China Evergrande Group (in Liquidation) v. Hui Ka Yan and Others
Read the full judgment text of HCMP 1080/2024 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 18 March 2025.
1. On 28 February 2025, I heard two applications as between the plaintiff (“CEG” or “Liquidators”) and the 5 th defendant (“Ms Ding”), being, in chronological order of issue:
Cites 8 cases
|
HCMP 1080/2024 [2025] HKCFI 897 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 1080 OF 2024 ________________________
________________________
AND HCA 551/2024 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE ACTION NO. 551 OF 2024 ________________________
________________________
_________________ D E C I S I O N _________________ A. Introduction 1.On 28 February 2025, I heard two applications as between the plaintiff (“CEG” or “Liquidators”) and the 5th defendant (“Ms Ding”), being, in chronological order of issue:
2.The Confidentiality Summons was heard by me first, in Chambers (not open to the public). After the argument, I dismissed the application, with reasons to be provided later. Those reasons are given below. 3.I then heard the Clarification Summons, in Chambers (open to the public). At the end of that hearing I reserved my decision, which I also now give below. 4.Both summonses arise out of proceedings involving the Liquidator’s claim against various directors/officers of China Evergrande Ltd (“CEG”), a company in insolvent liquidation as a result of the winding up ordered by Linda Chan J: see Re China Evergrande Group (中國恒大集團) [2024] 1 HKLRD 1128 at §§1 & 49. Linda Chan J also appointed Ms Wing Sze Tiffany Wong and Mr Edward Simon Middleton as the joint and several liquidators of CEG (i.e. the Liquidators). The claim brought by the Liquidators essentially relates to the declaration and payment of dividends paid out from CEG (and the assets now represented by them). 5.Much of the further relevant background and context has been set out by me in a previous decision [2025] HKCFI 689 at §§6-13. It can be read, and need not be repeated here. 6.It suffices to say for present purposes that one of the directors of CEG was the 1st defendant (“Chairman Hui”), to whom Ms Ding was married during most of the material period, though they are now divorced. The claim brought by the Liquidators has been extended to Ms Ding (and relevant corporate vehicles), and comprises both a proprietary claim as well as other claims. The Liquidators sought and obtained the Injunction Order, which comprises orders for a Proprietary Injunction, a Worldwide Mareva/Freezing Injunction, and ancillary asset disclosure. Similar orders have also been made against Ms Ding by the High Court of Justice of England and Wales (“English Injunction Order”). The English Injunction Order has also been subject to variations, and certain applications. 7.At the hearing before me, the Liquidators were represented by Mr Charles Manzoni SC, and Ms Ding was represented by Ms Terri Ha of Counsel. B. Confidentiality Summons B.1 Applicable Principles 8.In support of Ms Ding’s confidentiality request, Ms Ha relied on the ground that the “interest of the private lives of the parties so requires” under Article 10 (“BOR 10”) of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance Cap 383 (“BORO”), and the consideration of the relevant principles in Asia Television Ltd v Communications Authority [2013] 2 HKLRD 354 at §§19-36. 9.From that case, the following propositions can be highlighted:
10.It is also settled that where an applicant seeks to justify restrictions on open justice by reference to a risk to life or safety, whether of himself or others, that should be clearly articulated. 11.I also accept Mr Manzoni’s submission that, in addition to these principles of general application, the action against Ms Ding takes place against the backdrop of the liquidation of CEG, where there is a separate public interest in ensuring that liquidations are performed with open transparency. This is not to say that liquidators are necessarily in any different position than other litigants, but the ordinary transparency of liquidations is a matter to be taken into any balancing exercise. B.2 Application of Principles to this Case 12.In her affidavit evidence, repeated in the evidence of her solicitor, Ms Ding essentially relied on the following matters:
13.Ms Ha submitted that those factors justified appropriate restrictions on open justice in this case, so that the hearing should be closed to the public. Alternatively, Ms Ha submitted, even if the hearing is not ordered to be closed, then the hearing might at least be conducted so as not to reveal to the public personal information about the parties more than that which is already in the public domain. 14.Partly in response to Ms Ding’s evidence, the Liquidators sought to rely on an affidavit of Scott William Alston, an investigator and process server in England, and aspects of Mr Middleton’s 7th affidavit (“Middleton 7”), which was not filed in support of the Liquidators’ opposition to either the Clarification Summons or Confidentiality Summons, but instead in opposition to M Ding’s application to discharge the Injunction Order (fixed for hearing on 21 March 2025). Ms Ha objected to both affidavits being deployed in the context of the Confidentiality Summons. 15.At the hearing, I decided that I would not admit or have regard to the affidavit of Mr Alston. I also indicated that I would consider what approach to take to Middleton 7, reading it on a de bene esse basis. Having considered that matter, it does not seem to me to be necessary or helpful to refer to any part of Middleton 7 so as to be able properly to decide the Confidentiality Summons. 16.This is because I agree with the submission made by Mr Manzoni that, even if Ms Ding’s evidence is accepted at face value, it falls short of the high threshold to justify a departure from open administration of justice. Most of the stated concerns are in reality no more than normal incidents of litigation. Further, the concerns about risk to personal safety do not seem to me in context to identify the necessary clear articulation of a fear or risk to life or safety. With respect, Ms Ding’s personal situation is far removed from that of a refugee or torture claimant whose circumstances might justify a restriction on open justice (often effected by the making of an anonymity order). B.3 Conclusion 17.Therefore, after careful consideration of the various matters to be brought into the balancing exercise, I dismissed the Confidentiality Summons. 18.By way of postscript, there was also force in Mr Manzoni’s submission that, if there is no basis for the Court to be closed to the public, there is no basis for a restriction of what might be said in Court. Nevertheless, as is only appropriate, Mr Manzoni said he would refer to those matters no more frequently than was necessary. That is simply an aspect of good advocacy, in which Ms Ha also joined – as did I – during the conduct of the hearing of the Clarification Summons. 19.As to costs, I see no reason why the costs should not follow the event. Therefore, CEG’s/Liquidators’ costs of the Clarification Summons will be paid by Ms Ding. As the matter is ‘stand-alone’, it is appropriate to deal with those costs (if the quantum cannot be agreed) by way of summary assessment, to be made on paper, on a timetable which I permit Mr Manzoni and Ms Ha to agree. C. Clarification Summons C.1 Introduction 20.As already indicated, the Clarification Summons was issued on 11 December 2024. The battleground at the hearing related to 4 paragraphs of the summons, whereby Ms Ding has sought:
21.By the time of the hearing, the Liquidators had given consent to the making of the amendment proposed by Ms Ding under Paragraph 1. Therefore, the only issue arising from that Paragraph 1 is the question of costs. 22.Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 are fully disputed. C.2 Overview of Parties’ Positions 23.Ms Ding’s position is that:
24.The Liquidators’ position is that:
25.Before turning to the detail of these points, it is necessary to consider the relevant applicable principles. C.3 Law on Declaratory Relief 26.Ms Ha pointed to my recent summary and consideration of the principles for granting declaratory relief in Convoy Global Holdings Ltd v Kwok Hiu Kwan [2020] 4 HKLRD 222, at §§49, 53, 65-67, and 81. Ms Ha highlighted the following points:
27.Mr Manzoni accepted that the Court has a wide discretion to grant declaratory relief, as part of its inherent jurisdiction. But he sought to emphasise the strict limits to the situations in which the Court will typically be prepared to grant declaratory relief. Though accepting that the above principles have broad application, Mr Manzoni referred to the decision of Anthony Chan J in S v G [2020] HKCFI 2201 §§33-46 (amid other decisions, which probably need not be individually cited), where the relevant principles were summarised in a way consistent with that in the Convoy decision. For example, and by way of additional emphasis to the points made in the Convoy decision:
28.As a specific example relevant to the circumstances of potential declarations in the context of a freezing injunction, Ms Ha referred to the case of Click Above Corben Mews Ltd v 381 Southwark Park Road RTM Co Ltd [2025] EWHC 105 (TCC), at§§10 and 75. In that case, Jefford J considered an application by the applicant for, amongst various possible relief, (1) a declaration that dealings of specific properties would not fall within the terms of the freezing injunction; and, in the alternative (2) variation of the freezing injunction to allow such dealings of the specific properties. 29.The Court did not exercise its discretion to make the declaration, because it could not be proved that the specific properties did not belong to the claimant. It nevertheless granted the variation to clarify that the applicants are permitted to deal with and dispose of the properties. It did so on the basis that whether or not the claimant has any beneficial interest in the properties, a prior charge over the property would take priority. Therefore even if the properties fell within the scope of the freezing injunction, that would be no benefit to the respondents, making it appropriate that the injunction should be varied to clarify that dealing with the specific properties was permitted. 30.But, that means that the case was an example of a court making a variation (not granting a declaration) on the particular facts, to cater for a discrete and well-defined issue as to whether particular property was or was not within the terms of the injunction – and, even if it was, whether the existence of the prior charge meant that there would be no benefit to the respondents in maintaining the injunction from dealing in that property. Therefore, I do not think the Click Above case lends any particular assistance as to how to resolve Ms Ding’s Clarification Summons. 31.There is no dispute that, even though the Injunction Order did not contain the words “liberty to apply”, this is implied. C.4 Law on Ancillary Disclosure Orders 32.By virtue of the Injunction Order, Ms Ding was required to disclose to CEG and the Court the “value, location and details” of all of her assets exceeding US$150,000 in value, whether in her own name or not, and whether solely or jointly owned. That disclosure must be made to the best of Ms Ding’s knowledge, information and belief following reasonable enquiries. If enquiries have been made, but there is as yet no proper or full response to those enquiries, provision of further information, if received, is within the scope of the existing obligation. 33.I accept that disclosure obligation is subject to the principle of strict construction and must be interpreted purposively. In a previous decision in this same litigation, [2024] HKCFI 1854, I attempted my own summary of the applicable principles, which included points materially relevant to the purpose of the disclosure obligation, such as in the current situation, as follows:
34.Further, the standard of compliance required in respect of the disclosure obligation ancillary to a Mareva injunction is much higher than that in the ordinary discovery context: see China Metal Recycling v Chun Chi Wai [2014] 6 HKC 190 at §§50-51. The whole purpose of Mareva injunctions and consequent disclosure orders is to protect and secure assets in order to ensure that a judgment obtained in litigation will not go unsatisfied. Therefore, if there is to be compliance with the Mareva order disclosure provision, it must be virtually complete compliance. Put another way, the disclosure must be made in good faith and disclosure of an extent that can fairly be judged to be full disclosure. It must not be illusory. 35.As to what value of any asset is to be disclosed, reference can be made to ADM International Sarl v Grain House International SA [2024] 1 WLR 3263 §§67-68, 71-72. There, the question identified was whether a claimant’s purpose in getting disclosure of assets to assist in enforcement is better served by knowing in the first instance only the market value, or by knowing only the unencumbered value. The conclusion was that it is the former. Of course, a well-drawn disclosure order might properly require expressly both gross value and any encumbrances or beneficial interests of others which are said to reduce that value to a lesser one in which the defendant has a beneficial interest. 36.The ADM case at §68 is also useful for confirming the point that disclosure of value only has to be made at the snapshot time required by the terms of the court order, and is not subject to constant updating. On the other hand, it seems to me that where a person is subject to a freezing order but requests to amend its terms – for example, to permit greater spending than the cap imposed in the order, or to permit spending from a particular asset – then it may be appropriate to look at an updated snapshot taken at the time of the request. C.5 Costs of Paragraph 1 37.There is little need to refer to any authority dealing with the Court’s discretion on costs. It is trite that the Court may consider if there is, and who is, the “effective winner”. But the Court takes a broad brush approach, referring to all matters, and with the objective of doing justice between the parties without incurring unnecessary Court time and consequently additional cost. 38.Hence, though ventilated at rather greater length, I think the argument boiled down to the following points. 39.Ms Ha submitted that Ms Ding is the “effective winner”, in that she obtained what she sought by Paragraph 1, even if by consent. Hence, the usual order should be made, namely that Ms Ding be granted her costs. On 17 October 2024, Ms Ding’s solicitors provided to CEG’s solicitors a confirmation letter from the relevant bank dated 9 October 2024 which demonstrated that the relevant units in a fund were acquired prior to the payment of the dividends which might have created the Dividend Assets. The letter also stated that Ms Ding had instructed the bank on 23 July 2024 that all units in the fund should be redeemed, as they were on 7 October 2024. Hence the US dollar amount in the bank account was generated from the proceeds of the redemption. 40.On the other hand, Mr Manzoni submitted that it was only on the provision of a further letter from the bank dated 4 February 2025 that the necessary confirmation of the link between the monies used to acquire the units in the fund and the redemption proceeds, and that those original assets were traceable to the redemption proceeds. Then, relatively quickly after the provision of that further letter, the Liquidators gave approval to the proposed amendment sought by Paragraph 1. 41.Looking at the two letters, and bearing in mind that the Liquidators were in my view entitled to be cautious, even suspicious, about what they were told unless wholly clear and supported by independent documentary evidence, I do not think the Liquidators are to be criticised for awaiting the information provided in the further letter before giving their approval to the amendment. That is also in the context that by an earlier solicitors’ letter dated 16 September 2024, the Liquidators had previously requested evidence that the US dollar amount disclosed in the bank was a Non-Dividend Asset. As it was put, the Liquidators were seeking better materials than had been provided up to that date, which shed no light on the source of the funds initially used for investment, how the investment was subsequently dealt with – for example whether the units, or further units, were traded, and the source of the funds for the units in the fund the redemption of which generated the US dollar amount held in the account. As the Liquidators pointed out, those matters would be shown by the transfer details and account statements previously requested. Notwithstanding that those materials ought to have been readily available to Ms Ding, and obtainable at virtually no cost to her, she chose to withhold them – and continues to do so. 42.Ms Ding, or the solicitors instructed by her, may have formed the view that sufficient information had been provided, but it is clear that the Liquidators were exercising the appropriate degree of caution in making sure that point A could be seen to be linked directly to point B. They were entitled to test and see if the dots joined up. 43.I reject the argument that it would be reasonable to infer that the Liquidators would not have consented even if the further letter was provided prior to the issuing of the Clarification Summons, or that there was any misconduct on the part of the Liquidators for withholding their consent until receipt of the further letter. I also reject the suggestion that there has been any inconsistency in what information was being sought by the Liquidators, as that has been clear from the outset. Further, whilst it may be true that Ms Ding had a real need for an order in the terms of Paragraph 1, there would have had to have been an application for the amendment in any event (even if made by consent). 44.Indeed, it seems to me that the time taken and costs incurred in obtaining the further letter from the bank are likely negligible compared to the time taken and costs incurred in originally refusing to provide that information, having the debate in correspondence, and in issuing Paragraph 1 with the subsequent argument on it, even if limited to costs. As I have also stated, the debate might have been resolved by the transfer details and account statements which must have been readily available to Ms Ding. 45.In the above circumstances, and in the exercise of my discretion, I see no good reason to order the costs of Paragraph 1 against the Liquidators. The only question is whether there should be no order as to costs, or whether the Liquidators’ costs should be paid by Ms Ding. On balance, the latter order seems to me to be appropriate in the circumstances. Therefore, the Liquidators’ costs of Paragraph 1, including the costs of the argument on costs, shall be borne by Ms Ding. C.6 Paragraph 2 46.Paragraph 2 of the Clarification Summons seeks a direction or declaration that Ms Ding is not required to answer certain queries raised by the Liquidators in correspondence, or that she has already satisfactorily answered those queries. As previously indicated, the context for the queries raised by the 6 November Letter is that it is in essence summarised and repeated for Ms Ding’s new English solicitors the questions first raised in a letter dated 9 October 2024 from CEG’s English solicitors. The purpose of those queries was expressly stated as to ensure that the Injunction Order is complied with, and to consider taking any further steps necessary to protect against dealings with the Dividend Assets or asset dissipation. The queries themselves arose out of Ms Ding’s updated asset disclosure given on occasions between 9 August 2024 and 2 October 2024. 47.I do not think it is necessary to go into the detail of the queries – such as to why they arose, whether they are or were reasonable, whether they have already been answered, and if so whether satisfactorily, etc – as it is not appropriate to grant the declaratory relief as sought by Ms Ding. That relief is in the form of a negative declaration. 48.It is clear that Ms Ding is either seeking to ‘get in her retaliation in advance’, or seeking anticipatorily to neutralise any potential application that CEG may bring to compel her to answer the queries, or to neutralise any possible proceedings CEG may bring against Ms Ding for failing to comply with the terms of the Injunction Order and/or the English Injunction Order. Indeed, as Mr Manzoni pointed out, that much is clear from Ms Ding’s own evidence, where she stated her view that she had properly complied with the terms of the Injunction Order, but given the breaches of that order are punishable by contempt of Court, there is a real and genuine need for her to obtain proper clarification on the scope and/or terms of disclosure. 49.I also accept that the perceived potential applications concerning Ms Ding would likely be brought in the English Court, not in Hong Kong. The queries were expressly raised in correspondence between the London solicitors relating to the English Injunction Order. It does not matter that the terms of the Injunction Order in essence mirror those of the English Injunction Order. The point of importance is as to the likely jurisdiction for any subsequent steps. In my view, it is utterly inappropriate to seek to pre-empt what might occur on any application made to the English Court. Indeed, any declaration that I might make in Hong Kong would unlikely assist, let alone bind, the English Court in its own decision-making process. 50.Therefore, the negative declaration sought does not serve any useful purpose – not least when it might be entirely premature. Now is not the time to take up precious judicial resources to make any ruling as would require the Court to go into the intricate historical detail as to the background to any particular request, and any response to it in that context – and in what remains the hypothetical scenario of potential enforcement or contempt proceedings. 51.As I ventured during the hearing, both CEG and Ms Ding have the benefit of legal representation in two jurisdictions. Each side is well able to seek advice and decide what further steps, if any, are appropriate. For example, if Ms Ding takes the view that she has done all that is required, she can stand on that view. If CEG takes the view that Ms Ding is in breach of the disclosure order and should be sanctioned for her contempt, it can bring proceedings in the appropriate jurisdiction. But there are other potential factual scenarios which arise, and I see no benefit to the Court or to the parties to seek somehow to second-guess which potential factual scenario will arise, and somehow to rule on that on an anticipatory basis. 52.Though it is not necessary to decide the point, I think there is force in the submission made on behalf the Liquidators that the queries made of Ms Ding have been triggered by Ms Ding’s approach to the Injunction Order more generally, tending to delay, obfuscation, and unnecessary resistance to reasonable enquiries. I would also state in passing that, albeit on only a high level review, the arguments put forward by Ms Ding are far from compelling. 53.In any event, I refuse to exercise my discretion to grant the relief sought by Ms Ding in Paragraph 2. C.7 Paragraph 3 54.The Carnation Way Properties are rental properties, owned by Ms Ding, and managed by the third-party professional service provider, JLL. Ms Ding suggests that JLL has not, however, been able to manage the Carnation Way Properties freely, given the Injunction Order – and she says this causes her prejudice. 55.However, in September 2024, Ms Ding sought CEG’s consent to a variation of the English Injunction Order to allow JLL to continue to provide services in relation to the Carnation Way Properties, notwithstanding that order. It seemed that the terms of the draft Consent Order to facilitate that variation were largely agreed between JLL, Ms Ding and CEG. However, after the appointment of her new solicitors, Ms Ding changed her position, and stated that no such variation was required at all, such that she would not consent to the matter which had arisen out of her own proposal. 56.Nevertheless, JLL considered the variation was necessary for it to be able safely to continue providing management services without the risk of contravening the English Injunction Order. In brief, JLL asked the English Court for variations intended to enable JLL (1) to apply income derived from the Carnation Way Properties towards payments relating to the management of the properties and towards its own fees, and (2) to provide letting services, including marketing the properties to new potential tenants, and the receipt and return of rental deposits. 57.It can safely be presumed that permission was sought to perform the limited and specified acts which JLL thought it needed a variation to perform. Contrary to Ms Ha’s submission, it does not seem to me to matter that JLL did not achieve, or even ask for, all of what it originally wanted. Whatever it originally wanted, JLL asked for and got what it needed. 58.The English Court granted the variation in the form sought by JLL, and ordered Ms Ding to pay the costs of both JLL and CEG. In his decision to make the order, [2024] EWHC 3400 (Comm), Mr Paul Stanley KC (sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge) noted at §§24-28 the following material points, amongst others:
59.It may be thought significant that, rather than taking the stance that the terms of the variation proposed by JLL were too narrow, and asking the English Court for an order in different terms, Ms Ding simply opposed even those variations. She did not, for example, consent to those variations on the basis that they were a useful start. Nor did she ask for what Ms Ha described as the “wholesale removal of restrictions on JLL’s management of the Carnation Way Properties”, which she seeks by Paragraph 3 of the Clarification Summons. It is therefore odd that the submission is now made on her behalf that the JLL situation has not been sufficiently resolved by the English order, when Ms Ding must be taken to have chosen not to widen the resolution of the matter when before the English Court. 60.I would also point out that the stance taken by Ms Ding reeks of seeking to cause obfuscation and delay. Rather than pursue the precise form of order she says she wants, when the matter was before the English Court already seized with the relevant issue on JLL’s summons dated 9 December 2024, Ms Ding instructed her Hong Kong solicitors to issue a summons in Hong Kong two days later, on 11 December 2024. 61.In the circumstances, it is plain that the declaratory relief sought by Paragraph 4 is not appropriate. As a result of the determination by the English Court, JLL is able to perform the specific acts for which it considered it needed clear permission. There remains no live issue pertaining to whether the Injunction Order extends to how JLL “manages” the Carnation Way Properties. 62.Further, I respectfully agree with DHCJ Stanley KC that the Hong Kong Court is plainly not the court best placed to decide any issue relating to how JLL provides its professional services as regards to the Carnation Way Properties. As he pointed out, the application leading to his variation order was about the discretionary effect of an injunction on property in England, in respect of third parties in England. It is also obvious that the variation sought was a variation to the English Injunction Order. It might further be pointed out that Ms Ding, the owner of the relevant properties, is also in England. 63.The declaration sought by Paragraph 3 is not useful. 64.I refuse to exercise my discretion to grant the declaration sought by Ms Ding in Paragraph 3. C.8 Paragraph 4 65.Paragraph 4 of the Clarification Summons seeks a direction or declaration that the Injunction Order does not extend to and/or require Ms Ding to give ongoing and/or continuing updates to CEG in respect of the disclosure already made. 66.I have already accepted that ordinarily the disclosure to be made in compliance with the disclosure order is to provide information up-to-date at the date of service, and that the Injunction Order does not of itself require constant updating thereafter. However, those matters do not make the declaration sought in any way appropriate – even leaving aside that the declaration sought at least overlaps with the declaration sought by Paragraph 2, which I have already refused. 67.Indeed, the declaration sought by Paragraph 4 is extremely broad. It would, if granted, permit Ms Ding to refuse to provide any updating information, even the updating information which she has herself recognised in her evidence that she should give, and said that she would give. 68.In any event, there are a number of potential circumstances where updating information will be required. If the basis of her original knowledge, information and belief following reasonable enquiries changes from when she made disclosure on that basis, that may require updating for Ms Ding to remain compliant with the Injunction Order. As noted, that fact has been recognised by Ms Ding and her solicitors, and dealt with in her evidence. There have also been updates provided in correspondence to correct or change previous descriptions of matters and estimated values. Further, if Ms Ding were to request variations to the Injunction Order on an ongoing basis, it may also require her to give updated information for the ability of CEG, and the Court, to consider whether such a request should be approved at that time. 69.I take into account that Mr Manzoni has confirmed in his submissions that CEG/Liquidators are obviously not suggesting that Ms Ding is required to give updates in the sense that was being suggested in the ADM case. 70.I also take into account that asset disclosure is in any event ongoing, and that there remains an issue as to whether the disclosure provided to date is compliant. It would not be correct to make a declaration which might in effect preclude an appropriate argument, on the appropriate application, made in the appropriate jurisdiction, as to whether compliance has been achieved or not. There is also force in Mr Manzoni’s submission that it is difficult to understand why Ms Ding seeks a declaration which in part would state that she is not required to do something which she has already agreed to do. 71.I refuse to exercise my discretion to grant the relief sought by Ms Ding in Paragraph 4. C.9 Conclusion 72.In order to identify how the Injunction Order would be amended, if I were to grant any of the declarations sought by the Clarification Summons, Ms Ha hopefully provided a draft amended order. I note that some of the amendments put forward are likely not controversial, for example flowing from my order to consolidate the two sets of proceedings. But, other than the variation resulting from Paragraph 1 of the Clarification Summons (which variation is made by consent), I do not make the contested variations which would result from Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the Clarification Summons. 73.I see no reason why the costs should not follow the event. Therefore the Liquidators’ costs of all of Paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Clarification Summons also be paid by Ms Ding. In this regard also, I think it is appropriate to deal with those costs (if the quantum cannot be agreed) by way of summary assessment, to be made on paper, on a timetable which I permit Mr Manzoni and Ms Ha to agree. D. Result 74.Both the Confidentiality Summons and the Clarification Summons have been dismissed, with the Liquidators’ costs payable by Ms Ding, to be summarily assessed.
Mr Charles Manzoni SC, instructed by Karas So LLP, for the plaintiff Ms Terri Ha, instructed by Lam & Co, for the 3rd defendant in HCMP 1080/2024 and the 5th defendant in HCA 551/2024 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under HCMP 1080/2024