Beijing Songxianghu Architectural Decoration Engineering Co., Ltd v. Kitty Kam also known as Wang Yuzhi
Read the full judgment text of HCA 1289/2022 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 30 May 2024.
1. In this action, the Plaintiff claims against the Defendant (“ Kam ”) in respect of 2 sums, namely HK$220,548,682 (“ Sum A ”) and HK$32,500,000 (“ Sum B ”), for fraud, dishonest assistance and conspiracy to injure by unlawful means.
Cited by 3 cases · Cites 3 cases
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HCA 1289/2022 [2024] HKCFI 1658 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE ACTION NO 1289 OF 2022 ______________ BETWEEN
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__________________________________ REASONS FOR DECISION __________________________________ 1.In this action, the Plaintiff claims against the Defendant (“Kam”) in respect of 2 sums, namely HK$220,548,682 (“Sum A”) and HK$32,500,000 (“Sum B”), for fraud, dishonest assistance and conspiracy to injure by unlawful means. 2.Before me for substantive hearing and determination was Kam’s summons dated 20 November 2023 seeking an order that
The scope, basis and issues in this striking out 3.In the 5th Affirmation of Kam (“Kam 5th”)[1] filed in support of her striking out application consisting of 45 pages, she raised and elaborated on 8 points under section C thereof, which contain more submissions than disposition of facts, arguing that the Plaintiff’s allegations of fraud against her are without proper basis. To give some flavour of what the 8 points she raised are, I will set out their titles:
4.However, the issue of whether the Plaintiff has a good arguable case of fraud against Kam, among other issues, in fact has already been hotly contested and adjudicated in the Plaintiff’s application for the Mareva Injunction heard on 12 January 2023 before A Chan J when Kam appeared by Mr Manzoni SC (“the Mareva Application”). The learned Judge handed down his Decision the next day on 13 January 2023 by which he held in favour of the Plaintiff on that and other issues and granted the Mareva Injunction (“the Mareva Decision”). 5.Kam did not appeal against the Mareva Decision. 6.In his written submissions dated 28 May 2024, Mr Lam SC (leading Ms Ho and Ms Sat), counsel for the Plaintiff, submitted extensively that all these issues so raised in Kam 5th have been considered and adjudicated by A Chan J in the Mareva Decision, and therefore it was a blatant abuse of process (under Henderson v Henderson principle) for Kam to re-argue now that the Plaintiff’s claim is bound to fail. 7.Mr Lam submitted that the striking out should be refused on the basis of abuse of process alone, but that in any case, this is obviously not a proper case for striking out. 8.In the written submissions dated 27 May 2024 lodged by Mr Chain SC (leading Mr Cheng and Mr Sim), counsel for Kam, it was for the first time indicated that the scope and basis relied on for the striking out were much more limited. Instead of what was asked for in the summons, Kam now seeks:
9.Mr Lam SC registered a complaint over such last-minute change in the scope and basis, but was prepared to proceed with the hearing on the basis of Kam’s present stance. 10.In Kam’s written submission and her reply skeleton submissions dated 29 May 2024, the one matter that Kam said has now been indisputably proved justifying the striking out of the claim for Sum A was that under Cayman Islands law the Plaintiff in fact has acquired an interest as a limited partner in SSI (defined below)(“the Contractual Fulfilment Point”), points C2 to C8 as raised in Kam 5th were no longer referred to and relied on, and the Henderson abuse point as raised by Mr Lam in respect of points C2 to C8 was also not addressed to directly. 11.Such being the parties’ latest stances, this Court enquired at the hearing and Mr Chain accepted, in my view rightly and sensibly, that since the Plaintiff’s case of fraud over Sum A has been adjudged by A Chan J as having reached the threshold of “good arguable case”, it would mean that the claim has been adjudged to be “more than barely capable of serious argument, and yet not necessarily one that the judge believes to have a better than 50% chance of success”[2], and that such level of merits of the claim logically speaking is one that has already overcome the “bound to fail” threshold. 12.Mr Chain also confirmed that Kam was not seeking now to re-argue the matters canvassed in the Mareva Application. Mr Chain said that there was now a material change of circumstances in that there has been available since the Mareva Decision “undisputed evidence” not placed before A Chan J proving the Contractual Fulfilment Point, which would show or lead to the result that the Plaintiff’s claim over Sum A would be bound to fail. 13.Mr Lam initially contended that there was no real material change of circumstances in that the so-called “undisputed evidence” by way of Cayman Islands law expert reports could have been, but were not, proffered in the Mareva Application. In the course of the hearing, Mr Lam did not further pursue that contention. 14.With such narrowing of scope and basis of the striking out, the abuse of process point raised by the Plaintiff and the other 7 points raised in Kam’s 5th (ie. points C2 to C8) were no longer in issue in this application. Dismissing the striking out application and withdrawal of the application to discharge the Mareva Injunction 15.At the conclusion of the hearing for the striking out and before hearing the application to discharge the Mareva Injunction, I announced my decision dismissing the striking out application and indicated that written reasons would be provided. 16.After a short adjournment, Kam sought leave to withdraw her application to discharge the Mareva Injunction, which leave was granted and that application was withdrawn. 17.Mr Chain did not dispute that costs should follow the event regarding the striking out and that Kam should also pay the costs of the withdrawn application to discharge the Mareva Injunction. The question outstanding was whether such costs should be taxed on an indemnity basis, as the Plaintiff asked. As discussed with counsel, this Court would indicate its provisional view thereon by way of an order nisi in these Reasons. The applicable principles 18.The principles applicable to striking out are trite and not controversial. However, they bear repeating in the circumstances of the present case. 19.Striking out is an exercise of summary powers only for plain and obvious cases. One must be careful not to summarily drive a plaintiff from the judgment seat. Before the court will strike out a claim for being frivolous, it must be shown that the claim is impossible, not just improbable, to succeed and is bound to fail or can have no prospect of success or is obviously unsustainable. The mere fact that the case is weak and not likely to succeed does not suffice to merit a striking out. The burden is on the party seeking to strike out to prove so. The threshold is a high one. 20.Mr Chain relied on the principle, which is trite and was not disputed, that where fraud is being alleged, the court will not allow allegations of such nature to be made without proper evidence and if they were made irresponsibly, it will exercise its inherent jurisdiction to strike out the same (Chinachem Charitable Foundation Ltd v Chan Wai Tong Christopher [2022] HKCA 1907 §6). 21.Mr Chain also placed reliance on Polyline Development Ltd v Ching Lin Luen [2021] HKCFI 483 (§§69, 76 and 77) to support a proposition that where a striking out application is taken out against a statement of claim alleging fraud, the court must take an overall view of the statement of claim to identify what is the real complaint and then decide whether it is sustainable. 22.I do not accept that Mr Recorder Manzoni SC laid down such a general proposition in that case. There, the learned Recorder was dealing with a statement of claim that he found could be described as “kitchen sink” - containing every possible cause of action that the pleader could think of. And in view of the transactions and particular set of factual and legal allegations before him, the learned Recorder approached his analysis by, among others, sorting out and identifying what the “real complaint” was. I have no doubt that, where it is appropriate to the case, such an approach may be adopted as a useful analytical process or tool. But the crux of the matter in the present case, I think, is how Mr Chain sought to force the Plaintiff’s claim herein from what it is expressed to be in the Statement of Claim into what Kam considered to be “the real complaint”. I will have to say more about this in due course. Background and the factual setting 23.The relevant background and factual setting were lucidly summarized by A Chan J in the Mareva Decision. I gratefully adopt the same, including the abbreviations used :
The Plaintiff’s case of fraud, and matters it relied on in the Mareva Application 24.The Plaintiff’s case pleaded in its Statement of Claim filed on 17 November 2022 is that Kam together with SSGI carried out a fraudulent scheme to deprive P of Sum A and Sum B[3]. 25.It was pleaded that Sum A and Sum B were transferred to Kam in reliance of certain oral representations made by Kam :
26.It was then pleaded that the First and Second Oral Representations were false and were made fraudulently in that :
27.The following further matters were deposed to in the affirmation evidence filed by the Plaintiff and relied on by it in the Mareva Application:
Kam’s case presented in the Mareva Application 28.Kam said that the Plaintiff was regretting the investment and was trying to extricate itself from it before maturity. Kam raised a number of disputes by way of defence in the Mareva Application which were summarized in §§42 to 49 of the Mareva Decision. 29.As the only contention raised by Kam’s for this striking out is the Contractual Fulfilment Point, I therefore do not think it necessary here to go into the other matters Kam disputed or alleged by way of defence. Suffice it to mention that those disputes should be resolved at trial, but I have borne those disputes in mind as backdrops to this application. The Mareva Decision 30.For the present purpose, I think it pertinent to recap the gist of the Mareva Decision concerning whether a good arguable case was shown, as follows. 31.In §§56 to 61 of the Mareva Decision, the learned Judge observed that there were a number of unusual features of Kam’s case, which “are indeed telling”, including (a) SSI purported to be a multi-million dollar investment vehicle managed by SSGI, there was no sign that SSI or SSGI has any staff, (b) neither Kam nor SSGI behaved in a manner consistent with a normal and honest investment provider in that they refused to provide a fully executed copy of the Partnership Agreement to the Plaintiff as soon as practicable after having received a huge sum from it and they continuously refused to tell the Plaintiff what has happened to the money and its whereabouts, (c) Kam made vague references to an investment in a 15-year Cayman fund without any explanation or a shred of evidence. 32.The learned Judge then analysed the principal factual controversies and contentions, including (a) whether Wang had met with Kam prior to the payment of Sum A (Wang said they did and Kam said they did not), (b) that correspondences showed that Kam steadfastly refused to tell the Plaintiff what had happened to its money, (c) the parties’ respective case over the 2022 Maples Register, (d) the Plaintiff’s case regarding the circumstances relating to the payment of Sum B was to an extent corroborated by certain WeChat messages, (d) the credibility of Wang’s evidence and (e) Kam’s contention that any breach should be determined by arbitration. 33.The learned Judge also made reference to the Plaintiff’s reliance on certain evasive conducts of Kam after the present action was commenced (see §36-41 of the Mareva Decision), which conducts the learned Judge described as “gamesmanship” (and an indemnity costs order dated 11 November 2022 has been made to mark the disapproval). 34.The learned Judge also considered the Plaintiff’s point, which he described as powerful, that if the Plaintiff’s money was legitimately invested, Kam and SSGI would have been most forthcoming to dispel any misunderstanding or suspicion on the Plaintiff’s part that it has been cheated by simply showing to the Plaintiff the Register of SSI and information on where the money was invested and was held. The learned Judge further observed that the point could be taken further in that if such information was provided it would be a complete answer to the Mareva Application and there would be no need for Kam to incur huge costs in defending these proceedings. 35.The learned Judge then concluded in §74 that he was quite satisfied that there was a good arguable case of fraud against Kam. Disclosures made by Kam after the Mareva Decision 36.In compliance with the Disclosure Order made by A Chan J on 13 January 2023 ordering Kam to disclose the whereabouts of Sum A and Sum B, Kam disclosed that HK$170,962,682 of Sum A was kept in a bank account held in Kam’s personal name at Standard Chartered Bank Singapore Limited (account no: 631XXX) and that the balance of Sum A, namely HK$49,586,000, has been applied as management fee paid by SSI to SSGI but Kam stated that the same would in due course be transferred back into and would remain at the same account at Standard Chartered Bank Singapore. As Kam’s case was that she has no knowledge of and did not receive Sum B, there was no disclosure on it. No further information was disclosed by Kam. 37.I note that Kam has not fully complied with the Disclosure Order as she failed to disclose the whereabouts of the said balance of HK$49,586,000. Further, there was no explanation or any detail whatsoever given relating to the purported charging of “management fee” of HK$49,586,000 by SSGI and payment to it by SSI. There were further complaints by the Plaintiff that Kam has not fully complied in other respects. I do not think I need to go into them here. 38.Upon the Plaintiff’s direct enquiry with Standard Chartered Bank Singapore shortly after Kam’s said disclosure, it was discovered that there was no account identified by the said number “631XXX”. Upon further enquiry with Kam’s solicitors, it was only then said that the actual account number was in fact “652756XXXX” and “631XXX” was the client number. 39.Then weeks later on 24 February 2023, Kam disclosed a very heavily redacted bank statement of the above-mentioned Singaporean account in her name which showed that HK$170,962,700 and another sum of US$6,300,000 (equivalent to HK$49,140,000) were kept in that account. There was no further information or explanation given. “Undisputable evidence” proving that the Plaintiff had acquired an interest in SSI ? 40.Kam now says that considering the Cayman Islands law expert reports proffered by the parties and based on undisputed facts, it is indisputably proved that the Plaintiff had acquired an interest in SSI under Cayman Islands law. 41.In this application, the parties have proffered the following expert reports on Cayman Islands law:
42.Mr Chain submitted that
43.Mr Lam submitted that there were clearly disputes. Among others, Conyers opined that[7]
44.Therefore, it seems to me that there is no substantial conflict between the respective experts on the law and it is common ground between the parties that whether the Plaintiff has actually acquired an interest in SSI would depend on whether SSGI had accepted the Plaintiff as a limited partner of SSI. 45.The dispute is on the application of the law. Kam now contends that receiving Sum A and taking away the LP Agreements signed by Wang by Kam on 15 December 2019 amounted to sufficient act or indication of acceptance on the part of SSGI. While the Plaintiff contends that the 2022 Maples Register, as a prima facie evidence as provided by the ELPA did not show that the Plaintiff was a limited partner, nor was there any objective facts showing that the Plaintiff has been in any way from December 2019 to date been treated as a limited partner. Thus, the parties are each relying on a different set of acts/conducts/factors as proving or showing that SSGI had or had not accepted the Plaintiff as a limited partner. 46.Mr Chain submitted effectively that the opinion and conclusion of Walkers were definitive. On the present materials and in the context of this application, I do not think I can come to that conclusion. 47.As it is not disputed that (a) the 2022 Maples Register did not show the Plaintiff as a limited partner of SSI, (b) the entitlements of a limited partner under clauses 5.2 and 2.7 and (c) the Plaintiff has not been given or received any of these entitlements in all these times, I take the view that Conyers’ such opinion and the Plaintiff’s such contention are at least arguable. 48.I accept Mr Lam’s submission that the parties’ disputes surrounding the 2022 Maples Register and/or whether SSGI in fact had maintained its own Register and that it had in or around January 2020 caused the Plaintiff to be registered as a limited partner in that Register allegedly maintained by SSGI (as alleged in the substantially amended §6(10) of the Amended Defence and not earlier) are matters material for deciding whether the Plaintiff has in fact acquired the interest, and that they are matters for trial. 49.It therefore seems to me very clear that whether SSGI had in fact accepted the Plaintiff as a limited partner of SSI is a question that could not be resolved in the context of a striking out application and is a matter for trial. I thus hold that Kam has not shown to be indisputable that the Plaintiff had indeed acquired an interest in SSI. Was the Plaintiff entitled to refer the Court to its draft Amended Statement of Claim to resist this striking out? 50.About 2 months after Kam issued the present summons on 20 November 2023, the Plaintiff issued a summons dated 30 January 2024 to apply for leave to amend the Statement of Claim (“the Amendment Summons”). 51.The Plaintiff seeks to add the following averments by the draft Amended Statement of Claim ;
52.It is trite that
53.The Plaintiff has been seeking to have the Amendment Summons to be heard together with the present summons, but such course was refused by Kam, and a separate set of directions for filing of evidence and then fixing a hearing date was given for the Amendment Summons. 54.Mr Lam asked the striking out be considered on the facts and matters intended to be pleaded in the draft Amended Statement of Claim. 55.Mr Chain asked that this Court “must be vigilant towards any attempt by P to unjustifiably muddy the waters”[8], and that the Plaintiff was not entitled to refer to or rely on the draft because, according to him, the Plaintiff has made a prior and unequivocal election and indication that the intended amendment would not be so relied on. 56.Upon examination and with respect to Mr Chain, such assertion that the Plaintiff had so elected and indicated is completely without basis, and was based on mis-quoting completely out of context part of the Plaintiff’s solicitors’ letter dated 8 April 2024 (“P’s Letter”)[9], thus :
57.P’s Letter was written in response to Kam’s solicitors’ letter dated 2 April 2024, which, however, is not included in the hearing bundles. To show context, I would quote P’s Letter from the beginning up to the relevant part:
58.Thus, it is abundantly clear that in P’s Letter, it was only said that Kam’s argument was irrelevant in that Kam argued that she need more time to file the reply affirmation for the striking out because of the alleged “implication of the intended amendments”; and it was only further emphasized that the 2 sets of affirmation evidence should confine themselves to the respective applications for which a particular affirmation was filed, which was of course the proper course to take. 59.I therefore completely rejected this totally groundless assertion that the Plaintiff has so unequivocally elected. 60.Moreover and it can be recalled, at the time the Plaintiff filed the Statement of Claim on 17 November 2022, it has, after much fruitless chasing for a long time, finally received a copy of the allegedly executed Partnership Agreement under cover of Kam’s solicitors’ letter dated 27 June 2022 and no or little meaningful information concerning what had become of the money and concerning the operation of SSI was, up to that point, given to the Plaintiff despite its repeated requests. Limited information was then obtained by the Plaintiff through a Norwich Pharmacal Order against Chiyu Bank and the Disclosure Order granted by A Chan J against Kam. 61.As I set out above, the intended amendments by and large sought to plead matters that occurred or became known to the Plaintiff after the Statement of Claim was filed and to align the Plaintiff’s pleaded case in light of the discovery of those matters. 62.In my view, quite apart from the fact that it was expedient and convenient to consider the striking out on the basis of the draft amendment, it would, in the circumstances of this case, be unjust and wrong not to allow the Plaintiff to refer to and rely on the draft amendment in this application. 63.For these reasons, at the hearing I ruled that the Plaintiff was entitled to refer to and rely on the proposed amendments to the Statement of Claim. Clearly not a case for striking out 64.By reason of my views and holdings set out in paragraphs 44-49 above, Kam’s striking out application would fail in limine. 65.At the hearing, I have invited Mr Lam to address me on the assumption, taking Kam’s case at its highest, that it was shown that the Plaintiff has actually acquired an interest in SSI. And in case I am wrong regarding my said views and holdings in paragraphs 44-49 above, I would also refuse Kam’s striking out application for the following reasons. 66.Mr Chain argued that “the real complaint and real essence” [10] and “main complaint”[11] of P’s alleged claim in fraud for Sum A was that it never received an interest in SSI, and it being shown indisputably that the Plaintiff has acquired an interest in SSI, the Plaintiff thus has obtained exactly what it bargained for under the LP Agreements, there would be no falsity and therefore no fraud[12], and the Plaintiff would have no grounds for complaint as against Kam personally[13]. 67.With respect, such an argument is clearly untenable, and is premised on Kam’s own unilateral and asserted interpretation of the Plaintiff’s claim of fraud in relation to Sum A made under the guise of identifying “the real complaint” in purported reliance on Polyline Development Ltd v Ching Lin Luen. 68.The Plaintiff’s claim in respect of Sum A is set out in the Statement of Claim, which is straight forward. 69.As alluded to above, the Plaintiff’s case of fraud in respect of Sum A pleaded in the Statement of Claim is that Sum A was paid into the Chiyu Account to Kam as a result and in reliance of the First Oral Representations, which are false and made with fraudulent intent, and the representation that the Plaintiff would acquire an interest in SSI was but only one of the 4 representations pleaded in §8(1) of the Statement of Claim. In this regard, I must reject Kam’s contention that this is the “real complaint” of the Plaintiff, with the attendant alleged consequence that the Court should ignore, or treat as in any way insignificant, the Plaintiff’s claim in relation to the other representations and their alleged falsity. 70.The other 2 representations that the Plaintiff now alleges having been made by Kam and are false are (a) “The new fund would invest in newly developed real estate properties in, inter alia, London, Japan and Australia” (§8(1)(a) of the Statement of Claim) and (b) “The Defendant would provide information about the investment after the signing of the relevant agreements” (§8(1)(d) of the Statement of Claim). It is not the Plaintiff’s case, nor Kam’s, that the Plaintiff’s claim in relation to these 2 representations would rise or fall together with that in relation to the representation that the Plaintiff would acquire an interest in SSI. 71.There is thus no basis or any reason in support of the contention that if the Plaintiff had in fact acquired an interest in SSI, then there would be no falsity regarding the other representations pleaded in §8(1) of the Statement of Claim or that there would be no fraud. 72.Looking at this from another angle, even if the Plaintiff has a good cause of action to sue SSI and/or SSGI (and for argument’s sake, even Kam herself) for breach of the LP Agreements, as a matter of principle, the Plaintiff is not necessarily thereby precluded from suing Kam for fraud where there are further and additional materials and evidence justifying it. 73.As have mentioned, A Chan J have considered those further and additional matters and evidence and held that the Plaintiff has a good arguable case of fraud against Kam. I respectfully agree with the learned Judge’s assessment and conclusion. 74.The bare and uncontested facts remain that (a) since the Plaintiff paid over Sum A, SSI has not invested in any real estate properties in London, Japan, Australia or anywhere, and (b) Kam/SSGI/SSI have not provided to the Plaintiff any real information about the investment. 75.Moreover, as confirmed by Mr Chain upon this Court’s enquiry, despite SSI being a multi-million dollar investment vehicle and SSGI its manager and HK$49,586,000 allegedly having been charged by SSGI as management fee, thus far (ie since late 2019 to date) there is no evidence indicating that any account of whatever sort or nature has been prepared by Kam/SSGI/SSI regarding the operation, assets and investments of SSI. 76.I further accept Mr Lam’s submission that the arguably defective and very limited nature of the disclosure provided by Kam in purported compliance with the Disclosure Order and the further information so disclosed regarding the whereabouts of the money, limited though it is, are additional matters that arguably fortified the Plaintiff’s case of fraud. 77.Kam may have good explanations or defence to all of the above mentioned matters, but all these are to be resolved at trial. 78.Regarding Kam’s application to strike out the Plaintiff’s claim for dishonest assistance as disclosing no reasonable cause of action, as Sum A might on one view be regarded as having been received by SSI and managed by SSGI and the Plaintiff’s case is that Kam was in de facto control of SSGI and SSI and that they schemed together in the fraud, I find the further and alternative claim against Kam of dishonestly assisting SSGI and SSI, as pleaded in §§22 and 23 of the Statement of Claim, a sustainable alternative claim and ought not be struck out. 79.For the reasons expressed above, it was in my view very clear that it has not been shown that the Plaintiff’s claim in respect of Sum A and Kam’s dishonest assistance should be struck out. I thus dismissed Kam’s striking out application. Order indemnity costs on nisi basis 80.My provisional view is that this application for striking out is clearly without basis and unmeritorious, that Kam 5th was unreasonable in length and in seeking to present arguments rather than facts and arguing as if this were a trial over those issues, but which eventually were abandoned save but one point, that the resistance against allowing the Plaintiff to refer to the draft amendment is totally unreasonable and unmeritorious, and the application to seek to discharge the Mareva Injunction was based on or consequential upon similar arguments. In the round and provisionally, I consider it clearly appropriate to order Kam to pay the costs of her summons to be taxed on an indemnity basis. I also certify for 2 counsel. I so order on nisi basis which will become absolute in 21 days unless any party applies by summons to vary within that time. The other outstanding summonses 81.As I indicated to the parties at the outset of the hearing, there was a clear need to manage robustly the outstanding summonses which include (a) the Amendment Summons, (b) the Plaintiff’s summons dated 8 February 2024 for a proprietary injunction, disclosure and repatriation of the money (“the Proprietary Injunction Summons”), and (c) the Plaintiff’s summons dated 29 February 2024 for this striking out and discharge application and the other outstanding applications to be heard together with similar applications made in a related proceedings before the same Judge (“the Heard Together Summons”). 82.At the end of the hearing and with the parties’ input and consent, leave was granted to withdraw the Heard Together Summons with costs of and incidental thereto be made costs in the cause, and directions were given to file evidence in relation to the Proprietary Injunction Summons and to have the same heard together substantively with the Amendment Summons before this Court on 9 August 2024. 83.Kam should take into consideration this Court’s observations above concerning the proposed amendment to the Statement of Claim in relation to her intended opposition against the Amendment Summons. 84.Lastly, I thank Mr Lam, Mr Chain and their junior counsel for their assistance.
Mr Douglas LAM SC leading Ms Sabrina HO and Ms Sakinah SAT, instructed by PC Woo & Co, for the Plaintiff Mr Christopher CHAIN SC leading Mr Jing En SIM, instructed by Latham & Watkins LLP, for the Defendant [1] A1/224 - 268 [2] See §29/1/66 Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2024 and the cases there cited [3] §3 at p.A1/2 [4] B3/628-650 [5] B7/1449 – 1476, enclosures thereto B7/1477 – B8/1743 [6] B7/1404 - 1432 [7] §§78 to 86 of Conyers 2nd at B7/1426 -1428 [8] §3 of his written submissions [9] B8/1761 [10] §9 and 11.3 of Kam’s written submissions [11] §21.5 of Kam’s written submissions [12] §13 of Kam’s written submissions [13] §11.2 of Kam’s written submissions | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
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