江小佩 v. Central China Real Estate Ltd
Read the full judgment text of HCA 866/2023 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 9 May 2025.
1. Before me are two Summonses both filed on 25 March 2025 by the Plaintiff:-
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HCA 866/2023 [2025] HKCFI 1795 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE ACTION NO. 866 OF 2023 ____________
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_______________ D E C I S I O N _______________ I. INTRODUCTION 1.Before me are two Summonses both filed on 25 March 2025 by the Plaintiff:-
2.I should consider the Appeal Summons first. II. APPEAL SUMMONS OUT OF TIME 3.The learned Master’s Order was made on 6 February 2025. The time for appeal expired on 20 February 2025. The Appeal Summons was issued out of time. During the hearing, the Plaintiff explained that she adopted a wrong procedure for appeal. She in fact filed a Notice of Appeal on 10 February 2025 with the Court of Appeal under Order 59. Her Notice of Appeal was dismissed on 21 March 2025, and knowing the right procedure thereafter, she shortly filed the current Summonses. 4.It is trite that even a litigant-in-person is expected to observe the rules and procedures, and failure to do so, without more, cannot be a good reason for delay. 5.However, absence of good explanation for delay is one consideration only. The most important consideration is the substantive merits of the intended appeal. Therefore, I proceed to consider the substantive merits of the Appeal Summons. III. BACKGROUND 6.The present action is concerned with US$300,000,000 7.25% senior notes issued by the Defendant on 24 April 2019 with a maturity date of 24 April 2023 (the “Notes”). The Notes were constituted under an indenture dated 24 April 2019 (the “Indenture”), to which the Defendant, some of the Defendant’s subsidiaries as subsidiary guarantors and DB Trustees (Hong Kong) Limited as trustee (the “Trustee”) are the only parties. The Plaintiff, however, has never been a party to the Indenture. 7.The Notes were executed and delivered under a global note (together with any other global notes for the Notes issued thereafter, collectively, the “Global Note”), registered in the name of Deutsche Bank AG, London Branch (“DBAG London”) as the “Common Depository” (as defined in §2.04(c) of the Indenture). DBAG London held the Global Notes in the accounts of Euroclear Bank SA/NV (“Euroclear”) and Clearstream Banking S.A. (“Clearstream”), as the first-tier intermediaries. The Bank of New York Mellon (“BNYM”), being the second-tier intermediary, holds and deals in interests in the Notes as an accountholder. In turn, such an accountholder holds interests for itself as principal and to the order of customers as the third-tier intermediaries. In the present case, such a customer includes Standard Chartered Bank (“SCB”), who in turn holds and deals in interest in the Notes for itself and/or its customers. 8.Through this structure, it would not be the actual bearer note, but the interests therein, that would be traded, and the settlement of transfers would be conducted electronically with sales and purchases of securities recorded by book entries in the accounts: see Re Leading Holdings Group Ltd [2023] 4 HKLRD 71 at §§53 and 59. 9.I should also set out a few provisions of the Indenture. Section 2.04 of the Indenture provides that:-
10.Section 2.06 of the Indenture provides that:-
11.Section 6.07 of the Indenture provides that:-
12.Section 1.01 of the Indenture defined “Holder” as “a Person in whose name a Note is registered in the Register”. Thus, DBAG London who was the Holder. 13.The governing law of the Indenture was stated in Section 12.07 to be “the laws of the State of New York”. IV. PLAINTIFF’S CASE 14.From the Statement of Claim prepared without legal representative, I summarise the Plaintiff’s case as follows:-
V. DEFENDANT’S DEFENCE 15.In essence, the Defendant raises the following defence:-
VI. PLAINTIFF’S LEGAL STANDING 16.As to the first defence, there is no contract between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. As mentioned above, the Plaintiff has never been a party to the Indenture. From the legal opinion on the laws of the State of New York adduced by the Defendant, which is essentially the same as the Hong Kong law in this regard, the Plaintiff has no contractual rights against the Defendant in such circumstances. 17.The Plaintiff is aware of her difficulty as a result of this contractual relationship. Therefore, she reiterated that she obtained authorisation letters dated 10 May 2024 and 31 October 2024 issued by Euroclear. 18.The former letter seem to be actually dated 9 May 2024, which states:-
19.The letter dated 31 October 2024, similarly, states:-
20.However, according to the legal opinion on the laws of the State of New York, under Section 6.07 of the Indenture, only the Holder, that is, DBAG London, has the right against the Defendant. Therefore, there is at least a triable issue as to how these letters issued by Euroclear to BNYM would constitute any authorisation by DBAG London to the Plaintiff to maintain her claim against the Defendant. 21.The Plaintiff further contends that by virtue of section 2.06(a) of the Indenture, Euroclear is also a “Common Depository” and thus a “Holder”. She seems to suggest that Euroclear could therefore authorise the Plaintiff to claim against the Defendant. In my view, the Plaintiff clearly misreads section 2.06(a), which provides:-
22.It is reasonably clear from this clause that Euroclear and Clearstream are participants in the Common Depositary, but not themselves the Common Depository. Section 2.04(c) clearly defines DBAG London, but no others, as the “Common Depositary”. 23.The Plaintiff also contends that the authorisation letters were in fact Certificated Notes whereby the Notes were legally transferred to her in her own name. However, such Certificated Notes and such transfer are not pleaded in the Statement of Claim, and it is trite that summary judgment can only be entered upon the Statement of Claim as it is. 24.In any event, Section 2.06(b) of the Indenture, as provided above, provides that only in situations specified in Section 2.04(e) (quoted above), could such Certificated Notes be issued for such transfer of the Notes. There is no evidence, let alone plea, to explain how any such situations have realised. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s reliance on China Ping An Insurance Overseas (Holdings) Ltd v Luck Gain Ltd & Ors [2023] HKCFI 3315, where the specified situations had realised for requesting for a certificated note, does not take the Plaintiff’s case any further. 25.Lastly, the Plaintiff seems to suggest that an Offering Memorandum dated 15 April 2019 provided by the Defendant also governs the relationship between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. However, it is clear to me that there is at least a triable issue as to whether this Memorandum was an invitation to treat rather than a unilateral offer the acceptance of which would immediately constitute a binding contract. In any event, I do not see how the Offering Memorandum would assist the Plaintiff’s claim, and in fact in §6 of the Plaintiff’s Reply dated 6 March 2025 (filed after the learned Master dismissed the Plaintiff’s application for Order 14 judgment), the Plaintiff herself accepts that the material terms of the Indenture and the Offering Memorandum are consistent. Thus, whether the Offering Memorandum governs the relationship is irrelevant for the present purpose. 26.For the above reasons, I find that the Defendant has raised a triable issue and reasonably arguable defence that the Plaintiff has no legal standing to commence the present action. I also find that in view of the analysis above, it should have been clear to the Plaintiff that the Defendant would be able to raise a triable issue and reasonably arguable defence to resist an Order 14 application. Therefore, I also find that the learned Master was right to dismiss the Plaintiff’s Order 14 application. 27.This conclusion would be sufficient for me to dismiss the Appeal Summons, even if I would allow the Plaintiff to appeal out of time. I shall therefore refrain from expressing my view on the other defence and other issues raised by the Defendant. VII. MERITS ON INTENDED APPEAL ON COSTS 28.Insofar as the Plaintiff would still like to appeal on costs, my view is that there was nothing unreasonable or legally erroneous (see Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2025 Vol 1 §58/1/6) for the learned Master to order the Plaintiff to pay the costs upon the dismissal of the Plaintiff’s application, and the amount assessed was not unreasonable. Therefore, there are no merits in the intended appeal on costs. VIII. CONCLUSION 29.Given that the intended appeal is unmeritorious, I refuse to grant time extension for the Plaintiff to appeal against the learned Master’s Order, and dismiss the Appeal Summons. I therefore also dismiss the Stay Summons. 30.Costs should follow the event. I order that the Plaintiff shall pay the Defendant costs of the two Summonses summarily assessed at HK$80,000 forthwith.
The Plaintiff, appeared in person Ms Tiffany Chan, instructed by Sidley Austin, for the Defendant | ||||||||||||||||||||