Noah Technology Corporation v. Wsl Co Ltd
Read the full judgment text of DCCJ 5425/2021 on BabelCite. This District Court judgment was delivered on 2 August 2024.
1. On the first day of trial of this action, ie 16 July 2024, D was absent.
Cites 5 cases
|
DCCJ 5425/2021 [2024] HKDC 1190 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION CIVIL ACTION NO 5425 OF 2021 ---------------------------------------
---------------------------------------
--------------------------------------- REASONS FOR JUDGMENT --------------------------------------- 1.On the first day of trial of this action, ie 16 July 2024, D was absent. 2.D’s former solicitors obtained an order on 8 May 2024 to cease to act for D and D was absent at the PTR on 13 May 2024 as well. 3.P has filed 2 affirmations of service: one deposing to service of the Order made at the PTR and the other of the trial bundle and P’s Opening Submissions. I am satisfied that those documents were duly served, and that D was made aware of the trial date, as such I proceeded with the trial. 4.P called its 2 factual witnesses, both of whom adopted their written statements, the contents of which support P’s pleaded case. 5.At the conclusion of P’s case I gave the following judgment :-
6.Here are my reasons. P’s Case 7.P’s factual case is very straightforward and rather typical of email frauds:-
8.P started the present action on 25 November 2021 and obtained a proprietary injunction on the Sum on 10 December 2021. 9.P seeks recovery of the Sum, primarily on the basis of a constructive trust claim. D’s Defence 10.D in its Defence filed on 23 February 2022 admitted to receipt of the Sum on 26 May 2021, but raised 2 defences:-
Analysis 11.D has only pleaded non-admissions to P’s factual case on being defrauded, however stringing through D’s defence is the factual case that it received the Sum as a result of a legitimate sale and purchase transaction, for which it had procured supply of goods downstream. 12.Evidentially, while P’s witnesses have come to adopt their evidence in their respective witness statement, D’s witness has not. 13.I see no reason not to accept the truthfulness of P’s witnesses as well as the authenticity of the documents pertaining to the fraudster’s emails. I find that P had indeed been defrauded into transferring the Sum to D’s A/C. 14.The question is thus whether there was such a sale and purchase transaction, both upstream through Marcos and downstream with its own supplier, that could ground the defences D has pleaded, both factually and legally. 15.Firstly, as to the bona fide recipient defence, as correctly submitted by Mr. Chiu, counsel for P, this defence is not available between direct parties of payment, ie P and D (see Nelson Martayan v Hancheng Industrial Co Ltd [2022] HKDC 1400 at §§31-34). 16.Hence, even if D genuinely believed that it was transacting with Marcos acting for P, it cannot avail itself of this defence as a matter of law. 17.Secondly, as to the change of position defence, in short, the evidence before me falls short of establishing the necessary linkage with the upstream transaction with Marcos:-
18.As such, as a matter of fact and logic, D cannot begin to show that it had changed its position (ie incurred expenses/liability to pay its downstream supplier in this case) as a matter of “but-for” causation, not to mention in detrimental reliance of its transaction with Marcos. The present case is no different from the scenario in Kaefer AG v Winfield Marine Services Co Ltd [2022] HKCA 807 (see §46 thereof). 19.In conclusion, I reject both of D’s defences and it has no basis to retain the Sum. Reliefs 20.As to the proprietary claim based on constructive trust, the following summary of the relevant principles are apt (see HongKong Windmode Sports Equipment Co Ltd v HK Haolong Industrial Ltd [2024] HKDC 875 at §§29-31) :-
21.D in the present case, by the latest, must have come to the requisite knowledge by the time the specifically endorsed Writ was served, and by that time the Sum had already been frozen in D’s A/C. 22.Further, on evidence, the Sum has remained frozen in D’s A/C firstly by the Hong Kong Police and then by the Court and hence remains available and identifiable to be made a subject of proprietary relief. 23.I therefore gave the declaratory relief to that effect and also granted order for accounts and inquiries to enable P to trace and recover the Sum or what becomes of it further downstream. 24.It follows also that the Sum has to be returned to P and so I ordered. 25.On to the mechanism of bringing the above reliefs into actual effect, ie transferring the Sum from D’s A/C to P, P seeks an order under s. 38A of the District Court Ordinance (DCO) that a person be nominated to execute necessary documents to cause a transfer of the Sum to P. This section provides for a scenario where a party fails to execute documents to effectuate what the Court has ordered and what the Court may order after such a scenario has arisen. 26.Mr. Chiu further referred to O.48, r.5 of the RDC and relied on §45/8/1 of HKCP 2024 Vol 1 and the case of Pacific Electric Wire & Cable Co Ltd v Taxan Management Ltd (unrep, HCA 2230, 2746 & 2736/2004) for the submission that in appropriate circumstances an order under O.45, r.5 in relation to enforcing a mandatory order may be given before an act of disobedience, where there is evidence upon which the Court may reasonably anticipate disobedience. 27.I accepted that in order to give effect to the reliefs, which included an order to transfer the Sum in D’s A/C to P, both s.38A of the DCO and O.48, r.5 of the RDC could be engaged: the latter covers enforcing a “mandatory order”, in this case the order to return the Sum to P, and the former covers a necessary step in performing such a “mandatory order”, in this case the execution of transfer instructions/documents with the bank. 28.In the circumstances of the present case, I am also satisfied that there is basis for me to reasonably anticipate disobedience on the part of D: it has since the PTR been absent at all Court hearings despite due notice and knowledge of the hearing dates (through its legal representative when it was represented no less) hence it is highly unlikely that it would somehow re-emerge to cooperate in giving effect to the judgment and order I gave. 29.I therefore gave the order sought, nominating a partner of P’s solicitors to have authority to effect a transfer of the Sum from D’s A/C to P. 30.One slight modification required came about from the letter of the Hong Kong Police, which named another account number when stating that the Sum was frozen, i.e. no. 801298696201. For prudence, this account is also specified in the order made, in addition to D’s A/C. Interests and Costs 31.After giving the above judgment and order, I was informed that P by letter dated 17 November 2022 made a Sanctioned Offer to D for settling the claim for a sum slightly less than the Sum. By the last day on which this offer could have been accepted without leave, i.e. 15 December 2022, D had not accepted the same. 32.On the above basis, P seeks indemnity costs and enhanced interest from 16 December 2022 onwards, as well as enhanced interest on such indemnity costs. 33.Per O.22, r.24 RDC, the Court will order costs on indemnity basis and give enhanced interest unless it is unjust to do so. 34.As explained in Grupo Pacifica Incorporada v Worldwide Marine Product Ltd. & Ors [2018] HKCFI 2584 at §§8-9, the Court is required to look at all the circumstances of the case, including, inter alia, the information available to the parties at the time of the offer and parties’ conduct. 35.In the present case, the following features in my view justified indemnity costs and enhanced interest of 10% on top of judgment rate (on the Sum and indemnity costs):-
36.For all of the above reasons, I gave the judgment and order as recited in §5 above. 37.I thank Mr Chiu for his assistance.
Mr. Byron Chiu instructed by Messrs Fred Kan & Co. for the plaintiff The Defendant, acting in person and absent | ||||||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment