The Attorney General v. Tsang Yung-chun
Read the full judgment text of HCMA 812/1995 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 13 December 1995.
1. This is a case stated from Mr. Norman Yeung sitting as a Temporary Magistrate at South Kowloon Magistracy. The respondent Madam Tsang Yung-chun had been charged with contraventions of the Amusement Games Centre Ordinance Cap.435.
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HCMA000812/1995 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL Magistracy Appeal 1995, Nos.811 & 812 ______________
______________ Coram: Hon. Power, V.-P. Mayo, J.A. & Sears, J. Date of hearing: 14 November 1995 Date of delivery of judgment: 13 December 1995 ________________ J U D G M E N T ________________ Power, V.-P.(giving the judgment of the Court): 1. This is a case stated from Mr. Norman Yeung sitting as a Temporary Magistrate at South Kowloon Magistracy. The respondent Madam Tsang Yung-chun had been charged with contraventions of the Amusement Games Centre Ordinance Cap.435. 2. Magistracy Appeal No. 811 of 1995 arises out of a charge that on 17th May 1994 at the Space Track Game Centre at the basement of No.64-66A Kimberley Road, Tsimshatsui in Hong Kong, she did operate, keep, manage or have control of the centre, an amusement game centre under Licence no.10719, in contravention of the Licence Condition no.2 as specified in the licence in that the centre was found to be in operation after 12 mid-night contrary to sections 19(1)(a) and 19(5) of the Amusement Game Centres Ordinance. It was charged in the alternative that on 17th July 1994, at the Space Track Game Centre at the Basement No. 64-66A Kimberley Road, Tsimshatsui in Hong Kong, an amusement game centre under Licence No.10719, was the licensee of the centre where a condition, namely condition no.2 as specified in the licence, was contravened in that the centre was found to be in operation after 12 mid-night, contrary to Sections 19(3) and 19(5) of the Amusement Game Centres Ordinance, Cap.435. 3. Magistracy Appeal No. 812 of 1995 arises out of a charge that on 15th July 1994, at the Space Track Game Centre at the Basement, No.64-66A Kimberly Road, Tsimshatsui in Hong Kong, she did operate, keep, manage or have control of the centre, an amusement game centre under Licence No. 10719, in contravention of the licence condition no.10 as specified in the licence in that there were in the centre 7 number of machines in excess of 68 number as specified in the licence, contrary to Sections 19(1)(a) and 19(5) of the Amusement Game Centres Ordinance. It was charged in the alternative that on 15th July 1994, the Space Track Game Centre at the Basement, No.64-66A Kimberley Road, Tsimshatsui in Hong Kong, an amusement game centre under Licence No.10719, was the licensee of the centre where a condition, namely condition no.10 as specified in the licence, was contravened in that there were in the centre 7 number of machines in excess of 68 number as specified in the licence, contrary to Sections 19(3) and 19(5) of the Amusement Game Centres Ordinance, Cap.435. 4. The Temporary Magistrate dismissed both informations holding that the condition was ultra vires. He has stated the case to be answered by this court in the following terms:
5. The Case Stated in Magistracy Appeal No. 811 set out the following facts admitted by the parties pursuant to s.65C of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance Cap.221:
6. The case stated in No. 812 set out the following admitted facts:
7. Prior to 1st December 1993, amusement game centre licences had been issued by the Commissioner for Television and Entertainment under the Miscellaneous Licences Ordinance and the regulations thereunder. Mandatory conditions were imposed by Reg.152 which reads as follows:
8. In The Attorney General v. Chan Foo (1992) HKLR 438, this court held that any special conditions which had not been made by regulation, as required by s.3 of the Ordinance, were ultra vires. The court at p.437 made the following observation:
There was never any suggestion in that decision that the mandatory conditions in Reg.152 were ultra vires. Indeed they could not have been as these were plainly made, as s.3 requires they must be, by regulation. The licence issued to Madam Tsang on 2nd November 1993 under the Miscellaneous Licences Ordinance must necessarily have had endorsed thereon the two mandatory conditions. This was, therefore, the licence, so limited, which she held on 30th November 1993. 9. On 1st December 1993, those provisions of the Miscellaneous Licences Ordinance and those regulations thereunder which dealt with the licensing of amusement game centres were repealed and replaced by the Amusement Game Centres Ordinance Cap.435 and by regulations made thereunder. Provision was made for the continuation of existing licences in s.23 of that Ordinance:
10. Madam Tsang appears in person today but the argument which was advanced on her behalf below, relying upon The Attorney General v. Chan Foo, was that all conditions attaching to her existing licence pursuant to the Miscellaneous Licences Ordinance were ultra vires, and that as a result there were no conditions which the Commissioner could add to or vary by further conditions. This argument is plainly wrong as the licence when issued did have these valid mandatory conditions attached thereto. During the hearing before us a variation of the above argument was suggested namely that once Reg.152 of the Miscellaneous Licences Regulations was repealed, the mandatory conditions imposed by that regulation ceased to exist. We are satisfied that there is no merit in such an argument. It is true that the regulation which imposed the mandatory conditions was repealed but any licence already issued, together with whatever limitations validly placed upon it by virtue of Reg.152, must, we are satisfied, have continued in force by virtue of s.23(1). We reject any suggestion that the licence somehow survived without the limiting mandatory conditions subject to which it was issued. We are satisfied that even if the temporary magistrate was right in holding that the Commissioner's power to impose conditions on a licence under s.23(2) presupposes the existence of at least one valid condition, and we make it plain that, as that matter was not argued before us, we make no finding in that regard, he was wrong in holding that there was no valid existing condition. We are satisfied that there were valid existing conditions and that the Commissioner was entitled on 1st December 1993 to impose further conditions under the power given him by s.23(2) and that these were valid and binding. 11. We answer the questions posed in each case stated in the affirmative. 12. The matters, together with the opinion of this court, are remitted to the Temporary Magistrate for determination.
Representation: Mr. J. Reading, S.A.C.P. and Mr. Joseph To, S.C.C. (Crown Prosecutor) for Appellant Respondent in person. |