Nam Pei Hong (Holding) Ltd. and Other v. The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Ltd.
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 36/1998 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 25 August 1998.
1. This is an application for a judicial review. The respondent is the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong ("the respondent"). The respondent's Listing Committee has found Nam Pei Hong (Holdings) Ltd ("the company"), a listed company, and three of its directors ("the applicants") to be in breach of their respective obligations owed to the respondent in relation to the listing of the company. The Listing Committee has resolved that the applicants should be publicly censured for these breaches. The applic
Cited by 5 cases
|
HCAL000036/1998 HCAL 36/1998 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PROCEEDINGS NO. 36 OF 1998
---------------------- Coram : Hon. Godfrey, J.A. in court (sitting as an additional Judge of the Court of First Instance) Date of Hearing : 24 August 1998 Date of Judgment : 25 August 1998 ---------------------- J U D G M E N T ---------------------- Godfrey, J.A. : Introduction 1. This is an application for a judicial review. The respondent is the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong ("the respondent"). The respondent's Listing Committee has found Nam Pei Hong (Holdings) Ltd ("the company"), a listed company, and three of its directors ("the applicants") to be in breach of their respective obligations owed to the respondent in relation to the listing of the company. The Listing Committee has resolved that the applicants should be publicly censured for these breaches. The applicants complain, saying that, on the facts now disclosed here, it can be seen that there is a real danger that the members of the Listing Committee who decided to proceed against, and ultimately to censure, the applicants had allowed themselves, in advance of hearing it, to be influenced against the applicants' case. The respondent does not accept this; anyway, it says, even if it were so, the applicants have a right of appeal, and should accordingly be left to that remedy for the redress of their grievance. 2. I have to decide whether the applicants have made out their case, which, in a word, is a case of bias; and, if so, whether the existence of the remedy suggested by the respondent justifies refusing the applicants a judicial review. The facts 3. On 9 November 1991, the company as Issuer entered into a Listing Agreement with the respondent. The following provisions are material :-
(The form of Listing Agreement has been revised since 1991; references to "the Commission" have been deleted, and what was then para. 38 appears in the new form as para. 39.) 4. It is of course the obligation of a listed company, and of its directors, to comply with the provisions of the Listing Agreement. 5. Further, listed companies are subject to the Rules governing the listing of securities published by the respondent as amended from time to time ("the Listing Rules"). 6. Under the Listing Rules, the Listing Committee may issue a public censure of a company or director in breach of the rules : see Rule 2A.09(3). It must, if requested, give its reasons in writing for so doing : see Rule 2A.19. The party censured (the appellant) has a right to have the decision against it or him referred back to the Listing Committee for review. If the Listing Committee modifies or varies the earlier ruling, it must, if requested by the appellant, give in writing its reasons for the modification or variation, and; in the case of a public censure, the appellant has the right to a further and final review by the Listing Appeals Committee : see again Rule 2A.19. 7. Between 16 July 1997 and 23 July 1997 there were unusual movements in the company's share price and a large turnover in its shares. 8. On 24 July 1997, the respondent suspended dealings in the company's shares. 9. On the same day, Lawrence Fok, the Secretary of the Listing Division, reported this suspension to the Listing Committee. In a minute of what transpired at that meeting, Lawrence Fok is recorded as having "elaborated" on this as follows :-
10. The Chairman of the Listing Committee, Gordon Kwong, is recorded as having remarked :-
11. The Listing Committee is recorded as having agreed as follows :-
12. Finally, the minute records under "Any other business" that the Chairman stated as follows :-
13. All this led in due course to the institution of disciplinary proceedings against (among others) the applicants. Such proceedings envisage a "First Instance Hearing" with witnesses under "Disciplinary Procedures" committed to writing and adopted by the respondent's Listing Committee (para. 5, "Attendance at the First Instance Hearing"; and para. 6, "Conduct of the First Instance Hearing"). There is a right of appeal, to a "Review Hearing", before persons who were not present at the First Instance Hearing : see the Listing Rules, para. 2A.39. The procedures at the "Review Hearing" (para. 9, "Attendance at Review Hearing", and para. 10, "Conduct of the Review Hearing") are identical with those prescribed for the "First Instance Hearing". 14. The First Instance Hearing in the present case took place on 21 October 1997. Its decision was communicated to the company's solicitors on 17 November 1997. I will read the decision in full. It reads as follows :-
15. The decision was accompanied by the public censure announcement proposed to be made, which I need not read. 16. On 26 February 1998 (after an unsuccessful application for judicial review which is irrelevant for present purposes), the company's solicitors intimated to the respondent that the company wanted a review hearing before the Listing Committee. One was scheduled, for 12 May 1998. But, at the request of those solicitors made on that date, the hearing was adjourned to 16 June 1998. This hearing did not proceed. It was stalled by the present application for judicial review, made on 8 June 1998 after the respondent had made available to the applicants on 11 May 1998 the minute of the Listing Committee's meeting of 24 June 1997, from which I have already extensively quoted. 17. The applicants had not previously seen these minutes. They considered that what had transpired at that meeting, and the fact that the minutes had been circulated to all members of the Listing Committee, gave the applicants justification for concluding that the members of the Listing Committee would, or might, have been led to view with disfavour the applicants' case in answer to the Listing Division's allegations before the applicants had had any chance to advance at any first instance hearing their own side of the story. 18. The applicants accordingly launched, as I have said, this present application for judicial review; and I have now to decide the issues which I adumbrated in introducing this judgment. The first issue - bias? 19. Following what was said by Lord Goff of Chieveley in R. v. Gough [1993] A.C. 646 at p.670, the first issue may be framed thus : 20. Is there here a real danger that the members of the Listing Committee who attended the first instance hearing were led, either by reason of their having been present at the meeting on 24 July 1997 or by reason of their having received the minutes of that meeting, into prejudging the question of the applicants' guilt or innocence of the charges against them before hearing the applicants' case? 21. This is a matter of impression. So much I think is clear from the decision of the Privy Council in Panel on Takeovers and Mergers and Another v. William Cheng Kai-man [1995] 2 H.K.L.R. 302. In that case, the impression of the judge of the letter there under consideration was that it did not disclose bias on the part of the writer. The Court of Appeal in Hong Kong (of which I was a member) were unanimously of a different opinion. Our impression was that the letter in question did disclose bias on the part of the writer. The Privy Council was unanimously of the opinion that the judge was right. The letter had not disclosed bias on the part of the writer. Obviously, different minds can form different opinions when it comes to matters of impression. 22. If there was here any real doubt about the matter, the applicants would, in my judgment, be entitled to the benefit of it. But I have to say I do not have any such real doubt. As it seems to me, the comments made at the meeting of 24 July 1997 go no further than to express concern that the applicants had been guilty of offences which, if they were guilty of such offences, would be the proper subject of disciplinary action. I can see no real foundation for the suggestion that the members of the Listing Committee who attended the first instance hearing might have been led by these comments into denying a fair hearing to the applicants. The applicants accordingly fail on this issue. The second issue : alternative remedy? 23. The second issue, alternative remedy, does not strictly speaking, arise. But since this issue was fully argued, I will briefly state my conclusions on this issue as well. 24. I agree with Wade and Forsyth (see Administrative Law, 7th Edition, 1994, at p.721) that despite the wealth of dicta in the books (including pronouncements of the Privy Council, not to mention of this court : see Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Ltd v. Onshine Securities Ltd [1994] 1 HKC 119 which can be read as suggesting otherwise) there is no reason in principle why an applicant otherwise entitled to a judicial review should be denied relief simply because he has an alternative remedy which he has not exhausted. I quite see that there may be good reasons for this in practice; judicial review is a discretionary remedy, and applicants should be encouraged to use the court as a last resort, not a first resort. So, in practice, the court does require the applicant for judicial review who has not exhausted all his available remedies to show some special or exceptional circumstances why the court should, nevertheless, assist him. 25. In my judgment, it should be enough for a court to ask itself the same question, or the same sort of question, in these circumstances as it asks itself when considering whether or not to grant or refuse an application for an interlocutory injunction. Do the interests of justice require the court to intervene in this dispute at this stage? 26. When the interests of justice do not require such an intervention, then, in my judgment, the court should refuse so to intervene. 27. If, in the present case, I had been of the opinion that there was a real danger that the members of the Listing Committee who attended the first instance hearing had been led to prejudge the applicants' case, I would have thought it right to quash the decision arrived at at that hearing, however inconvenient for the respondent that might have proved. It would, as it seems to me, have been unjust, and indeed illogical, to leave the applicants to take their chance at a review hearing before different members of the same Listing Committee. If the whole panel of decision makers is tainted, how can the wrong be put right by a fresh hearing before different members of the same tainted panel? If, perhaps, there are now five or more members of the Listing Committee, none of whom were present at the meeting of 24 July 1997 or had received the minutes of the meeting held on that date, an offer by the respondent to constitute the review panel from among their number might have been enough to persuade me that the interests of justice did not require the grant of any relief to the applicants by way of judicial review. But none of this arises, in the light of my decision on the first issue. The result 28. For the reasons I have given, I propose to dismiss this application, with costs. (Gerald Godfrey) Justice of Appeal Representation: Mr. Richard Gordon, QC & Mr. Richard Zimmern instructed by M/s. Herbert Smith for the Applicants Mr. Geoffrey Ma, SC & Mr. Godfrey Lam instructed by M/s. Richards Butler for the Respondent |
Other judgments that cite this case