Ahmed Ijaz v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office

HCAL 3565/2019

[2025] HKCFI 2079

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 3565 of 2019

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)

Following:

	consideration of the documents only;            or
	consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the Applicant in open court

Order by Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Teresa Wu:

The application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.

Observations for the Applicant:

Introduction

1.By Form 86 dated 2 December 2019, the Applicant applies for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/ Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) dated 21 November 2019 (“the Board’s Decision”) confirming the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 31 May  2018 (“the Director’s Decision”), which rejected his non-refoulement claim on all applicable grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism (USM).

Background

2.The Applicant’s personal background, the incidents alleged in support of his claim that he would be ill-treated by his maternal uncle in Pakistan, and the immigration and procedural history, etc. have been set out comprehensively in the Board’s Decision.  It is unnecessary to repeat them all over again.  For completeness’ sake, reference can be made to the Board’s Decision, the hyperlink to which is included below[1]. Unless otherwise specified, the Board’s abbreviations and descriptions are adopted herein.

Discussion

3.In view of the seriousness of the issues at hand, I have reminded myself to apply an enhanced standard as required by law (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at §14).  After rigorously examining and anxiously scrutinizing the Board’s Decision, I am satisfied that the Board had accurately set out the burden and standard of proof, the law and key legal principles, assessed the evidence, COI materials, risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation, and upheld a very high standard of fairness.

4.Having considered the totality of the evidence, the Board concluded that the Applicant’s non-refoulement claim based on Torture risk, BOR 3 risk, BOR 2 risk or Persecution risk was not substantiated.  The Board found that the Applicant’s responses and the evidence overall failed to address its concerns which were cumulatively significant.  Consequently, the Board refused to accept that:

(1)   any member of the Applicant’s family owned land or property which was the subject of any dispute with AR, Rizwan or anyone else.

(2)   the Applicant or any members of his family were harmed, threatened with harm or actually harmed in connection with any land dispute, or for any other reason.

(3)   the Applicant’s maternal cousin was shot or that his brother was ever hit.

(4)   the Applicant was ever involved in any of the physical altercations identified, or any verbal or other disputes in respect of the Land.

(5)   the Applicant had faced in the past, or would face a real chance in the reasonably foreseeable future, of harm of any kind from AR, Rizwan or any of their networks for any of the reasons claimed.  

5.It is well-established that the primary responsibility for assessing the evidence, COI materials, risks of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation, etc. lies with the Board.

6.The Applicant has not identified any valid grounds for judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21/2015 (judgment dated 22 December 2016) at §142).  It is inadequate for the Applicant to merely exhibit a copy of the Board’s Decision without showing any procedural or other public law errors allegedly committed by the Board.

7.As the materials provided by the Applicant do not demonstrate any basis or ground to challenge the legality, rationality or fairness of the process below, the Court will not usurp the role of the Board as the primary decision maker (see Re Zunariyah (supra); Re Qadir Sher [2018] HKCA 160; Hounkpedji Messanh v Torture Claims Appeal Board [2018] HKCA 152; Re Rizwan alias Rizwan Gulistan [2018] HKCA 162; Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Masoom Parvez [2018] HKCA 163; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328; Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and Nupur Mst (supra), etc.).

8.I am not therefore satisfied that the Applicant’s intended challenge of the Board’s Decision is reasonably arguable with any realistic prospects of success (see Peter Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung & Another (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676).

Conclusion

9.I accordingly make an order that the Leave Application be dismissed.

Dated the 21^st day of May 2025

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

Form CALL-1