Ahmed Hamza v. Torture Claims Appeal Board

HCAL 954/2020

[2025] HKCFI 2151

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 954 OF 2020

Application for leave to apply for judicial review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)

Following:

	consideration of the documents only; or
	consideration of the documents and the applicant being absent in open court;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:

1.   On this court’s own motion, the name of the putative respondent be amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board”, and “Director of Immigration” be added as the putative interested party.

2.   The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.

Observations for the applicant:

The Leave Application

1.By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 21 May 2020, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board ("the Board") dated 6 May 2020 (“the Board's Decision”).  The Board’s Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:

https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2020/HCAL000954_2020_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf

2.The Board found that the applicant’s claims for non-refoulement protection were not made out on any of the applicable grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“the USM”).  Hence, the Board confirmed the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 17 August 2018 (“the Director’s Decision”).

Amendments 

3.In Form 86, the applicant named “Torture Claims Appeal Board Non Refoulement Claim Petition Office” as the putative respondent and did not name any putative interested party.  However, only the Board should be named as the putative respondent.  The Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office is just an office which provides administrative and secretariat support to the adjudicators of the Board and should not be named as a putative respondent at all. 

4.Thus, this court makes an order on its own motion to amend the name of the putative respondent to “Torture Claims Appeal Board” and to add “Director of Immigration” as the putative interested party.

The applicant’s case

5.It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s Decision, which can be viewed in the hyperlink above.

6.In sum, the applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because he would be harmed or mistreated by members/supporters of the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) (“PML(N)”) if he were to be refouled to Pakistan as he supported the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (“PTI”).

Oral hearing

7.The applicant requested for an oral hearing of the Leave Application. However, the applicant was absent at the hearing on 15 May 2025.

8.As held in Re Abdus Salam [2019] HKCA 1091, an application for leave to bring judicial review should not be dismissed for want of prosecution merely because the applicant failed to attend the oral hearing of the leave application.  The correct approach is to treat the applicant as having withdrawn the request for a hearing by reason of the absence at the hearing, and to proceed to determine the leave application on its merits.

9.Thus, this court will proceed to consider the merits of the Leave Application based on the written materials before this court.

Grounds for judicial review

10.The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).

11.The applicant did not advance any ground for the intended judicial review in Form 86, nor in his supporting affirmation dated 21 May 2020.  The applicant merely stated in the affirmation that he was not satisfied with the decision of Immigration as his life was still in danger in his home country.  

Discussion

12.The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-refoulement claims afresh.  The primary decision-makers in a claim for non-refoulement are the Director and the Board.  They alone assess the evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm, availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation.  The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way of judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).

13.Moreover, only the Board’s Decision is reviewable by judicial process and not the Director’s Decision, as the Director’s Decision was superseded by the Board’s Decision and is no longer susceptible to judicial review (see Re Moshsin Ali [2018] HKCA 549). Thus, this court will only consider the Leave Application in respect of the Board’s Decision.

14.In assessing the appeal by the applicant, the Board held an oral hearing on 12 September 2019.  The applicant was present and was given the chance to present his case and grounds of appeal to the Board in person.  The Board carefully examined his evidence and questioned the applicant for details.   

15.As can be seen from the Board’s Decision, the Board gave very full and detailed reasoning in rejecting the applicant’s claims.  The Board found that the applicant’s evidence with respect to his claimed PTI support to be deficient in many respects and held several other concerns about the plausibility of his claim to be of ongoing interest to PML(N) members.  The applicant admitted that he was not even a member of PTI but a mere supporter. Yet, the Board did not accept that the applicant was or ever had been a supporter of PTI or that he had engaged in any activities in support of the PTI.  As such, the Board found that the applicant’s claims were not credible, as he had not provided a truthful account of his circumstances in Pakistan and the reasons that led him to depart that country. 

16.Thus, after considering all the evidence and in the light of the Board’s findings, the Board concluded that there was not a real risk the applicant would face any of the proscribed forms of harm should he return to Pakistan.

17.The Board did not consider availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation.  However, as the applicant’s claim and the matters giving rise to his claim for non-refoulement protection was rejected in its entirety, it is therefore not necessary for the Board to consider the availability of state protection.

18.As to internal relocation, it is a well-recognised principle that the decision-maker only needs to consider internal relocation if the applicant has established that he qualifies as a refugee pursuant to Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention (see Robinson v SSHD & Anor [1997] EWCA Civ 3090, dated 11.7.1997).  In other words, internal relocation only arises if the applicant has established a real risk of persecution in his home area (see Gardi v SSHD [2002] 1 WLR 2755).

19.As it is the Board’s finding that the applicant had no real risk of any of the proscribed forms of harm, it is not necessary for the Board to consider internal relocation.

20.The assessment of evidence, country of origin information and risk of harm were primarily within the realm of the Board.  The Board is entitled to come to its own conclusion.  If the applicant is seeking to challenge the Board’s finding of facts, it is not permissible in an application for judicial review.

21.Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board had correctly set out the law and key legal principles relating to the applicable grounds under the USM, the burden of proof and the standard of proof.  The Board also correctly identified the issues and observed a very high standard of fairness.  This court could detect no error of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The Board’s Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test, ie it is not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational for the Board to reach its decision. 

22.In Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, the Court of Final Appeal held that for the court to grant leave to apply for judicial review, the claim had to be a reasonably arguable claim which enjoyed realistic prospects of success.  It is the view of this court that the applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence leave must be refused.

Conclusion

23.For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application is dismissed.

Dated the 27^thday of May 2025

Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the respondent’s evidence

Form CALL-1