Siti Susanti v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 1854/2023 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 28 November 2024.
1. By prescribed Form 86 filed on 16 October 2023, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“ Leave Application ”) of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“ the Board ”) dated 17 August 2023 (“ Board’s Decision ”). The Board had dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“ Director ”) dated 17 November 2022 (“ Director’s Decision ”) who refused the applicant’s claim for non-refoulement protection.
Cites 7 cases
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HCAL 1854/2023 [2024] HKCFI 3329 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 1854 of 2023
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Levy:
Observations for the Applicant: Introduction 1.By prescribed Form 86 filed on 16 October 2023, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“Leave Application”) of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 17 August 2023 (“Board’s Decision”). The Board had dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“Director”) dated 17 November 2022 (“Director’s Decision”) who refused the applicant’s claim for non-refoulement protection. Background 2.The background as taken from the Director’s Decision and Board’s Decision can be briefly stated as follows. 3.The applicant came from Indonesia. She arrived Hong Kong on 18 March 2020 with permission to remain in Hong Kong as a foreign domestic helper. Upon the termination of her employment contract on 12 January 2022, she did not depart but instead continued to illegally overstay. On 28 July 2022, she was arrested for overstaying. On 1 August 2022, she was given a suspended sentence for her conviction for the offence of breaching a condition of her stay. On 16 September 2022, she lodged a non-refoulement claim, covering all applicable grounds of torture risks[1], BOR 2 risk[2], BOR 3 risk[3] and persecution risk[4] under the USM.[5] The claim was based on her fear of being harmed by her ex-husband if she returned to Indonesia and the refusal to give custody of her son to the ex-husband. 4.The Director decided against the applicant’s claim on all applicable grounds. The Director considered that there was no substantial ground for believing that there was a real risk of the applicant being harmed or killed by her ex-husband if she returned to Indonesia. Furthermore, the Director noted that the applicant’s conduct in not surrendering as soon as practical, and delaying her claim for protection until around a month after her arrest was inconsistent with the conduct of a person who genuinely feared a grave threat to her life. The Director also considered and concluded that the application could avail herself of adequate police protection if she needed it, and that there was viable and reasonable internal relocation alternatives available. Hence, the appeal to the Board. 5.In the Board’s Decision, the Board noted that at no time did the applicant’s ex-husband inflict any serious or life-threatening harm upon her. The Board found no credible evidence that there were substantial grounds for believing that she would face a real risk of harm of any kind from her ex-husband or that she would face a real risk of proscribed harm necessitating international non-refoulement protection if she were to return to Indonesia. The Board also shared the Director’s finding that viable and reasonable internal relocation options were available. Legal principles applicable to judicial review 6.As the Courts have repeatedly stated, determination of the merits of a non-refoulement claim is essentially a matter for the Director and the Board, who are the primary decision-makers in the evaluation of the evidence based on the materials available to them. A court will not usurp their primary decision-making role in a judicial review, which is not an avenue for revisiting the assessment by the Board in the hope that the court may consider the matter afresh in the absence of any legal error. A finding of fact is exclusively within the realm of the Board, which a court in a judicial review will not interfere with unless such finding involved an error of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality: see Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328; Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524. Discussion and conclusion 7.The applicant’s Form 86 did not contain any grounds for seeking relief. In her supporting affirmation of the same date, she only deposed that her life would be in danger if she were to return to Indonesia because her ex-husband would kill her. There were no evidence or identification of errors in support of the intended challenge. 8.Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision with anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board correctly applied the law and the key legal principles relating to the four grounds mentioned above; correctly identified the issues, and observed a very high standard of fairness. I am satisfied that there were no errors of law or procedural unfairness in the Board’s Decision. In the absence of any specific grounds in support of the Leave Application, I find that it was perfectly open to the Board to come to its conclusion that the applicant’s evidence was not credible and that viable and reasonable internal relocation options were available. 9.For these reasons, I am not satisfied that the Leave Application is reasonably arguable with realistic prospects of success such that would enable this court to grant leave: see Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676. The Leave Application is accordingly dismissed. Withdrawal of Leave Application 10.On 31 October 2024, the applicant filed an affirmation to apply to withdraw the Leave Application, stating that she wanted to go back to Indonesia because it was safe for her to go back. 11.Apart from the application to withdraw the Leave Application, there is nothing outstanding in this action. In the circumstances, I should grant leave to the applicant to withdraw the Leave Application, and hereby order the dismissal of the Leave Application: see Re Manik Md Mahamudun Nabi [2022] HKCA 471. Dated the 28th day of November 2024
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1 [1] This refers to the risk of torture as defined in Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap.115. [2] This refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under Art. 2 of s.8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383 (“HKBOR”). [3] This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Art 3 of HKBOR. [4] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Art. 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. [5] This refers to the Hong Kong Government’s Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”) implemented since 3 March 2014 to process claims for non-refoulement protection. For a detailed description of the USM, see the judgment of Zervos J in HKSAR v Vu Thang Duong & Anor [2015] 3 HKC 293. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment