Celis Leonora Sacor v. Director of Immigration

Case No.HCAL 965/2024[2024] HKCFI 2281

Court

High Court CFI

Date12 Sep 2024

Judge—

Case Document

100%Judiciary

HCAL 965/2024

[2024] HKCFI 2281

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 965 of 2024

BETWEEN
	Celis Leonora Sacor	Applicant
	and
	Director of Immigration	Putative
		Respondent

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)

Following;

consideration of documents only; or

consideration of documents and Applicant being present in open court;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:

1. Leave to apply for Judicial Review be refused; and

2. A Restricted Proceedings Order (RPO) be made against the applicant.

Observations for the Applicant:

THE APPLICATION

1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 7 June 2024 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 2183 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).

2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against her since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert her non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process.

3.The applicant appeared before the Court on 24 July 2024 and admitted that she relied upon the same reasons in her previous claim in support of her subsequent claim.

The procedural history

4.The applicant is a national of the Philippines, aged 48. She worked as a domestic worker in Hong Kong. Her employment contracted terminated, but she remained in Hong Kong since 24 November 2015. She surrendered to the Immigration Department on 19 January 2016.

5.By way of written signification dated 14 April 2016, she raised her non-refoulement claim on the grounds of all applicable risks[1] based upon the reason that, if refouled, she would be harmed or killed by her husband and her creditor because she had forged her husband’s signature to mortgage his property to the creditor for a loan that she was unable to repay.

6.Her claim was rejected by the Director for the reason that her claim was not substantiated.

7.She appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”). The Board dismissed her appeal. The Board found that the applicant did not have any real risk of harm if she returned to her country. Further, the Board found that state protection would be available to her and internal relocation was a viable option for her.

8.She applied to the Court of the First Instance for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision. The Court of the First Instance dismissed her application.

9.She appealed and pursued all the way to the Court of Appeal and the Court of Final Appeal. Her application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal is still pending.

10.By letters dated 15 February 2024, the applicant applied for subsequent claim under section ZO of the Ordinance.

11.By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused her application.

The subsequent claim application

12.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, she has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success.

13.The applicant has submitted a statement to the immigration officer, in which she said her creditor and the creditor’s son are still looking for her. They will kill her if she returns to the Philippines. They are now pressing her husband and family for possession of the house to set off the loan. She is now very stressful because of the pressure.

14.Having considered the additional evidence, the immigration officer did not accept that there had been a significant change of circumstances since her previous claim was finally determined and such change, if any, when taken together with the materials previously submitted in support of her previous claim, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. She relies upon the same reasons in her previous claim. The Board had rejected her previous claim. Her fear of her husband no longer exists. The Director therefore dismissed her application.

The application for leave to apply for judicial review application

15.The applicant filed Form 86 on 20 June 2024 for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision.

16.In her affidavit in support of her application, the applicant said that she is not provided with a lawyer and it is her right to have a lawyer.

Discussion

17.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact-finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1).

18.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant admitted that she relied on the same reasons in her previous claim in support of her subsequent claim.

19.As to her ground in support of this application in paragraph 16, it is not valid as she is not entitled to free legal assistance at all stages of the proceedings[2].

20.I find that there is no realistic prospect of success in her subsequent claim. I dismiss her application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision.

The RPO

21.The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of her previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against her. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1.

22.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Direcctor of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25.

23.In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as her intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case.

24.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against her. The applicant has been explained the proposed restricted proceedings order before this hearing.

25.Upon being requested to show cause why the Court should not make the RPO against her, the applicant said she had nothing to say.

26.Having considered the applicant’s explanation, I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:

(1)  The Applicant be prohibited from commencing any fresh proceedings by whatever originating process, or continuing any existing legal proceedings, relating to any non-refoulement claim of the Applicant in the High Court and any appeal, including this Order, without leave of the Court of First Instance.

(2)  All applications for leave under paragraph (1) shall be made to the Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung or in his absence, the Judge in charge of the Constitutional and Administrative Law List or such other Judge as may be designated by the Chief Judge of the High Court to hear cases in the Constitutional and Administrative Law List.

(3)  At least 7 days before filing any application for leave under paragraph (1), the Applicant do notify in writing each intended defendant or respondent of her intention to make such application, enclosing a copy of the draft document by which the fresh proceedings are intended to be commenced, and if any response is received by the Applicant from any such intended defendant or respondent, that the Applicant do file a copy of each such response together with the said application for leave.

(4)  Any intended defendant or respondent having notice of such intended proceedings be entitled but under no obligation to place before the Court written representations regarding the same.

(5)  All applications made pursuant to this order and all ancillary matters be dealt with by the court on paper and without any oral hearing unless the Court should otherwise direct.

(6)  If the Applicant should issue fresh proceedings falling or which may fall within the terms of paragraph (1) without first seeking the Court’s leave, and if such fact should come to the notice of the Registrar of the High Court or any Master or Judge, such fresh proceedings be referred to the Court for a decision as to whether they should be permitted to continue or should be dismissed.

(7)  Notice of each decision by this Court or the designated Judge made pursuant to this order be given in writing to the Applicant and to each intended defendant or respondent named in the fresh proceedings.

(8)  Whether or not any fresh proceedings are brought to the notice of the Court, if a defendant or respondent is served with such proceedings without the relevant documents being accompanied by either an order granting leave to commence such proceedings or a direction that leave to commence such proceedings is not required, such defendant or respondent be entitled to make no response to such service pending notification of the court’s decision in relation to those proceedings; and that time for acknowledging service or for otherwise responding to such proceedings be deemed extended accordingly.

(9)  No more than one leave application under paragraph (1) may be made by the Applicant within any period of 3 months.

(10)  No appeal shall lie from a decision of the Judge granting or refusing leave within this Order unless leave to appeal has been granted by the Court.

(11)  This order shall cease to have effect at the end of 5 years from the date of this order.

(12)  A copy of this Order shall be sent to the Registrar of the High Court.

DISPOSITION

27.The applicant’s application is dismissed.

28.RPO in terms of paragraph 26 be made against the applicant.

Dated the 12^th day of September 2024

(M.O. WONG)(Ms)
for Registrar, High Court

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

Notes for the Applicant: If leave has been granted, the Applicant or the Applicant’s solicitors must:
a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A); b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).		Sent to the Applicant on 12/9/2024 Celis Leonora Sacor Applicant’s ref. no: Nil		Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on 12/9/2024 Director of Immigration Putative Respondent’s ref. no.: L/M (30290) in ImmD RA 7/37/C (formerly RBCZ/11488/16) Department of Justice, Senior Assistant Law Officer (Civil Law) (Civil Litigation Unit 2)

Form CALL-1

[1] All applicable risks are:

a.  risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115, (“the Ordinance”) (“Torture risk”);

b.  risk under Article 2 of Section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383 (Risk of violation of the right to life) (“BOR 2 risk”);

c.  risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (“CIDTP”) under Article 3 of Section 8 of the HKBOR (“BOR 3 risk”); and

d.  risk by reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol (“Refugee Convention”) (“Persecution risk”)

[2] The Court of Appeal in Re Ahmed Syed Rafiq CACV 272/2017 [2018] HKCA 178 held:

“22. This Court has repeatedly held that neither the high standard of fairness laid down in Secretary for Security v Sakthevel Prabakar (2004) 7 HKCFAR 187 nor the judgment of FB v Director of Immigration HCAL 51 of 2007 prescribed that a CAT claimant or a claimant for BOR 2 or BOR 3 or persecution risks must have an absolute right to free legal representation at all stages of the proceedings: Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14, Re Zahid Abbas [2018] HKCA 15, Re Tariq Farhan [2018] HKCA 17, and Re Lopchan Subash [2018] HKCA 37. The applicant already had the benefit of legal representation in presenting his case to the Director of Immigration. We do not find anything amiss arising from lack of legal representation in the process before the Board.”