Wong Wai Lap Jack v. To King Sau Tso, Tang Sheung, Manager of To King Sau Tso and Others
Read the full judgment text of DCCJ 2450/2018 on BabelCite. This District Court judgment was delivered on 17 January 2024.
1. This is the hearing of the plaintiff’s summons for default judgment (the “ Summons ”) against the 1 st to 3 rd defendants. The plaintiff makes the present application on the basis that (1) the 2 nd defendant has acknowledged service and indicated his intention not to contest these proceedings, and (2) the 1 st and 3 rd defendants have failed to acknowledge service of the Writ of Summons (the “ Writ ”) and Statement of Claim (the “ SOC ”).
Cites 4 cases
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DCCJ 2450/2018 [2024] HKDC 118 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION CIVIL ACTION NO 2450 OF 2018 ————————
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———————— DECISION ———————— Introduction 1.This is the hearing of the plaintiff’s summons for default judgment (the “Summons”) against the 1st to 3rd defendants. The plaintiff makes the present application on the basis that (1) the 2nd defendant has acknowledged service and indicated his intention not to contest these proceedings, and (2) the 1st and 3rd defendants have failed to acknowledge service of the Writ of Summons (the “Writ”) and Statement of Claim (the “SOC”). 2.In this action, the plaintiff claims for a declaration that he has acquired possessory title over four pieces of land, namely, Lots No. 598, No. 599, No. 608 and No. 609 in D.D. 90 (200 Muk Wun, North, New Territories) (respectively “Lot 598”, “Lot 599”, “Lot 608”, “Lot 609” and collectively “the Lots”) registered under the names of the 1st to 4th defendants respectively. 3.The Writ and SOC were issued on 5 June 2018. 4.Pursuant to the order of Registrar Lui dated 30 June 2022, the proceedings against the 4th defendant have been discontinued. Service on the 1st to 3rd defendants 5.According to the affirmation of service made by a clerk to the plaintiff’s solicitors, the Writ and SOC were purportedly served on the 1st defendants by sending the same by registered post with a covering letter addressed to the 1st defendants at Lot 598, allegedly being the usual and/or last known address of the 1st defendants. 6.Similarly, the Writ and SOC were sent to the 3rd defendant at Lot 608 by registered post, again allegedly being the usual and/or last known address of the 3rd defendant. 7.The service on the 2nd defendant is a little different. In addition to sending the Writ and SOC to the 2nd defendant by registered post at Lot 599, the same was also sent to a residential address in San Tin Wai Estate, New Territories, Hong Kong. 8.In addition to the above, the Writ and SOC were also placed at the main entrance to the Lots. It was stated in the affirmation of service that in the opinion of the plaintiff, the Writ and SOC would have come to the defendants’ knowledge within 7 days after the date of posting. 9.It is trite that the plaintiff’s opinion on due notice of the proceedings must be a reasonably held one. Service at a knowingly unreachable address is not valid service under the rules: Law Kwok Hung v Tse Ping Man [1999] 4 HKC 397 per Yuen J (as she then was) at 404D-E; Hung Lai Wan v Ngo Sam (unreported, HCA 3189/2016, 2 February 2017) per DHCJ Anson Wong at §12. 10.In this case, I cannot accept that due notice has been given to the 1st and 3rd defendants. 11.The plaintiff’s pleaded case is that his family has been in exclusive control and possession of the Lots from as early as 1962, or from 1972 when the plaintiff was born. It is inconceivable that the Writ and SOC, which were served at the very same Lots under the plaintiff’s alleged exclusive control and possession, could have come to the defendants’ knowledge. It is not surprising that the 1st and 3rd defendants have not acknowledged service of the documents and those documents were never returned. 12.The reason why the 2nd defendant was able to acknowledge service is very likely because the Writ and the SOC were sent not only to Lot 599, but also at an additional address at San Tin Wai Estate. 13.The circumstances here are highly similar to those in Hung Lai Wan (supra) where DHCJ Anson Wong held that service on the defendant was irregular when the Writ was purportedly served at the property over which the plaintiff claimed to have exclusive possession and control for more than 12 years. 14.In view of the foregoing, I find that service of the Writ and SOC on the 1st and 3rd defendants was irregular and this court has no jurisdiction to grant default judgment against them. The plaintiff’s application for default judgment against the 1st and 3rd defendants is dismissed. Default judgment against the 2nd defendant 15.As mentioned above, the 2nd defendant has acknowledged service of the Writ and SOC and indicated his intention not to contest these proceedings. 16.The 2nd defendant appears at the hearing of the Summons on 17 January 2024 and confirms to the court that he does not oppose the plaintiff’s application for default judgment. His appearance is only entered for the purpose of contending that he should not bear costs of these proceedings. Ms Tracy Lam, solicitor appearing on behalf of the plaintiff, indicates that, subject to any contrary order from the court, the plaintiff in principal has no objection to that. 17.In these circumstances, it remains for the court to consider whether the plaintiff has made out a case of adverse possession based on his SOC. 18.It is well established that factual possession and intention to possess are the two requirements for acquiring possessory title by adverse possession: Tsang Foo Keung v Chu Jim Mi Jimmy [2017] 3 HKC 527. 19.For the purpose of deciding whether the defendant’s title has been defeated by limitation, the court does not need to decide the precise point of time when the plaintiff entered the property so long as it is satisfied that the plaintiff has proved that he has been there for the requisite period of time with the necessary intention to possess: Yu Siu Cheuk v Realray Investments Ltd (unreported, CACV 181/2009, 10 November 2009) per Cheung JA at §17. In this case, pursuant to section 38A(1)(c) of the Limitation Ordinance (Cap. 347), the applicable limitation period is 20 years. 20.Having considered the plaintiff’s SOC, I am satisfied that the two requirements for adverse possession have been met:
21.In conclusion, I am satisfied that the plaintiff has been in adverse possession of Lot 599 for a continuous period of more than 20 years prior to the commencement of these proceedings. Disposition 22.I make the following orders:-
Miss Tracy Lam of Wong & Co. for the plaintiff The 1st and 3rd defendants were acting in person and did not appear The 2nd defendant was acting in person and present | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under DCCJ 2450/2018