Ng Yau Sing and Others v. Falcon Insurance Company (Hong Kong) Ltd and Another
Read the full judgment text of HCA 135/2022 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 30 May 2025.
1. The plaintiffs (“Ps”) were the 4 joint owners of a racehorse named “Super Star”.
Cites 5 cases
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HCA 135/2022 [2025] HKCFI 2343 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE HIGH COURT ACTION NO 135 OF 2022 ____________ BETWEEN
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_______________ D E C I S I O N _______________ A. INTRODUCTION 1.The plaintiffs (“Ps”) were the 4 joint owners of a racehorse named “Super Star”. 2.Super Star was euthanized in February 2021 after having failed to respond positively to treatments for a serious respiratory condition. 3.These proceedings involved a claim by Ps against Super Star’s insurers, Falcon Insurance Co (Hong Kong) Ltd (“D1”) and Assicurazioni Generali Societa Per Azioni (“D2”) (collectively as “Ds”), for an indemnity under a Bloodstock Insurance Policy issued on 18 March 2020 (“the Policy”) which covered, inter alia, the “Humane Destruction” of Super Star. 4.The underlying claims were settled by Consent Orders dated 12 and 24 April 2024, under which leave was granted for Ps to accept Ds’ sanctioned payment on 13 April 2022 at HK$100,000 (“Sanctioned Payment”) out of time. 5.What remains in dispute are costs as between Ps and D1.[1] 6.There are two outstanding costs issues. 7.First, there is a dispute as to liability for costs after 11 May 2022, ie the date of expiry of the Sanctioned Payment:
8.Second, there is a dispute as to the applicable scale for taxation purposes:
B. BACKGROUND 9.The following background facts, which have been succinctly summarized by Mr Joshua Chan for Ps in his submissions (Ps’ Submissions”), are not seriously disputed by D1. B.1 The Policy 10.On 18 March 2020, D1 and D2 issued the Policy. 11.The Insuring Agreement at p.J-1 of the Policy provides that:
12.The Glossary at p.J-1 of the Policy defines “Humane Destruction” to mean inter alia:
13.Pursuant to the Equine Agreed Value Clause at p.J-4 of the Policy and the Schedule to the Policy, it was agreed that the Fair Market Value of Super Star for the purposes of the Policy was HK$4.7 million. 14.The Policy also contained a Retirement Clause at p.J-9 which provides that:
15.The use specified in the Schedule to the Policy was “Flat Racing in Hong Kong only”. 16.The Policy was issued upon the acceptance of a letter dated 2 March 2020 from Dr Paul Robinson (“Dr Robinson”) of the Hong Kong Jockey Club (“HKJC”) certifying that Super Star was in good health and condition. 17.The insurance broker in respect of the Policy was Golden Horse Insurance Brokers Ltd (“Golden Horse”). B.2 Super Star’s illness and euthanasia 18.On 5 February 2021, Dr Robinson issued an Ultrasound Report (“the Ultrasound Report”), in which he reported, inter alia, that:
19.On 18 February 2021, Dr Robinson issued a Veterinary Report (General) (“the Veterinary Report”), in which he reported, inter alia, that:
20.In view of the views expressed in the Veterinary Report, on 20 February 2021, Ms Joey Poon Sui Yi (“Poon”) of Golden Horse sent an email to HKJC on behalf of Ps informing the latter that Ps wished to lodge a mortality claim and sought advice as to whether the suffering of Super Star was incurable and so excessive that immediate destruction was imperative for humane reasons. 21.On 22 February 2021, HKJC replied to Poon attaching an email from Dr Robinson in which he advised that “[T]he horse can potentially be treated aggressively but I think this will be a recurring problem and HVCS[5] and I have spoken and recommend euthanasia on humane grounds”. 22.In light of Dr Robinson’s advice:
23.On the same day, Poon emailed staff members of D1 notifying the latter of Ps’ mortality claim for the fair market value of Super Star. 24.On 25 February 2021, Super Star was euthanized. 25.On 2 March 2021, Mr Kenneth Chow (“Chow”) of D1 replied to Poon stating, inter alia, that “we regret to our belated acknowledgement. In fact, we had already appointed Dr Peter Schiff to review the medical issue and a report will be available soonest.” B.3 Denial of claim and exchange of correspondence 26.On 25 March 2021, Ds’ loss adjusters, Robert Scally & Associates (“RSA”), indicated that Ds would deny liability on the ground that:
27.P noted that RSA relied primarily on the views of Dr Robinson in support of its position. It merely relied upon the opinion of Dr Peter Schiff (“Dr Schiff”) as being consistent with and supporting the views of Dr Robinson. 28.Between May and July 2021, Ps’ solicitors Keith Lam Lau & Chan (“KLLC”) and RSA exchanged 6 letters with a view to resolve the disputes between the parties. During this process, KLLC specifically requested RSA by letter dated 7 May 2021 to “provide the names of these [other veterinary surgeons RSA consulted] and details of their views in the form of their reports or contemporaneous records of the consultation for our client’s reference.” 29.This request was however ignored by RSA. 30.RSA instead relied exclusively on the opinions and reports of Dr Robinson in its letters dated 17 May and 19 July 2021. 31.This is illustrated by the following passages in RSA’s letter dated 17 May 2021[6]:
32.In light of RSA’s non-response, KLLC further attempted to clarify the position by requesting RSA by letter dated 20 September 2021 to provide Ps with the report or certification prepared by Dr Schiff or any other veterinary surgeons appointed by Ds pursuant to the Policy such that Ps[7]. In the same letter KLLC reminded “We have then specifically asked you in our letter dated 7 May 2021 to you to provide the other veterinary surgeons you have consulted and details of their views in the form of their reports. But apparently you have ignored our request.” [emphasis added] 33.As an alternative, KLLC indicated to RSA that:
34.By a letter dated 27 September 2021, RSA asserted that Dr Schiff’s report was subject to litigation privilege and refused to release the same to Ps[9]. RSA further reiterated Ds’ position that in light of the concurring views of Dr Schiff and Dr Robinson, Super Star’s suffering was not so incurable and excessive as to require humane destruction. 35.A further request from KLLC for disclosure of Dr Schiff’s report by letter dated 4 October 2021 was declined by RSA on the same grounds in its letter dated 5 October 2021. C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 36.The following procedural history has been summarized by Mr Chan for P of which D1 does not seriously dispute. C.1 The Pleadings 37.On 27 January 2022, Ps commenced these proceedings by issuing a writ and serving the statement of claim (“SoC”) where they claim that they were entitled to an indemnity under the Policy by virtue of Super Star’s humane destruction, pursuant to the opinion and recommendation of Dr Robinson. 38.In their defence dated 11 April 2022, Ds continued to deny liability based on, inter alia, the contention that Super Star’s suffering was not so incurable and so excessive that immediate destruction was imperative for humane reasons. However, Ds did not refer to any opinion of Dr Schiff or any other veterinary surgeon as the basis for such a contention. P claims that Ds pleaded cases was ambiguous as to whether they had appointed any veterinary surgeon for the purposes of assessing whether Super Star’s case fell within the definition of Humane Destruction in the Policy. 39.In their reply dated 6 July 2022, Ps averred, inter alia, that Ds had waived their right to deny Ps’ indemnity on the ground that Dr Robinson was not the veterinary surgeon appointed by them in light of (1) Ds’ failure to inform Ps that they had appointed their own veterinary surgeon, or request Ps to hold off on the euthanization of Super Star pending such appointment; and (2) Ds’ repeated reliance on the opinions of Dr Robinson in the pre-action correspondence.[10] 40.Ds did not file any rejoinder suggesting that they had appointed their own veterinary surgeon. C.2 Discovery 41.The parties filed their respective lists of documents on 28 September 2022. 42.In their list of documents, Ds did not refer to any report or certificate produced by, or any correspondence with, a veterinary surgeon other than Dr Robinson. C.3 Exchange of witness statements and further discovery 43.Ds filed 4 witness statements on 25 November 2022 and 1 December 2022 respectively, including the witness statement of Chow and the witness statement of Dr Schiff, both dated 1 December 2022. 44.Ds filed a supplemental list of documents on 2 December 2022. 45.In these new materials:
46.P claims that Dr Schiff’s opinion was materially different from Dr Robinson’s opinion (as expressed in the Ultrasound Report and the Veterinary Report), in that Dr Schiff opined, inter alia, that:
47.Thereafter, KLLC sent a number of letters to Ds’ solicitors at the time, namely, Messrs Mayer Brown, to protest against the late disclosure of materials which were evidently in Ds’ possession even before proceedings were commenced.[15] C.4 Settlement negotiations between the parties 48.In the same month, the parties recommenced[16] negotiations with a view to settling the claims in these proceedings. This resulted in a mediation session on 9 December 2022, as well as on-and-off without prejudice correspondence in 2023 and 2024.[17] 49.The settlement negotiations culminated in the Consent Orders of Master Hui dated 12 and 24 April 2024 whereby:
D. DISCUSSION D.1 P’s case 50.P’s case is that D1 should pay costs up to 31 December 2022 because of Ds’ alleged deliberate withholding of information and materials highly relevant to their assessment of the Sanctioned Payment. 51.The withheld information and materials that Ps labelled as “relevant materials” are set out in Section B5 of the second affidavit of Ps’ solicitor Poon Sui Wah (“Poon’s 2nd Aff”). I would prefer to call them the new materials (“New Materials”). The key information and materials which had allegedly been withheld by Ds included:
D.2 D1’s Case 52.The following is a summary of D1’s case as stated in Mr Ho’s skeleton argument (“D1’s Submissions”). D.3 In relation to the background facts 53.In relation to the background facts summarized by Mr Chan in P’s Submissions, Mr Ho for D1 has highlighted the following facts in D1’s Submissions. 54.First, Dr Robinson considered that Super Star had pleuropneumonia, ie infection of chest cavity and lungs. He however did not state in the Ultrasound Report or the Veterinary Report that the infection in the lungs was an excessively painful disease. In particular, the word “pain” is not found in the Ultrasound Report and the Veterinary Report. 55.Second, while Golden Horse has referred to Dr Robinson’s email dated 22 February 2021 to support P’s case as definition for “humane destruction”, Dr Robinson email did not reply with a simple “yes”. He qualified his reply by stating that Super Star “can potentially be treated aggressively”, but cautioned that “this will be a recurring problem”, hence he and the Head of Veterinary Clinical Services (“HVCS”) recommended “euthanasia on humane grounds”. 56.Third, while the decision to undergo euthanasia of Super Star was made on 23 February 2021 when the consent form was signed, Dr Schiff only came into the picture after the death of Super Star (he was appointed by Ds on 27 February 2021 only). In other words, D1 claims that before the death of Super Star, the only veterinary surgeon who had expressed any condition of Super Star was Dr Robinson. Further, as was admitted by Ps, Ds have already indicated to Ps, via Golden Horse, on 2 March 2021 that they had appointed Dr Schiff. Thus, the appointment of Dr Schiff was all along known to Ps. 57.Fourth, Dr Schiff’s report was prepared on 11 March 2021. Having set out the chronology leading to euthanasia of Super Star, Dr Schiff stated that:
58.Fifth, although Dr Schiff’s report was not provided to Ps at the pre-action stage (and D1 claims that Ds had no obligation to do so), the gist of Dr Schiff’s comments was provided to D1 in a letter from RSA dated 25 March 2021[19]:
59.RSA stated in another letter dated 27 September 2021 to Ps’ solicitors that:
60.Therefore, D1 says that all the key comments in Dr Schiff’s report have been conveyed to Ps at the pre-action stage. D.4 D1’s pleaded case 61.In Ds’ defence, they have specifically raised, inter alia, the following matters:
62.Mr Ho in particular emphasized the fact that Ds have never pleaded that Dr Schiff was a veterinary surgeon appointed by Ds in accordance with the definition of “humane destruction” of the Policy, or that Dr Schiff produced any certificate in relation to Super Star prior to its euthanasia. Dr Schiff’s name cannot be found in the defence. All along, Ds have not amended the defence. 63.Mr Ho submits that, after the filing of lists of documents, Ps plainly knew that Chow / D1 had communications with Dr Schiff; Dr Schiff had prepared a report; and there must be materials (eg treatment records, trackwork records) provided to Dr Schiff which enabled him to make a report. Yet, Ps did not seek specific discovery. D.5 Legal principles on acceptance of sanctioned payment 64.In relation to the costs on the acceptance of sanctioned payment, the following principles apply. 65.Order 22 r.15 of the Rules of the High Court (“RHC”) provides for the grant of leave to accept a sanctioned payment out of time. 66.Order 22 r.15(3) provides that in cases where the Court grants leave, it shall make an order as to costs. 67.In Or Siu Lung v Fu Hong Home for the Elderly Co Ltd [2018] 1 HKLRD 872, Lam VP (as he then was) set out the following principles in relation to O.22 r.15(3)[20] :-
E. ISSUES TO BE DECIDED 68.Having read counsel’s written submissions and having heard their oral submissions in court, it seems to me that the following are the issues which the Court has to decide in order to determine the arguments in this case:-
E.1 Whether the New Materials were relevant to Ps’ claim 69.In my judgment, the fundamental problem with Ps’ claim in the present proceedings is that it doomed to fail from the word “Go” as Ps had plainly failed to fulfil the terms of the Policy to make Ds liable to pay. 70.In the SoC, Ps pleaded that the conditions for the term “Humane Destruction” as defined in §3(a) of the Glossary of the Policy (“Definition (a)”) were satisfied. 71.I do not agree with that very bold proposition. 72.Definition (a) says:
73.From the plain reading of the above definition, in my view, it is beyond dispute that in order for Ps to succeed in making a claim against Ds under the Policy, they have to fulfill the following 3 conditions:
74.With respect to P’s legal team, I do not think any of the above 3 conditions had been fulfilled prior to Ps consented to having Super Star put down on 25 February 2021. 75.First, in my judgment, no injury or excessively painful disease had been experienced by Super Star prior to it being euthanized. 76.Despite Ps tried to rely on the Veterinary Report to say that Super Star was suffering from an excessively painful disease (See §7 of Reply), and alternatively pleuropneumonia constituted injuries for Definition (a) (See §8.2 of Reply), in my view, this is not supported by the medical evidence made available at the time when the decision was made to euthanize the horse. 77.Dr Robinson said nothing about pain, let alone excessive pain in the Veterinary Report. There is also no description of any objective sign of excessive pain of Super Star. Ps have not called Dr Robinson to make any witness statement and did not adduce any expert evidence. In my judgment, there is simply no factual basis for Ps to say that Super Star had suffered from excessive pain as a result of pleuropneumonia. Ps assertion that pleuropneumonia would lead to excessive pain also cannot stand as it is merely speculation and not supported by any medical opinion. 78.Further, I agree with Mr Ho that Ps’ alternative argument that pleuropneumonia was an injury is against common sense. In that regard, I agree with the following statement of Latham CJ in Hume Steel Ltd v Peart (1947) 75 CLR 242 at 252 cited by Mr Ho:
79.The medical evidence reveals that Super Star had pleuropneumonia over a period of time. It was not caused by a specific incident or event. Dr Robinson explained that pleuropneumonia could be treated by indwelling chest drains and prolonged antibiotic therapy. I agree with Mr Ho that the treatment of antibiotic therapy suggests that the pleuropneumonia might be caused by bacterial infection. 80.In my judgment, the pleuropneumonia suffered by Super Star over a period of time cannot be regarded as an “injury” suffered by it. 81.Second, in order for Ps to make a successful claim under the Policy, they have to show that a veterinary surgeon appointed by Ds shall first to have provide a certificate. 82.Clearly, Dr Robinson was not a veterinary surgeon appointed by Ds to provide such a certificate in this case. 83.Moreover, the Ultrasound Report and the Veterinary Report were not prepared pursuant to the request by Ds. They were addressed to Ps. Specifically, the Veterinary Report contains a note to request it to be forwarded to “all owners and insurance companies (if applicable) involved with this horse”. This indicates that Ds were not even aware of the existence of the Veterinary Report when it was being prepared. 84.Further, there is no evidence to show that Dr Robinson was appointed by Ds to treat Super Star or to express an opinion of whether he should be put down. If anything, the documents show that Dr Robinson (who works for HKJC) was the treating veterinary surgeon appointed by the horse owners (ie Ps in this case) for the horse. He certainly could not speak on behalf of Ds, let alone issuing a certificate for the purpose of authorizing the euthanasia on their behalf, without their specific instructions. 85.Moreover, it is not disputed by Ps that the first time Ds had informed them about Dr Schiff was on 2 March 2021 via Golden Horse. It was for the purpose of informing them that Dr Schiff was being appointed to review the medical issue. This was 5 days after Super Star was put down. Thus, Dr Schiff could not have been appointed by Ds to provide the required certificate. D1 certainly had not mentioned anything about Dr Schiff being appointed by them to certify anything at all. 86.In my view, Ps pleaded case that Dr Robinson was appointed by D1 because he had issued a letter on 2 March 2020 (ie almost one year before Super Star was euthanized) certifying that the horse was then in good health and condition and was a fit subject for Mortality and Restrictive Loss of Use Insurance, is a pretty desperate one. With respect, Dr Robinson’s letter was accepted by the Ds as a Veterinary Certificate at the commencement of cover under condition 2 of the Policy. It was not for the purpose of recommendation of humane destruction of the horse. Ps should have waited for Ds to appoint such a veterinary surgeon by Ds before they make a decision of following Dr Robinson’s recommendation of giving “strong consideration” for the euthanasia of Super Star. 87.Thus, in my judgment, Ps would have failed to fulfil the second condition also. 88.The third condition requires a certification from a veterinary surgeon that the suffering of Super Star was “incurable and excessive that immediate destruction was imperative” for humane reasons. 89.On the issue, I agree with Mr Ho that the Veterinary Report relies on by Ps fell far short to satisfy the third condition for the following reasons:-
90.In my judgment, if Ps would not be able to fulfill those 3 conditions when they made their claim with Ds in the first place, then whatever New Materials which came into the picture later, whether it is in the form of Schiff Report or Schiff Materials, they would not be able to save the day. Thus, seen in such light, in my judgment, the New Materials could not be said to be material or relevant to Ps’ claim against D1 at all. E.2 Whether Ps relied on the New Materials before accepting the Sanctioned Payment 91.Mr Chan submits it is self-evident that Ps would take into account the New Materials when deciding whether to accept the Sanctioned Payment. He submits that the New Materials are not mere “background” documents. They consist of Ds’ witness statements and the exhibits thereto. He says that materials of such a nature would obviously be taken into account when considering any settlement offer. 92.He says that Ps did in fact take such materials into account was specifically confirmed by Mr Ng Yau Sing on behalf of Ps in his evidence.[21] 93.Mr Chan claims that Ps’ reliance on the New Materials is also consistent with and affirmed by the timing of the settlement negotiations leading to the acceptance of the Sanctioned Payment, which shows that (1) the parties recommenced negotiations shortly after the New Materials were filed, and (2) these negotiations led to the eventual settlement of the underlying claims. 94.With respect, I do not see how Ps can argue that they had relied on the New Materials to decide whether to accept the Sanctioned Payment if Ps did not have a case against Ds in the first place. 95.If Dr Schiff was not (and could not be) the veterinary surgeon appointed by Ds for the purpose of certifying whether Super Star had suffered from an incurable and excessive condition, then whatever things he said and whatever materials he gathered (particularly after Super Star was put down) would not have changed anything at all. It simply would not have made any difference to Ps’ claim against Ds, which, as I explained above, was doomed to fail. 96.Thus, whether Ps relied on the New Materials before accepting the Sanctioned Payment is not here nor there as it would have made no difference to the ultimate outcome of the case. 97.It should be noted here that, before Ds filed the defence, Ds’ solicitors issued a detailed without prejudice letter dated 22 February 2022 to Ps explaining why Ps did not satisfy Definition (a):
98.Ds invited Ps to withdraw their claim on a “drop hands” basis within the next 14 days, which was rejected by a lengthy letter from Ps’ solicitors. A second without prejudice offer was made on 24 March 2022, which was rejected with a statement that “We shall leave our client’s counsel to fully argue our case in court. We look forward to receiving your Defence on or before the requested extension of time”. In response to the point that there was no evidence of excessive pain, Ps said “one can learn from the dreadful experience from someone who had been exposed to pneumonia or the recent COVID-19 which is a kind of respiratory infection”. 99.Given Ps’ stance on the matter, Ds filed the defence and raised, inter alia, the same points I have mentioned above. 100.Thus, in my judgment, it is clear that despite Ds had clearly explained why in their view Ps were not entitled to make a claim due to the failure in meeting the 3 conditions under Definition (a), Ps were adamant that they would go ahead with issuing the writ and filing the SoC. 101.The evidence reveals that at no time did Ds make any representation to Ps that they would rely on Schiff Report or Schiff Materials as part of their defence, least that they would rely on them as a “certification” for the humane destruction of the horse. 102.As such, in my judgment, it does not make any logical sense for Ps to claim that they had relied on the New Materials before accepting the Sanctioned Payment as in my view they were irrelevant. If Ps chose to do so, whether on the advice of their legal advisers or otherwise, it is their choice. However, they cannot now claim that they are entitled to claim the costs between the date of Ds making the sanctioned payment and when the New Materials were made available to them. E.3 Whether D1 deliberately withheld the New Materials 103.Mr Ho in his written submissions does not deny the fact that Ds had not provided the New Materials, including Schiff Report, Schiff Materials and Schiff Correspondence, to Ps prior to the issue of proceedings. Instead, what he says is that the gist of Schiff Report can be found in the correspondence between Ps and RSA or Ds’ former solicitors. 104.In my judgment, based on the factual background and procedural history set out above, there is little doubt in my mind that Ds had withheld the New Materials from Ps. They included the Schiff Report, the Schiff Materials and the Schiff Correspondence. They were not disclosed to Ps until the exchange of witness statements in December 2022. 105.Ps say that Ds chose to do so notwithstanding that:
106.In the pre-action correspondence, Ds claimed, through their loss adjustors RSA, that the New Materials were subject to litigation privilege.[22] 107.In my judgment, that was clearly an erroneous assertion made by RSA as it can be seen from the Schiff Correspondence that:[23]
108.I agree with Mr Chan that, thereafter, it is plain Ds adopted a “stonewall” or “cards face down” approach whereby they sought to disclose as little information as possible until the last possible moment, so as to avoid giving away anything which might prejudice their attempt to deny liability. 109.While I agree with Mr Chan that such an approach plainly goes against the spirit and underlying objectives of Civil Justice Reform, in the particular circumstances of this case, for the reasons explained above, I do not consider it has any relevance to the claim made by Ps in the present proceedings nor the decision in accepting the Sanctioned Payment out of time. E.4 Conclusion on the Costs Issue 110.In the aforestated circumstances, I find:
F. SCALE OF COSTS FOR TAXATION F.1 Legal principles on Scale of Costs 111.In relation to the scale of costs upon sanctioned payments accepted without leave under Order 22 r.20 of the RHC, the following principles apply:
F.2 Scale of Costs in this case 112.There is no dispute that for the period which D1 is entitled to costs, such costs should be taxed at the High Court scale. The parties’ difference is on the scale of costs for the period which Ps are entitled to costs (which I find to be up to 11 May 2022 only). 113.By a letter dated 13 April 2022, Ds have indicated to Ps that if the Sanctioned Payment was accepted, Ds would apply to the Court for an order that the costs of this action be taxed on the District Court scale. As held by Bharwaney J in Wong Chim Hing, supra, at §20, if a sanctioned payment of the amount within the jurisdiction of the District Court was accepted for a High Court claim that would constitute an “exceptional circumstance” for the exercise of the Court’s discretion to make an “otherwise order” under O.22 r.20 of the RDC. 114.In my judgment, the fact that Ps were prepared to accept a meagre sum of HK$100,000 for a claim of HK$4.7 million strongly indicates to me that they knew their claim were lack of merits and very likely going to fail in light of the clear terms of the Policy. 115.Further, if the Court can form a preliminary view on whether the claim should have been proceeded in the first place or that a plaintiff’s claim is bound to fail in light of the available evidence, it is a relevant factor for the Court to take into account when considering exercising its discretion on costs: See Chan Fung Yu Anji v Hong Kong Sheng Kung Hui Welfare Council Ltd [2023] 4 HKLRD 223 at §§13, 44. 116.Moreover, it is crucial for Ps and their legal advisers, having considered the evidence available to them at the pre-action stage, to decide whether to issue the proceedings or not. Thus, if there was clear evidence provided to Ps suggesting that they should not have issued the writ, that must be one of the major factors to be taken into account by the Court when exercising its discretion as to what scale of costs should be awarded: Li Suk Yee v Parknshop (HK) Ltd [2024] 1 HKLRD 146 at §§42-45. 117.Based on my analysis above, it is my view that Ps should never have commenced proceedings in the first place as their claim was bound to fail in light of the clear wordings under Definition (a) of the Policy. Further, the fact that they were willing to accept a small sum of less than 2% of the claimed amount after the defence was filed shows that Ps effectively admitted defeat in the case. 118.Thus, I consider that a fair scale of costs for Ps’ costs up to 11 May 2022 should be taxed at the District Court scale. DISPOSITION 119.In conclusion, I would make the following costs order in this case:-
120.Lastly, I would like to thank counsel on both sides for their helpful assistance.
Mr Joshua Chan, instructed by Keith Lam Lau & Chan, for the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Plaintiffs Mr Leon Ho, instructed by John Lam, Law & Co., for the 1st Defendant [1] The parties have agreed for Ps to discontinue their claims against D2 with no order as to costs: see [A/8/49]. [2] Eric Lee Affirmation §4 [A/19/117] [3] Poon Sui Wah Affirmation §8 [A/18/103] [4] Eric Lee Affirmation §§4, 6(12) [A/19/117, 120] [5] ie HKJC’s Head of Veterinary Clinical Services [6] [B/358-359] [7] [B/387] [8] [B/388] [9] [B/390] [10] See Reply §8 [A/3/28] [11] Chow WS §§7-12, 23 [12] As defined under P’s Case below [13] As defined under P’s Case below [14] As defined under P’s Case below [15] See KLLC’s letter dated 8 December 2022 [C/6/410], MB’s letter dated 16 December 2022 [C/7/412], KLLC’s letter dated 3 February 2023 [C/9/415], MB’s letter dated 15 February 2023 [C/11/418] [16] There was a series of WP correspondence between February and April 2022 which did not result in any settlement: see MB’s letter dated 22 February 2022 [C/1/398], KLLC’s letter dated 7 March 2022 [C/2/401], MB’s letter dated 24 March 2022 [C/3/402], KLLC’s letter dated 4 April 2022 [C/4/406] [17] See correspondence at Bundle C Tabs 12-27 [18] Chow WS §§7-12, 23 [19] [B/315-319] [20] Lam VP was commenting on the District Court equivalent of O.22 r.15(3) but those principles should apply equally to the Rules of the High Court. [21] Ng Yau Sing Affirmation §§7-8 [A/20/124-125] [22] See RSA’s letters dated 27 September 2021 [B/390] and 5 October 2021 [B//393] [23] See [B/1/129-134] |
Cases cited in this judgment