Limbu Nandaraj v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 526/2025 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 19 March 2025.
1. At the request of the Applicant, this is the oral hearing of his application for leave to apply for judicial review. However, it has inauspicious beginnings.
Cites 2 cases
|
HCAL 526/2025 [2025] HKCFI 951 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 526 OF 2025 ________________________
________________________
_________________ D E C I S I O N _________________ A. Introduction 1.At the request of the Applicant, this is the oral hearing of his application for leave to apply for judicial review. However, it has inauspicious beginnings. 2.That is because the application is in a form – or even ‘pro forma’ format – which has become familiar to me from previous similar applications: see, for example, HCAL 102/2025 and my decision [2025] HKCFI 779; HCAL 170/2025 and my decision [2025] HKCFI 368.
3.The previous applications had no merit. This application is no different. 4.Might I be so bold as to suggest that L&L should consider ceasing to provide assistance from the shadows, and the use of their office address, on applications which they either know or ought to know have no merit, and which ought not to require the deployment of scarce judicial resources. 5.As it happens, I have found a Scam Alert issued by The Law Society of Hong Kong on 6 December 2024, headed ‘Fake Law Firm bearing the name of “Lakshmi & Laxmi, Solicitor”’. The content of the Scam Alert reads as follows:
6.Therefore, it may be that when in my previous decisions I described L&L as a firm of solicitors, I was mistaken. 7.Anyway, having considered this case, with the benefit of the application materials previously filed and the oral submissions made by the Applicant today (through an interpreter), this is my Decision. B. The Application 8.On the Form 86, the impugned decision is that of the Director dated 19 January 2024, which the Applicant asks to “be quashed of Improper procedure”. Other than that suggestion, no grounds on which the relief is sought are set out on the Form 86. Where the grounds should have been set out is only the apparent explanation for the delay (see above). 9.The Applicant’s affirmation filed in support simply states (sic):
10.As already indicated, the attachments to the affirmation – other than perhaps the correspondence between the Director and the Applicant/L&L – seem to relate primarily to the merits of the application for the dependant visa. A document headed ‘Brief facts’ also recites those matters which the Applicant apparently thinks should have led to the grant of the dependant visas. It is also suggested there that the Applicant could not make the judicial review application within the time bar due to the re-consideration request and the visit visa application. 11.Incidentally, the affirmation is filed in apparent breach of Rules of the High Court (“RHC”) Order 41 rule 1(4), which rule requires the statement of the “place of residence” of the deponent. I do not think the address given, namely the office address of L&L, is the place of residence of the Applicant. Indeed, I do not think it is a place of residence at all. But, if it were, bearing in mind the number of people who seem to give that address, it would be quite crowded. 12.Some of the Director’s correspondence referenced in, and attached to, the affirmation shows the Director seeking various pieces of information or documents required or sought to facilitate the assessment of the visa applications. However, it was by letter dated 14 November 2023 – not 19 January 2024 – that the entry dependant visa applications made by the Applicant were first refused. The refusal was explained as follows:
13.It seems that on 21 November 2023, a request for reconsideration for refusal of entry as dependant was received by the Director. By letter dated 27 November 2023, the Director pointed out that a request for reconsideration is entertained only if there are fresh circumstances which relate to the reasons underpinning the decision, and that the request is made within a reasonable period of time following the refusal decision. 14.The Director’s letter dated 19 January 2024 – i.e. the letter comprising the decision challenged on the face of the Form 86 – was actually the letter informing the Applicant that the reconsideration request was refused, because the information provided and representations made did not serve to form any fresh ground pertinent to the captioned refusal for reconsideration, so that the decision dated 14 November 2023 still stood. 15.Thereafter, the Applicant made applications for visit visa, which were also refused on 20 August 2024. C. Significant Delay 16.The statement at the foot of the Form 86 (see above), and the suggestion that the Applicant could not make the judicial review application within time due to the re-consideration request and the visit visa application, are an attempt at an explanation for the delay in bringing the application, which is obviously out of time. 17.It is trite that an application for leave to apply for judicial review must be made promptly and in any event within 3 months of the date when the grounds for the application first arose, usually by reference to the date of the impugned decision. If the leave application is not made promptly or within that long stop period, there needs to be an application for an extension of time within which the leave application can be made, identifying the circumstances as might justify the grant of an extension. 18.The effective decision refusing the dependant visas was given on 14 November 2023. It is also settled that the time within which to challenge a decision is not extended merely by asking for a reconsideration of that decision. The long stop 3-month period for seeking to challenge that 14 November 2023 decision expired on 13 March 2024. 19.These proceedings were commenced only on 22 February 2025. There was, therefore, a significant delay of over 14 months after the date of the real impugned decision, and almost a year after the expiry of the time permitted for the intended challenge. Even the delay after the decision on the request for reconsideration is significant. 20.I do not think the apparently offered explanation – speaking to friends and solicitors and gathering documents, or pursuing a reconsideration request or a request for an entirely different type of visa – justifies the grant of an extension of time. That is particularly so where, in his dealings with the Director, the Applicant had assistance from L&L. Whether L&L was holding itself out as a genuine firm of solicitors or not, it was certainly self-described as ‘Litigation and immigration Consultants’. 21.In any event, and as I have said before, if time was spent gathering documents which are relevant to the underlying dependant visa applications, those are unlikely to be of particular assistance in an intended judicial review challenge. In such a case, the Court does not act in any appellate capacity, nor does it focus on the merits of the impugned decision. Rather, the Court looks at the integrity of the decision-making process. None of the documents now produced, even with the benefit of the delay, appear to be of any great materiality as regards the decision-making process. 22.There are no materials which persuade me that the circumstances of this case justify an extension of time for bringing the intended challenge. That, of itself, is fatal to the application. D. No Merit 23.In reaching that conclusion, I have of course also taken into account the apparent lack of any merit of the intended application. 24.It is trite that pursuant to the mandatory requirements set out in the RHC Order 53 rule 3(2), an application for leave to apply for judicial review must be in the Form 86 which should include a statement of (amongst other things) the grounds for the relief sought. There must also be an affidavit verifying the facts on which the application is based. 25.I do not think the Form 86 and the affirmation in this case satisfy those mandatory requirements. No ground at all is set out on the Form 86 except the unparticularized suggestion of “improper procedure”. The affirmation merely makes other unparticularized suggestions that the Director “failed to take relevant factors into account”, that there was “Wednesbury unreasonableness”, and that there was “bias and racial discrimination”. These generic or unparticularised or vague suggestions do not identify any proper public law ground of review. 26.At the hearing this morning, the Applicant made brief oral submissions. He stated that: (1) he had submitted all the documents asked for by the Immigration Department, and he did not know what else the Immigration Department might want or that he should provide; (2) despite his wish to live with his family, he is still living alone; and (3) he is just praying to God that he will be able to be joined by his family. 27.I acknowledge those submissions, and the Applicant’s expression of sentiment. But I am afraid that they do not identify points of merit justifying the grant of leave to apply for judicial review. First, the burden is on an applicant for a dependant visa to satisfy the Director that the application comes within the dependant visa policy, and that the dependant visa is appropriately grant. Even where the Immigration Department requests further information, and that is provided, that does not shift the burden – and the Director is entitled to assess the merits of the dependant visa application on the materials provided. There is no obligation on the Director to continue to request materials until the Director is satisfied that those materials justify the grant of the visa. Secondly, it is settled that the dependant visa policy does not exist for the purpose of family reunification. Rather, as its name identifies, it is a policy which requires the applicant to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Director both the relevant familial connection and the dependency. 28.The absence of any sufficient merit in the application is a further reason for dismissing the application. E. Result 29.The intended challenge to the impugned decision is significantly out of time, with no explanation for the delay which would justify the grant of any extension of time. 30.In any event, the Applicant has failed to identify any public law grounds of review which are reasonably arguable with any realistic prospect of success. 31.For those reasons, individually or together, the Applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review is dismissed. 32.The Applicant is acting in person, and I make no order as to costs. 33.If he had solicitors on the record, I would be seriously considering making a ‘wasted costs order’. Indeed, a genuine solicitors firm which permits an applicant to use the firm’s professional address (whilst the applicant otherwise purports to act in person) may perhaps reasonably be regarded as in fact being on the record, and so be subject to the full force of the Court’s discretionary powers on costs. But, as I have noted above, there is no record held by the Law Society that L&L is a genuine Hong Kong solicitors firm or registered foreign law firm.
The applicant, acting in person | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||