (“Mr Sin”), a senior officer, and the Applicant’s immediate supervisor, informed the Applicant that she was falling behind and failing to meet service standards for filing case reports. She was requested to make improvements in this area of her work. 7.On 15 August 2019, Mr Sin informed the Applicant again that she had not shown any improvement in respect of outstanding case review and reports. She was requested to make improvements in this area of her work. 8.On 21 November 2019, Mr Sin reminded the Applicant once again that she had outstanding case review and reports, and had failed to show any improvement. 9.On 28 February 2020, it was discovered that the Applicant had apparently acted outside her authority, in what is said to be a very serious breach of trust. She stopped two social workers’ actions to intervene in a suspected suicide without first obtaining consent and agreement with the two social workers’ direct supervisor as well as from Mr Sin to intervene in such a manner (“1st Incident”). 10.On 3 March 2020, Mr Sin discovered that the Applicant had failed to submit 11 case review and reports which had been due for completion, and there were 2 outstanding case review and reports, which were pending by 11 months and more than 1 year respectively (“2nd Incident”). 11.On 3 March 2020, Mr Sin had a supervisory meeting with the Applicant in relation to her performance appraisal. Mr Sin informed the Applicant that in light of 1st and 2nd Incidents (collectively, “Incidents”) as well as previous concerns raised about the timely filing of case review and reports, and the failure to address and improve on such behaviour, her performance was unsatisfactory, and that he would recommend to the Social Services Director that a written warning be issued against her (“3 March 2020 Meeting”). The Applicant denies that she was informed by Mr Sin that she was under disciplinary investigation about the Incidents at the 3 March 2020 Meeting. She also maintains that the 3 March 2020 Meeting was merely a supervision session and performance appraisal interview and nothing more. 12.On 29 April 2020, Mr Sin completed a full report (“29 April Report”) explaining his reasons for recommending that a written warning be issued against the Applicant. In producing the 29 April Report, Mr Sin:
13.On 5 May 2020, Mr Sin submitted a formal recommendation to issue a written warning after submitting the 29 April Report, in the following terms:
14.Following the formal recommendation, the issuance of a written warning was suspended because the Applicant appealed against her 2019/2020 performance appraisal. 15.Between 5 March 2020 and 5 January 2021, The Salvation Army’s Social Services Department conducted extensive investigations in relation to the Applicant’s annual performance appraisal report, including the Incidents. B.2 The Written Warning 16.Following the investigation by The Salvation Army’s Social Services Department, the Written Warning was issued by Ms Li on 11 January 2021, and provided to the Applicant by Mr Sin on 12 January 2021. 17.The Written Warning stated (as with English translation):
B.3 The events after the Written Warning 18.On 26 January 2021, the Applicant wrote by email to Mr Sin stating that she intended formally to appeal (“Appeal”) against the Written Warning given at her interview on 12 January 2021 on the grounds that the procedures in the SQS had not been followed in the process of the disciplinary action against her. 19.On the same day, the Applicant applied for sick leave until 1 April 2021, on the basis of an allegation that she had suffered mental and psychiatric injuries, as a result of her appraisal sessions with Mr Sin and an internal meeting on 20 October 2020. Though out of chronological order, it can be noted here that the Applicant (1) later returned to work from 7 April 2021 until 16 June 2021, except taking sick leave for 5 days, (2) later applied for sick leave because of the alleged psychiatric injuries from 17 June 2021 until 2 March 2022, and (3) upon returning to work, continue to take sick leave, annual leave and vacation leave until the end of her contract on 30 September 2022. This obviously had an impact on the ability to investigate and deal with the Appeal. 20.On 28 January 2021, Mr Sin wrote back by email to the Applicant informing her that the Appeal could be carried out in accordance with the procedures of SQS 5 (‘Human Resources’). He therefore submitted her formal Appeal to the Director of Social Services in accordance with SQS 5, and further informed the Applicant that the Appeal would be referred to the proper person-in-charge for follow up action. 21.On 20 May 2021, the Applicant then lodged a complaint to then Major Helina Chan. She informed Major Helina Chan that Ms Li and Mr Sin had failed to enforce disciplinary action in accordance with the SQS. 22.On 29 May 2021, Major Helina Chan wrote back to the Applicant and told her:
23.On 1 June 2021, the Applicant sent an email to Major Minny Chan regarding the Written Warning and what she said were Ms Li and Mr Sin’s failures to adhere to the SQS. The email set out the following particulars:
24.The Applicant then lodged a complaint, in respect of The Salvation Army’s failure to adhere to the SQS when conducting its disciplinary investigation and issuing the Written Warning, to the Lump Sum Grant (“LSG”) Independent Complaints Handling Committee (“ICHC”) on 16 June 2021 (“1st ICHC Complaint”). The LSG ICHC was set up in April 2009, and handles LSG-related complaints that cannot be satisfactorily addressed by non-governmental organisations (“NGOs”) subvented by the Social Welfare Department (“SWD”). 25.The 1st ICHC Complaint was made by the Applicant without waiting for the result of her Appeal against the Written Warning. In her 1st ICHC Complaint, the Applicant stated (in English translation):
26.The ICHC considered the Applicant’s 1st ICHC Complaint and informed the Applicant on 26 October 2021 (“1st ICHC Decision”) (in English translation):
27.On 26 November 2021, The Salvation Army issued a response to the ICHC regarding its 1st ICHC Decision. In the response, The Salvation Army explained its understanding, namely, that the phrase “包括” means “includes” and does not require each and every investigation to arrange interviews. Further, in the same response, The Salvation Army stated that its understanding was that every investigation depends on the individual circumstances of each case. Additionally, in this particular case, the objective documentary evidence was very clear and Mr Sin had conducted an interview meeting with the Applicant in accordance with the Guidelines. 28.On 14 December 2021, the ICHC responded to The Salvation Army’s response to the 1st ICHC Decision, and confirmed that the points were noted. 29.By way of an email dated 10 August 2022 from Mr Sin, the Applicant was informed (among other matters), as she was resuming her duties on 11 August 2022, that according to the Written Warning she needed to formulate and submit an improvement plan for remedying continuously ignoring her supervisor’s instructions, including complying with the supervision mechanism and submitting case records on time. 30.Between 11 and 31 August 2022, the Applicant communicated with members of staff at The Salvation Army. Within those communications, the Applicant expressed her shock and dismay that The Salvation Army had not followed up with the 1st ICHC Decision. 31.The Applicant wrote to the ICHC again seeking help regarding her situation (“2nd ICHC Complaint”). In the 2nd ICHC Complaint it was stated (in English translation):
32.On 31 August 2022, The Salvation Army through Ms Lau, replied to the applicant informing her (among other things), that the Applicant’s ICHC and EOC investigation results did not support the Applicant’s complaints:
33.On 28 November 2022 – it can be noted that this was after the Applicant’s employment had ended after her last contract extension expired without renewal on 30 September 2022 – the Appeal Decision was finalised and stated that the appeal was not justified and the result of the disciplinary action remains unchanged. The Appeal Decision set out the contents of the appeal and the grounds for non-justification of the appeal.
34.Subsequently, on 10 February 2023, the ICHC gave its decision regarding the Applicant’s 2nd ICHC Complaint (“2nd ICHC Decision”) (in English translation):
35.At different dates before and after the non-renewal of the Applicant’s fixed term contract, the Applicant also commenced proceedings in the Labour Tribunal (LBTC 2803/2022) and in the District Court for employees compensation (DCEC 376/2022). The Applicant also had an ongoing EOC claim against The Salvation Army. C. The Salvation Army C.1 Background 36.The Salvation Army is an international Christian church and charity working in 133 countries and areas, and has been serving Hong Kong for over 90 years since 1930, with the commitment of transforming, caring for people and making disciples. It is a large organisation which comprises Church ministries, social services, educational services, and charitable services. 37.The Salvation Army operates over 80 social services units, 36 schools and education centre, 17 corps (churches) and one outpost, and 15 family stores in Hong Kong and Macau. There are also offices in Yunnan and Sichuan Province for community development. 38.In 1951, the Hong Kong Legislative Council formally incorporated The Salvation Army as a statutory corporation for the purpose of having perpetual succession under the Salvation Army Ordinance Cap 1062 (“SAO”). 39.The SAO contains a handful of provisions:
40.There are no statutory provisions regulating The Salvation Army in respect of matters concerning employment contracts and internal performance appraisals and disciplinary conduct of employees/staff. C.2 Social Services of The Salvation Army 41.For the purpose of its social services, the Salvation Army receives subvention from the SWD. As already stated above, the SWD is the government department responsible for developing and co-ordinating welfare services in Hong Kong and provides subventions to NGOs. Since January 2001, the SWD operates on a LSG subvention system. The amount is provided on the NGO basis, pursuant to funding and service agreements. By giving a LSG to an NGO, it allows the NGO to have autonomy and flexibility in deployment of subvention resources to meet service needs. Unspent subvention can be accumulated in a reserve to meet future spending, up to 25%. 42.The SWD LSG subvention makes up around 65-68% of The Salvation Army’s social services budget, and the rest is covered by other funding sources and donations obtained elsewhere. To obtain such LSG subventions, NGOs such as The Salvation Army must enter into a funding service agreement (“FSA”) for each service that is provided. The Salvation Army has 52 FSAs drawn up to date. 43.Each FSA will include Output Standards, Outcome Standards, Essential Service Requirements, and the need to observe the 16 SQS as well as the need to follow the requirements laid down in the LSG Manual and Circulars. The NGOs are also required to adopt the best practice laid down in the Best Practice Manual developed by the LSG Steering Committee. 44.The SQS does not have any statutory underpinning. But it is set out as a guideline for SWD-subvented organisations to follow in their day-to-day operations, to enable effective use of LSGs. C.3 The LSG Manual 45.The Social Welfare Services LSG Manual dated October 2016 (“LSG Manual”) provides for how the SWD will administer the LSG. The purpose of the LSG Manual is to set out (a) the structure of LSG, the arrangements for Provident Fund provision and other related matters; (b) the financial management under LSG; (c) the respective management under LSG; and (d) advice on management practices and processes. Sub-paragraph (d) is meant for NGOs’ reference, and it is open to individual NGOs to adopt these as appropriate to fit their individual organisation. 46.Chapter 4 of the LSG Manual sets out the roles and responsibilities of SWD and NGOs and issues of public accountability and the authority of the Audit Commission. In particular, Chapter 4 provides:
47.In short, the SWD and the NGO (in this case The Salvation Army) are required to follow the LSG Manual and ensure that there is no mismanagement or mishandling of publicly granted LSG funds. C.4 The SQS Regime 48.While the SQS does not have any statutory underpinnings, NGOs are required to meet the requirements of the 16 SQS as set out in the relevant FSAs. 49.The SQS was developed according to four core principles, namely to:
50.The relevant SQS criteria, in the present application is SQS 5, which relates to principle (2) above, and which states:
51.To assist NGOs in implementing the SQS, the SWD issued the SQS Implementation Handbook (“Handbook”). The Handbook recommends (among other things) that the NGO (1) has policies and procedures accessible to staff in relation to employment contracts and disciplinary actions, (2) has a policy spelling out the mechanisms for supervision and regular performance appraisals, and (3) ensures that the policies, procedures and plans are implemented. 52.The Handbook expressly states that the guidelines in it were prepared to assist an NGO in developing procedures for taking disciplinary actions related to staff matters, and for use as a reference document. In its use of language, including the word ‘guidelines’ and ‘contents of procedures proposed’, it can be seen that the purpose of them is to guide, to assist, to recommend, to propose, to permit – but not to mandate. The Handbook states that the adoption of the guidelines is a matter for each NGO depending on their size and structure – obviously, there is no ‘one size fits all’ approach that can be adopted by every NGO. 53.The Handbook suggests the proposed content for disciplinary action policy and procedures, including specifying the criteria for action, the various disciplinary actions that may be taken (warning/dismissal), a process for administering disciplinary actions, appropriate levels of authority for disciplinary actions, an appeal or mechanism that can safeguard the improper use of disciplinary actions, and time limit on investigating and responding to the appeal. There is no requirement or mandate for any in-person meeting or oral hearing like a court or tribunal. 54.Put simply, the requirement for implementation and enforcement of SQS 5 is for each NGO, and The Salvation Army was broadly free to implement its own policies and procedures as it saw appropriate to its particular needs. C.5 The Salvation Army’s Implementation of SQS 5 55.The Salvation Army has established its own guidelines, i.e., Appendix 7 to SQS 5 of the Guidelines. 56.The policy aims of the Guidelines are to set out a fair procedure for dealing with violations and misbehaviour of employees. Its aim is to investigate allegations of misbehaviour or misconduct before disciplinary action is taken, and to allow employees to appeal if they disagree. 57.Under Appendix 7 to SQS 5 of the Guidelines:
58.Paragraph 3.7 deals with the procedures on appeal. C.6 The LSG Complaints Mechanism 59.The LSG ICHC was set up in April 2009. 60.The terms of reference of the ICHC are:
61.The ICHC has no coercive powers except to report its decisions and recommendations to relevant agencies to the Director of the SWD to assess whether or not further action is to be taken against the relevant service provider/agency. 62.I note in the (revised) February 2023 ICHC Mechanism for Handling Complaints it states that complaints about the handling of individual cases, or the performance or attitude of staff fall outside the ambit of the ICHC. D. Proposed Grounds of Review and Relief Sought 63.In her Form 86, the Applicant seeks an order of certiorari to dismiss the Appeal Decision and the Written Warning. 64.The proposed grounds set out in the Form 86 are:
E. Amenability to Judicial Review 65.The general principles regarding amenability are well settled, and are as follows:
66.In this regard, Andrew Cheung J (as the Chief Justice then was) summarised the relevant principles in Anderson Asphalt Ltd v Secretary for Justice [2009] 3 HKLRD 215 (upheld on appeal in [2010] 5 HKLRD 490) at §57:
67.From the relief and the proposed grounds set out by the Applicant, it seems there are two central issues from the Applicant’s perspective, namely (1) whether the internal disciplinary guidelines were properly followed; and (2) whether she was given a fair opportunity to refute the allegations made against her in the disciplinary proceedings (primarily on the basis that she was unaware of the ‘incidents’ referred to in the Written Warning). 68.It is plain that the true nature of the Applicant’s case is an employment dispute – i.e. whether she ought to have been disciplined in the course of her employment. This is an example of a private law matter which should not be resolved by the Court’s judicial review machinery, and the kind of complaint that is not amenable to judicial review. Reference can also be made to Greechan v States Employment Board [2023] JRC 116, a decision of the Jersey Royal Court, at §§20-35 where Sir Timothy Le Cocq, Bailiff, set out a thorough review of the principles relating to amenability to judicial review in relation to employment matters. 69.While it is true to say that employment matters are not automatically immune from judicial review – see, for example, my recent decision in Tong Wai Yee Winnie v Secretary for Education and Another [2022] HKCFI 1402 at §§134-135 – it seems to me that, in this case, the thrust of the Applicant’s claim is clearly based on an alleged breach of private law duties. The allegation is that The Salvation Army as employer has failed to properly follow its internal guidelines (which were based on a requirement of an FSA to implement SQS) and thereby failed to provide the Applicant with a fair opportunity to refute the allegations, which led to the taking of disciplinary action against her. At its core, the Applicant has not claimed that The Salvation Army has breached any duties of a public law nature. 70.I accept there are some public aspects concerning The Salvation Army, including that:
71.I also note the Applicant’s suggestion that the necessity to enter into the FSA and the corresponding obligation to comply with the SQS is not merely a matter of agreement between the Government and the supplanted organisation, nor a matter solely concerned with obtaining Government’s funding. Rather, the Applicant says, it is a mechanism by which the Director of Social Welfare seeks to discharge her role and responsibilities to ensure that the social welfare services provided by the sub printed organisations are meeting Government’s policy objectives and are held accountable not only to the Government but also to the public. 72.However, I disagree that those various matters which identify the presence of some public elements are of sufficient significance in the decision-making process as could turn an otherwise private law decision into a public law decision, amenable to judicial review. The nature of the functions that the decision-maker was performing when making the decision under challenge in this case is of crucial importance, and that nature here seems to me to be undoubtedly about a (private) employment/disciplinary matter. The Applicant is not an officeholder. Whilst The Salvation Army in part uses public funds, which is subject to supervision to ensure accountability as to their proper use, it is not itself a public body. Further, as reflected from the private employment nature of the matter, the Applicant has herself commenced various alternative claims seeking remedies arising out of that employment relationship. 73.Overall, I do not find that there are any sufficiently significant public elements in the decision-making process to turn this private employment dispute into a public one. Applying the settled principles, this case seeks to raise a private law matter not amenable to judicial review. On that basis, I refuse to grant leave to apply for judicial review. 74.In any event, irrespective of my views on amenability, I would have refused the application for leave on the merits, which I can now address. F. Merits of the Grounds F.1 1st Ground of Review: failure to follow Item 3.2 of the Guidelines 75.The Applicant alleges that The Salvation Army failed to follow the Guidelines in the provision of any personal interview or meeting for the Applicant so as to enable it to gain an understanding of the situation in the course investigation for disciplinary action. 76.Specifically, the Applicant alleges that The Salvation Army failed to follow Item 3.2 of the Guidelines. Though I have already set out that provision above, it can be usefully repeated here (in both Chinese and English). Item 3.2 states (emphasis added):
77.The language of Item 3.2 is sufficiently clear. The starting point is that these are guidelines. They are not fixed rules, and are not to be mechanistically deployed. The paragraph does not mandate that an interview or meeting take place in all investigations of disciplinary misconduct. It merely states that, amongst the steps that might be taken, and in the course of an investigation, and if he believes necessary properly to understand the situation, the superior can arrange for individual interviews or meetings to assist in the completion of his/her investigation report. 78.The reason for such flexibility and discretion is obvious. Every disciplinary investigation differs and the process of such an investigation would be dictated by its individual circumstances. I therefore do not find that the Salvation Army has arguably breached Item 3.2 of the Guidelines. 79.With respect to the 1st ICHC Decision, the real issue is not whether an interview or meeting took place (in accordance with the Guidelines), but whether the investigatory and disciplinary process undertaken was fair. That is linked to the proposed 2nd Ground. F.2 2nd Ground of Review: procedural unfairness 80.The Applicant contends that the disciplinary procedure adopted was unfair, because she was denied any chance clearly to understand The Salvation Army’s allegations towards her, thereby making it impossible for her to make explanation about such allegations. 81.While there is a constitutional guarantee for a fair trial or hearing in all criminal proceedings or civil suits, there is no common law right to be heard in the context of disciplinary proceedings nor does natural justice demand a right to be heard. Instead, the Courts’ main concerns are whether the process followed was fair. 82.The content of procedural fairness is flexible. It is not possible to lay down rigid rules, and everything depends on the subject-matter. The requirements depend upon the facts and the context in which a decision is taken, including the nature of the legal and administrative system within which the decision is taken. The requirements necessary to achieve fairness range from mere consultation at the lower end, upwards through an entitlement to make written representations, to make oral representations, and to a fully-fledged hearing with most of the characteristics of a judicial trial at the other extreme. What is required in any particular case is incapable of definition in abstract terms. As Lord Bridge has put it in Lloyd v McMahon [1987] AC 625 at 702:
83.The same was reiterated by Lord Mustill in R v Secretary for the Home Department Ex p Doody [1994] 1 AC 531 at 560, noting that what fairness requires is “essentially an intuitive judgment”. Amongst the points that can be made are:
84.It can be noted that these principles start from the consideration of where an administrative power is conferred by statute, but the general approach to fairness is helpful. 85.The Applicant claims that she was unaware of the allegations made against her in the Written Warning, and consequently she was deprived of a fair opportunity to refute those allegations. But, this is contradicted by the objective documentary evidence:
86.I make no comment on the merits of the disciplinary action taken, not least because – as the Applicant herself emphasises – that is not a matter which concerns the Court exercising its supervisory judicial review jurisdiction. But, on the numerous contemporaneous materials, it simply beggars belief that the Applicant was unaware of, or had no opportunity to address, those matters which ultimately led to the Written Warning. 87.Furthermore, the matter was further investigated by The Salvation Army’s Social Services Department, which conducted an extensive investigation in relation to the Applicant’s annual performance appraisal report and the Incidents, before the Written Warning was issued. 88.The Applicant was provided with multiple opportunities to address the Incidents (whether orally, at the 28 February 2020 interview or the 3 March 2020 Meeting, or in writing). It cannot be said that the procedure adopted by The Salvation Army was unfair. 89.Additionally, irrespective of whether the Applicant was or was not provided with an opportunity to refute the allegations which led to the Written Warning, she had an opportunity on appeal to make representations to refute the Incidents and/or to clarify any allegations or incorrect statements in the Written Warning. One of the very purposes of the appeal mechanism was to cater to a complaint that the original disciplinary decision was taken improperly, and to safeguard against the improper use of disciplinary actions. It cannot be said that the Applicant was treated unfairly. In fact, the procedures put in place provided more than adequate protection to the Applicant, ensuring disciplinary proceedings were not misused and that the result could be challenged where cause could be shown. 90.In light of the above, the Applicant has failed to demonstrate that the disciplinary investigation or appeal process arguably involved any procedural unfairness. 91.The application for leave is unmeritorious. G. Promptness, Academic/Moot & Failure to Exhaust Alternative Remedies 92.For the sake of completeness, I also deal with The Salvation Army’s complaints that the Applicant had not filed her application for leave to apply for judicial review promptly, that a review would be academic or moot, and that the Applicant failed to exhaust alternative remedies. 93.The Salvation Army complains that there is delay in the commencement of proceedings, and that the Applicant waited until the 11th hour (the last possible day) to file her judicial review. 94.The Applicant, in reply, explained the reason for the timing of filing was because she was acting in person and not legal represented. Therefore, she needed time to learn and understand the procedure for commencing the present application and to prepare the relevant documents. 95.In light of the explanations, and given the application was made within the three month period, lack of promptness would not of itself have been fatal to the present application. Furthermore, no particular hardship, prejudice or detriment has been suffered by The Salvation Army arising from the timing. 96.Contrary to the view expressed in the evidence filed on behalf of The Salvation Army, the fact that the Applicant is no longer employed by The Salvation Army probably does not render the dispute as academic. But, the present application might be regarded as moot in the sense that there is no public element which would provide useful guidance for future cases – though this is really the same point as arises on the question of amenability to review. 97.Lastly, The Salvation Army contends that the Applicant had not exhausted all available and effective alternative remedies, because the Applicant could have submitted a further complaint to the ICHC regarding the Appeal decision. But, I am of the view that the Applicant had exhausted all available and effective remedies as The Salvation Army could disregard any decision from the ICHC. Hence, the present application was not inappropriate or premature on that basis. 98.I have, however, also already touched on the point that the Applicant has pursued various alternative remedies in the Labour Tribunal, the District Court, and in EOC proceedings. The availability of those alternative remedies only tends to emphasise the private (as opposed to public) nature of the matters giving rise to the complaint, and the pursuit of those available alternative remedies would likely itself point strongly against the necessity or aptness of an application for leave to apply for judicial review. H. Conclusion 99.The intended challenge is to a private law decision or decisions taken within the context of employment, with no sufficient public law connection to make it or them amenable to judicial review. In any event, the Applicant has failed to identify any reasonably arguable grounds of review with any reasonable prospect of success. 100.In those circumstances, the application for leave to apply for judicial review is dismissed. 101.My preliminary view is that costs should follow the event. However, I shall deal with the question of costs – including any claim to summary assessment – on paper submissions. The Salvation Army shall have until 3 January 2024 to file its submissions, and the Applicant shall have until 17 January 2024 to file her submissions. Unless I otherwise order, there will be no further submissions, and I shall simply proceed to deal with the matter of costs on the papers.
K.B. Chau & Co., for the applicant Kennedys, for the putative respondent | |||||||||||||||||||||
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