Sugiarti v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
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HCAL 250/2020 [2025] HKCFI 2361 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 250 of 2020
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Levy:
Introduction 1.By prescribed Form 86 filed on 23 January 2020, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“Leave Application”). The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“Board”) dated 17 January 2020 (“Board’s Decision”) dismissing the applicant's appeal against a decision of the Director of Immigration (“Director”) dated 6 November 2018 (“Director’s Decision”) rejecting the applicant's non-refoulement claim on all applicable grounds except torture risk[1] which was covered by a prior decision of the Director dated 6 August 2010. The Board’s Decision can be viewed at the following hyperlink: - 2.In her Form 86, the applicant named the Board as the interested party. As the Director should have been the proper interested party, the Form 86 will be accordingly amended on the court’s own motion. 3.The basis of the applicant’s claim was that she would be harmed or killed by her stepfather, who had sexually assaulted her repeatedly. The Board’s reasoning and findings were set out in detail in the Board’s Decision and it is not necessary for me to repeat them. Unless otherwise specified, I shall also adopt the Board’s abbreviations and descriptions stated in the Board’s Decision. 4.At the applicant’s request for a hearing of the Leave Application, this court scheduled a hearing on 24 April 2025. Before the scheduled hearing, the court received a fax dated 31 March 2025 from the Removal Assessment and Litigation (Removal and Deportation) Section (1) of the Immigration Department, stating that the applicant wanted “to withdraw [her] judicial review application” for the reason that she wanted to return to her home country as soon as possible. At the scheduled hearing, the applicant did not turn up at the hearing. A notice of hearing with a reminder[2] of the consequence of absence dated 20 March 2025 was sent to the applicant’s last known address by ordinary post. Several phone calls were made to the applicant’s given telephone number before the hearing, but to no avail. The information before this court shows that the said notice of hearing has not been returned undelivered through the post. 5.In the circumstances, this court will dispose of the Leave Application according to the materials already placed before the court. Discussion 6.The Leave Application operates as a ‘filtering’ process and there is no requirement or expectation to give elaborate reasons for my decision.[3] It is sufficient to state my observations after considering the Board’s Decision and the applicant’s materials adduced. 7.In a proper Form 86, an applicant is required to identify the grounds of judicial review clearly and succinctly[4], and further to make full and frank disclosure of all material facts to be verified by an affidavit. 8.In her Form 86 and supporting affirmation, the applicant did not raise any grounds for judicial review. 9.As the Courts have repeatedly stated, a finding of fact is exclusively within the realm of the Board, which a court in a judicial review will not interfere with unless such finding involved an error of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality.[5] In the present case whilst, the Board found there was a real risk of harm from the applicant’s stepfather, it was however localized. The Board also found that internal relocation would be viable. The Board thus rejected the applicant’s appeal. These are findings of fact, which the court in a judicial review will not interfere with, subject to there being any public law errors. 10.Bearing in mind the enhanced standard that should be adopted in scrutinizing the Board’s Decision, this court is satisfied that the Board correctly applied the law relating to all the grounds and observed a high standard of fairness. The applicant has not shown any errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The applicant’s intended challenge to the Board’s Decision is not reasonably arguable with realistic prospects of success such that would enable this court to grant leave[6]. Withdrawal of Leave Application 11.Having regard to the information stated in the said fax mentioned above, I think it is appropriate, as a matter of practice, to dismiss her Leave Application. Apart from the application to withdraw the Leave Application, there is nothing outstanding in this action. In the circumstances, I make an order to dismiss the Leave Application, and hereby order the dismissal of the Leave Application: see Re Manik Md Mahamudun Nabi [2022] HKCA 471, Ngo Xuan Tuyen v Torture Claims Appeal Board [2024] HKCA 1140. Order 12.The Form 86 is amended on the court’s own motion. 13.The Leave Application be dismissed. Dated the 9th day of June 2025
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1 [1] This refers to the risk of torture as defined in Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap.115. [2] “If the Applicant does not appear at the hearing, he/she will be deemed to have waived his/her right to make oral submissions at the hearing and the Court will deal with his/her application according to the paper already placed before the Court”. [3] Re Zunartyah [2018] HKCA 14 at [23]. [4] Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21/2015, 22 December 2016 at [142]. [5] Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328; Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524. [6] Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment