Pipin Riyanti v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 422/2022 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 10 December 2024.
1. This is an application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 13 April 2022 (“Decision”) refusing to allow the Applicant to make a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection after her previous claims had been rejected by both the Director and the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”) on all applicable grounds.
Cites 6 cases
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HCAL 422/2022 [2024] HKCFI 3465 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 422 OF 2022
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan:
Observations for the Applicant: Introduction 1.This is an application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 13 April 2022 (“Decision”) refusing to allow the Applicant to make a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection after her previous claims had been rejected by both the Director and the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”) on all applicable grounds. 2.The Applicant is a 38-year-old national of Indonesia who last arrived in Hong Kong on 6 March 2014 with permission to continue to work as a foreign domestic helper until the expiration of her employment contract on 6 March 2016 or within 14 days of its early termination, but when her employment was prematurely terminated on 4 November 2015, she did not depart and instead overstayed, and on 24 November 2015 she surrendered to the Immigration Department and raised a non-refoulement claim on the basis that if she returned to Indonesia she would be harmed or killed by her former husband’s creditor for failing to repay his loan and/or by some followers of the Sunni Islamic Movement Nahdlatul Ulama (“NU”) over their dispute with her father in her home village. Previous Non-Refoulement Claim 3.By a Notice of Decision dated 12 December 2016 the Director rejected the Applicant’s claim on all the applicable grounds including risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115 (“Torture Risk”), risk of her absolute or non-derogable rights under the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383 (“HKBOR”) being violated including right to life under Article 2 (“BOR 2 Risk”), risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of HKBOR (“BOR 3 Risk”), and risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (“Persecution Risk”). 4.In his decision the Director took into account of all the relevant circumstances of the Applicant’s claim and assessed the level of risk of harm from her former husband’s creditor or those NU followers upon her return to Indonesia as low due to the absence of any past ill-treatment from them, that it is doubtful that they would have any adverse interest in her after all these years since she left the country, that in any event these were private disputes between her husband and his creditor and the NU followers with her father only without any official involvement that state or police protection would be available to the Applicant if resorted to, and that reliable and objective Country of Origin Information (“COI”) show that reasonable internal relocation alternatives are available in Indonesia with a large population of 258 million people spread across a vast territory of more than 1.9 million square kilometers that it would not be unduly harsh for the Applicant as an able-bodied adult with working experience to move to other part of the country away from her home district in large cities such as Jakarta where it would be difficult if not impossible for anyone to locate her. 5.The Applicant’s appeal against the Director’s decision was then dismissed by the Board on 19 April 2018 after she failed to attend the scheduled hearing for her appeal without any explanation and upon finding no merits in her claim or appeal, and that it also agreed with the Director’s decision which it confirmed. 6.The Applicant’s late application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s decision was also refused by this Court on 12 November 2020 upon finding no good reason for her serious delay, that none of the proposed grounds for her intended challenge reasonably arguable, that there was no error of law or procedural unfairness in her appeal process before the Board or in its decision, and that there was no prospect of success in her intended application (HCAL 2189/2018 [2020] HKCFI 2461). 7.The Applicant’s subsequent appeal against the Court’s decision was then dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 29 September 2021 (CACV 623/2020 [2021] HKCA 1441). Request To Make Subsequent Claim 8.Less than 3 months later on 21 December 2021 the Applicant in writing to the Immigration Department requested to make a subsequent claim on the basis that she in 2020 converted her religion from the Sunni tradition of Islam to the Ahmadiyya branch of Islam which was objected to by her family and not acceptable in most parts of Indonesia that she fears of being harmed or killed or persecuted if refouled to her home country. 9.There are however constraints on a claimant who has previously made a non-refoulement claim to make a subsequent claim, as stipulated by Section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance as follows:
10.Accordingly, by a letter dated 28 December 2021 the Director required the Applicant to provide further information and evidence in writing in support of her request within 14 days, which she subsequently did via her lawyer from Duty Lawyer Service (“DLS”), which can essentially be summarized as follows (see [8] – [9] of Director’s Decision):
11.In support of her claim the Applicant also produced various documentary evidence including those stated in the Director’s Decision ([10] – [11]):
Director’s Decision Refusing Applicant’s Request 12.By a Notice of the Decision dated 13 April 2022 the Director accepted that the Applicant’s claimed religious conversion is a significant change in the circumstances since her previous claim was finally determined, but found that such change when taken together with the materials in support of her request as well as those submitted for her previous claim would not give her subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success, as her claimed risk of harm from her family and neighbours was based solely on her own bare assertions and speculations, that those articles submitted by her are all general country information about Ahmadiyya Muslims in Indonesia with none related to her personally that they do not show directly or indirectly that she would be subjected to any risk of such harm, and that even if such risk were real that it was a problem arose from a purely private dispute between her and her father and was confined to her home area that state protection and internal relocation alternatives would be available to the Applicant upon her return to Indonesia to negate such risk that her request to make a subsequent claim was refused. Applicant’s Leave Application for Judicial Review and Grounds 13.On 31 May 2022 the Applicant filed a Form 86 in these proceedings for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s decision, and upon subsequently being granted Legal Aid and with legal representation, she puts forward the following grounds as amended for her intended challenge:
14.Mr Jonathan Ip of assigned counsel for the Applicant submits that since the Director had accepted that the Applicant’s religious conversion to an Ahmadiyya Muslim to be a significant change in the circumstances since her previous claim was finally determined, the only issue was for the Director to determine whether such change would give her subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success, and in doing so the same principles of high standards of fairness and anxious scrutiny equally apply in the inquiry and investigation of all relevant materials, including a full and up-to-date assessment of relevant COI in particularly as regard the current situations of Ahmadiyya Muslims in Indonesia in order to properly assess and determine the Applicant’s intended subsequent claim of fear of being harmed by her family and neighbours and/or persecution by the general Sunni Muslims community due to her religious belief. Discussions 15.Firstly, there is no question in my mind that those administrative constraints imposed under Section 37ZO of the Ordinance as noted above are designed to prevent abuse of the 2-tiers screening process under USM by a claimant from making repeated non-refoulement claims without merits or basis so as to prolong his or her stay in Hong Kong, and that the Director and his officers in deciding whether to allow a request to make a subsequent claim are obliged to adopt those filtering measures robustly, including to take into account any finding of credibility or fact made in relation to the claimant’s previous claim where appropriate under subsection (3) thereof, but equally the Court should ensure that the application of such constraints in a particular case would not prevent a genuine claim with realistic prospect of success from being properly considered and determined under the USM: see Ram Chander, CACV 12/2018 [2018] HKCA 585 at para 11 of the judgment. 16.Furthermore, in considering such a request to make a subsequent claim, those principles applicable in the determination of non-refoulement claims and as laid down by the Court of Final Appeal in Secretary for Security v Sakthevel Prabakar (2004) 7 HKCFAR 187 at paras 51 - 55, including the application of high standards of fairness, and to make sufficient inquiry and consideration of the relevant COI as well as a proper understanding of the conditions in the claimant’s country of origin, should similarly apply to the consideration of the request. 17.Henceforth, before proceeding to consider whether it is reasonably arguable under the proposed grounds of the Applicant that the Director, and for that matter his immigration officer, had failed to do so in the consideration of her request as submitted by Mr Ip, it would be relevant to first set out the Director’s reasons in full for the refusal of the Applicant’s request in the decision as follows:
18.It is against such findings of the Director that I shall now return to the Applicant’s complaints, which are essentially about the Director’s failure to adequately consider all the relevant matters and/or COI in the consideration and assessment of the Applicant’s claim of risks of harm arising from her religious conversion to be an Ahmadiyya Muslim upon her return to Indonesia, and errors in law in his assessments on the availability of state protection and internal relocation to the Applicant upon her return to Indonesia. 19.Given the fact that the Director did not raise any issue with the Applicant’s religious conversion, and accepted that it amounted to a significant change of circumstances since her previous claim was finally determined, having thus satisfied the first requirement under subsection 2(a) of Section 37ZO, the only issue that falls for determination was whether the Applicant had in writing also satisfied the requirement under subsection 2(b) that such change when taking together with the material previously submitted in support of her previous claim would give her subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. 20.In doing so the Director must properly identify and ascertain from the Applicant’s statement and the supporting documents provided by her as to the source of risk of harm which she claimed to fear in her home country of Indonesia, of which she clearly stated as not just from her father and other members of the family or her neighbors, but more significantly also from the general Muslim community as well as the measures taken at the national, provincial and district levels by the Indonesian authorities to restrict the Ahmadis from practicing and propagating their religion which clearly involve the issue of state actor, as the Applicant so argued in her statement to the Director, and in the letter dated 21 December 2021 from her lawyer which set out the details of her intended subsequent claim, in particularly in paragraph 3 entitled Realistic Prospect of Success (HB/11/133, at 134 - 135) in which she referred to the following risks from both state and non-state actors against the Ahmadis in Indonesia:
21.In support of such claim the Applicant also included various footnotes that corresponded to the relevant sentences or paragraphs stated above in her submissions to indicate the sources of such information or evidence of risks posted to Ahmadis in Indonesia for the Director’s reference and consideration, as well as the following COI supplied to the Director (HB/18 -24/148 – 174):
22.It is against these submitted materials and information that Mr Ip argues for the Applicant that the Director totally neglected and failed to address any or being selective of the submitted COI materials that had demonstrated state-imposed discriminatory policy/law against the Ahmadis at various government levels, including the 2008 Joint Ministerial Decree criminalizing the spreading of the Ahmadiyya faith, and the common and increasing violence against Ahmadiyya Muslims by non-state actors, while state actors including the police are unwilling and/or unable to protect the Ahmadis, and that all these are occurring in various parts of Indonesia and not just limited to the Applicant’s home district. 23.Accordingly Mr Ip submits that it is reasonably arguable that the Director in refusing the Applicant’s request to make her intended subsequent claim failed in the following manners:
24.Given those findings by the Director in his decision as noted above in refusing the Applicant’s request to make her intended subsequent claim, I agree that her intended application for judicial review of the Director’s decision is reasonably arguable on the basis of her proposed grounds as stated above, and meeting the threshold for leave to be granted as laid down in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676. Disposition 25.In the premises, and for these reasons I grant leave to the Applicant to apply for judicial review of the Director’s decision on the basis of her proposed grounds, and accordingly direct that she shall file and issue the originating summons within 14 days of this decision, and to serve a copy thereof together with all the relevant documents on the Director as respondent, and with legal aid taxation. Dated the 10th day of December 2024
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
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Cases cited in this judgment