Abdallah Aboubacar Ali v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 3769/2019 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 7 April 2025.
1. By Form 86 filed on 18 December 2019 (the “ Form ”), the Applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (the “ Leave Application ”) against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non‑refoulement Claims Petition Office (the “ Board ”) dated 29 November 2019 (the “ Board’s Decision ”) [1] .
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HCAL 3769/2019 [2025] HKCFI 1409 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 3769 of 2019
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Philips Wong:
Observations for the Applicant: Introduction 1.By Form 86 filed on 18 December 2019 (the “Form”), the Applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (the “Leave Application”) against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non‑refoulement Claims Petition Office (the “Board”) dated 29 November 2019 (the “Board’s Decision”)[1]. 2.In the Form, the Applicant has named the Director of Immigration (the “Director”) as both the proposed respondent and the proposed interested party. As it is trite that the Board should be the proposed respondent whereas the Director should be the proposed interested party, I make an order to amend the Form on the court’s own motion. 3.The Applicant had requested an oral hearing for the application. The hearing took place on 13 March 2025. The Applicant however did not attend the hearing. Notice of Hearing was issued to the Applicant in advance. I also note from the records that attempts were made to remind the Applicant of the hearing on 11 March 2025 and 12 March 2025 by phone but in vain. Background 4.The Applicant’s background, the basis of his claim and the arguments he advanced had been set out in details in the Board’s Decision, and it is not necessary for me to repeat the same here. The hyperlink to the Board’s Decision is included below[2] for reference. Discussion 5.The applicable legal principles relating to application of this sort are well established. The role of the Court in a judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal. The primary decision makers are the Director and the Board. Though in non-refoulement cases, the Court will adopt an enhanced standard in scrutinizing the decision of the Board due to the seriousness of the issue at hand, the Court should not usurp the role of the Board. Assessment of evidence, country of origin information (COI) materials, risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board (and the Director). The Court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board. (See Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524, at §14) 6.In the Form and in the supporting Affirmation, the Applicant did not state any grounds in support of the Leave Application. The Applicant simply attached the Board’s Decision to his supporting Affirmation. 7.I have considered the Board’s Decision in details. I do not find any error of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality. Neither has the Applicant been able to demonstrate any of the same. There is nothing to indicate that the Board had failed to take into account any relevant matters. The Board’s Decision was comprehensive with adequate reasons provided. In particular, the Board explained in details as to why it rejected the Applicant’s evidence (see paragraphs 23 to 24 of the Board’s Decision). The Board’s Decision satisfies the enhanced Wednesbury test and is not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational. I am not satisfied that the Applicant’s intended challenge of the Board’s Decision is reasonably arguable with any realistic prospects of success. Accordingly, I refuse to grant leave for judicial review. 8.Leave application of this sort is meant to be a filtering process and I am not expected to give elaborated reasons for my decision (see Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14, at §23). Suffice for me to state that in reaching the decision, I have considered all the relevant documents before me. Conclusion 9.In the premises, I make an order that the Form be amended as described above and the Leave Application be dismissed. Dated the 7th day of April 2025
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1 [1] Although the Form did not specify the date of the decision in respect of which the Applicant seeks leave to apply for judicial review, it is clear from the supporting Affirmation that the Applicant was referring to the Board’s Decision. [2]https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2019/HCAL003769_2019_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf |
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