Jatta Lamin v. Director of Immigration

HCAL 1716/2024

[2024] HKCFI 3466

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO. 1716 OF 2024

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)

Following:

	consideration of the documents only;            or
	consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the Applicant in open court;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan:

1.  Leave to apply for Judicial Review be refused; and

2.  A Restricted Proceedings Order (RPO) be made against the Applicant.

Observations for the Applicant:

Introduction

1.This is an application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 28 August 2024 refusing to allow the Applicant to make a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection after his previous claims had been rejected by both the Director and the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”) on all applicable grounds.

2.The Applicant is a 34-year-old national of The Gambia who arrived in Hong Kong on 5 August 2014 as a visitor with permission to remain as such up to 3 November 2014 when he did not depart and instead overstayed, and on 4 November 2014 he surrendered to the Immigration Department and raised a non-refoulement claim on the basis that if he returned to The Gambia he would be harmed or killed by some land buyers due to disputes over their property transactions and/or by the manager of a local football club over their monetary dispute.

Previous Non-Refoulement Claim

3.By a Notice of Decision dated 6 July 2018 the Director rejected the Applicant’s claim on all the applicable grounds including risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (“Torture Risk”), risk of his absolute or non-derogable rights under the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383 (“HKBOR”) being violated including right to life under Article 2 (“BOR 2 Risk”), risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of HKBOR (“BOR 3 Risk”), and risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (“Persecution Risk”).

4.In his decision the Director took into account of all the relevant circumstances of the Applicant’s claim and assessed the level of risk of harm from his perceived enemies upon his return to The Gambia as low due to the low intensity and frequency of past ill-treatments from them, that there is no evidence of any real intention of them to seriously harm or kill him other than to press him to repay their losses, that in any event his problems with them were some private monetary disputes between them only without any official involvement that state or police protection would be available to the Applicant if resorted to, and that reliable and objective Country of Origin Information (“COI”) show that reasonable internal relocation alternatives are available in The Gambia with a large population of 2 million people spread across a vast territory of more than 11,000 square kilometers that it would not be unduly harsh for the Applicant as an able-bodied adult with working experience to move to other part of the country away from his home district in large cities such as Bass Santa Su where it would be difficult if not impossible for anyone to locate him.

5.The Applicant’s appeal against the Director’s decision was also dismissed by the Board on 4 March 2019 upon finding no merits in his claim or appeal, and that it also confirmed the Director’s decision.

6.The Applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s decision was then refused by this Court on 20 February 2023 upon finding none of the proposed grounds for his intended challenge reasonably arguable, that there was no error of law or procedural unfairness in his process before the Board or in its decision, and that there was no prospect of success in his intended application (HCAL 900/2019 [2023] HKCFI 451).

Request To Make Subsequent Claim

7.The Applicant never sought any appeal against the Court’s decision, but more than 1 year later on 28 June 2024 he in writing to the Immigration Department requested to make a subsequent claim on the basis that back in 2005 or 2006 when he was a teenager at 15 or 16 years was told by his elder brother who was then working for the previous regime of the Gambian government to transport some explosives, but that later after a regime change that the new government had arrested his elder brother for the said act and was then sentenced to life imprisonment, and hence the Applicant fears that if refouled to his home country he would suffer the same fate of his elder brother of being harmed or killed by the Gambian authorities.

8.There are however constraints on a claimant who has previously made a non-refoulement claim to make a subsequent claim, as stipulated by Section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance as follows:

“(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), a person who has previously made a torture claim must not subsequently make another torture claim.

(2) A person may make a subsequent claim if the person provides sufficient evidence in writing to satisfy an immigration officer that –

(a) there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined or withdrawn; and

(b) the change, when taken together with the material previously submitted in support of the previous claim, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success.

(3) In deciding whether or not a person may make a subsequent claim under subsection (2), an immigration officer may take into account any finding of credibility or fact made by an immigration officer or the Appeal Board in relation to a torture claim previously made by the person.

(4) If an immigration officer decides that a person may make a subsequent claim under subsection (2), the immigration officer must give the person written notice of the decision.

(5) If an immigration officer decides that a person may not make a subsequent claim under subsection (2), the immigration officer must give the person written notice of the decision, and the notice must also include the reasons for the decision.”

9.Accordingly, 10 July 2024 the Director required the Applicant to provide further information and evidence in writing in support of his request within 14 days, which he subsequently by a letter dated 15 August 2024.

10.By a Notice of Decision dated 28 August 2024 Director refused to allow the Applicant to make a subsequent claim upon finding that his alleged account of what happened in 2005 or 2006 which was some 8 or 9 years before he left the country to come to Hong Kong even if true was never mentioned or raise at all at any stage of his previous claim, that certain details of his alleged account were inconsistent to or contradicted by his evidence given in his previous claim in particularly of the imprisonment of his elder brother by the Gambian government when he stated that his only 2 brothers had already emigrated to the US that seriously undermined the credibility of his intended subsequent claim, and in the absence of any reliable evidence of him being pursued by the Gambian authorities other than the Applicant’s bare and incredible assertions that it is not accepted that there has been any significant change of circumstances since his previous claim was determined, or that such change even if true when taken together with the material previously submitted in support of his previous claim would give his subsequent claim any realistic prospect of success given the fact that his alleged act of transporting explosives if true would amount to a criminal offence that the Gambian authorities would be entitled to bring charges against the Applicant and that he would be regarded as a fugitive not entitled to non-refoulement protection.

11.On 30 September 2024 the Applicant filed a Form 86 in these proceedings for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s decision, but no ground for relief was given in his Form or in his supporting affirmation of the same date in which he just made bare assertions that the Director had failed to properly assess his intended subsequent claim but without providing any necessary or relevant details or particulars or elaboration as to how it was so, nor was he able to do so or put forward any proper ground for his intended challenge at the hearing of his application.

12.In the premises and having considered the decision of the Director with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, I do not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in the decision or any failure to apply high standards of fairness in the consideration and assessment of the Applicant’s request to make a subsequent claim, and as I am not satisfied that there is any prospect of success in the Applicant’s intended application for judicial review, I refuse to grant leave and accordingly dismiss his application.

Restricted Proceedings Order

13.Given the facts that the Applicant’s non-refoulement claim has already been finally and conclusively determined in the previous proceedings, ending with the order of this Court dated 20 February 2023 and which the Applicant never sought any appeal, but that he is still trying to re-litigate his case by making this subsequent claim based on wholly incredible and/or invalid basis, I shall next consider whether it would be appropriate to make a Restricted Proceedings Order (“RPO”) against him.

14.Section 27 of the High Court Ordinance, Cap. 4 provides as follows:

“Restriction of vexatious legal proceedings

(1) The Court of First Instance may, on the application of the Secretary for Justice or an affected person, make an order that –

(a) no legal proceedings shall without the leave of the Court of First Instance be instituted by the person against whom the order is made; and

(b) any legal proceedings instituted by that person in any court before the making of the order shall not be continued by him without the leave of the Court of First Instance.

(2) The Court of First Instance may not make an order under subsection (1) unless –

(a) it is satisfied that the person against whom the order is to be made has habitually and persistently and without any reasonable ground instituted vexatious legal proceedings, whether in the High Court or in any inferior court, and whether against the same person or against different persons; and

(b) it has heard the person against whom the order is to be made or given him an opportunity of being heard.

(3) An order made under subsection (1) –

(a) may be made on such terms and conditions as the Court of First Instance thinks just; and

(b) may provide that it is to cease to have effect at the end of a specified period, but shall otherwise remain in force indefinitely.

…”

15.Relevantly, Section 27A also provides:

“(1) Leave for the institution or continuance of any legal proceedings by a person who is the subject of an order for the time being in force under section 2791) shall not be given unless the Court of First Instance is satisfied that –

(a) the proceedings are not an abuse of the process of the court in question; and

(b) there are reasonable grounds for the proceedings.

(2) No appeal lies from a decision of the Court of First Instance granting or refusing leave required under this section, unless leave to appeal has been granted by the Court of First Instance.”

16.In Etik Iswanti v Torture Claims Appeal Board [2021] HKCFI 1589, Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance) examined the relevant principles for making an order under Section 27 against a non-refoulement claimant to prevent him or her from commencing vexatious legal proceedings which sought to re-open a non-refoulement claim which had already been finally and conclusively determined in previous proceedings, and held that repeated actions evidencing a calculated attempt by a claimant to delay an inevitable judgment or its execution or a refusal to accept the unfavourable final result of a litigation or seeking to re-open matters already determined in a previous action may be regarded as vexatious legal proceedings which would justify a RPO being made under the section.

17.His Lordship in the subsequent case of Re Wahyuni v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991 (again sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance) went on to hold that apart from Section 27 of the High Court Ordinance, the Court has an inherent jurisdiction which it can exercise on its own motion to make a RPO to prevent similar abuses of the court’s process by non-refoulement claimants, as the underlying purpose of the court’s jurisdiction to make a RPO is the prevention of abuse of process ([9] – [10]).

18.In the subsequent jointly heard appeals of Siti Khotimah v Director of Immigration, CACV 420/2021 and Reza Sahin v Director of Immigration, CACV 422/2021 ([2022] HKCA 327, 28 February 2022), Poon CJHC in giving judgment of the Court of Appeal also held that where a judge of the Court of First Instance (“CFI judge”) makes a RPO, he may where appropriate properly exercise his power under the Court’s inherent jurisdiction to also make a restrictive order against vexatious appeals under which the non-refoulement claimant concerned cannot appeal without first obtaining leave from him or another CFI judge designated by the Chief Judge of the High Court upon observing procedural fairness by putting the non-refoulement claimant concerned on notice and giving him or her the opportunity to address the court before making the restrictive order ([38] –[40]).

19.In the present case, it is clear from the above that the Applicant’s conduct in seeking persistently to re-litigate his non-refoulement claims without viable grounds amounts to an abuse of process, and that unless a RPO is made against him, to which he was unable to answer or raise any valid objection at the hearing, I am convinced that the Applicant will likely continue to do so and/or to make vexatious appeals, thereby wasting further precious time and resources of the Judiciary.

20.Accordingly, I make the following order:

(1)  The Applicant be prohibited from commencing any fresh proceedings by whatever originating process, or continuing any existing legal proceedings, relating to or touching upon or leading to any non-refoulement claim of the Applicant in the High Court, or any appeal, including this Order, without the leave of a Judge of the Court of First Instance;

(2)  All applications for leave under paragraph (1) shall be made to the Judge in charge of the Constitutional and Administrative Law List or such other Judge as may be designated by the Chief Judge of the High Court to hear cases in the Constitutional and Administrative Law List;

(3)  At least 7 days before filing any application for leave under paragraph (1), the Applicant do notify in writing each intended defendant or respondent of his intention to make such application, enclosing a copy of the draft document by which the fresh proceedings are intended to be commenced, and if any response is received by the Applicant from any such intended defendant or respondent, that the Applicant do file a copy of each such response together with his said application for leave;

(4)  Any intended defendant or respondent having notice of such intended proceedings be entitled but under no obligation to place before the court written representations regarding the same;

(5)  All applications made pursuant to this order and all ancillary matters be dealt with by the court on paper and without any oral hearing unless the designated Judge should otherwise direct;

(6)  If the Applicant should issue fresh proceedings falling or which may fall within the terms of paragraph (1) without first seeking the court’s leave, and if such fact should come to the notice of the Registrar of the High Court or any Master or Judge, such fresh proceedings be referred to this Court or the designated Judge for a decision as to whether they should be permitted to continue or should be dismissed;

(7)  Notice of each decision by the designated Judge made pursuant to this Order be given in writing to the Applicant and to each intended defendant or respondent named in the fresh proceedings;

(8)  Whether or not any fresh proceedings are brought to the notice of the designated Judge, if a defendant or respondent is served with such proceedings without the relevant documents being accompanied by either an order granting leave to commence such proceedings or a direction that leave to commence such proceedings is not required, such defendant or respondent be entitled to make no response to such service pending notification of the court’s decision in relation to those proceedings; and that time for acknowledging service or for otherwise responding to such proceedings be deemed extended accordingly;

(9)  No more than one leave application under paragraph (1) may be made by the Applicants within any period of 3 months;

(10)  No appeal shall lie from a decision of the Judge granting or refusing leave under this Order, unless leave to appeal has been granted by the Judge;

(11)  This order shall cease to have effect at the end of 5 years from the date of this Order; and

(12)  A copy of this Order shall be sent to the Registrar of the High Court.

Disposition

21.The Applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review is dismissed.

22.A RPO in terms of paragraph 20 be made against the Applicant.

Dated the 10^th day of December 2024

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

Form CALL-1