The Bank of New York Mellon, London Branch v. Xj International Holdings Co., Ltd
Read the full judgment text of CACV 372/2024 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 18 June 2025.
1. This is the petitioning creditor’s appeal against the order of Deputy High Court Judge Le Pichon dated 28 August 2024 (“ the Order ”) dismissing the Petitioner’s winding up petition against XJ International Holdings Co Ltd (“ the Company ”) on the ground that there was a bona fide dispute of the petitioned debt on substantial grounds. The appeal raises the question of which is the proper party in a typical global note (in registered form), a form of debt securities often used in the internati
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CACV 372/2024, [2025] HKCA 481 On Appeal from [2024] HKCFI 1378 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO 372 OF 2024 (ON APPEAL FROM HCCW NO 187 OF 2024) ________________________
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_________________ J U D G M E N T _________________ Hon Chow JA (giving the Judgment of the Court): INTRODUCTION 1.This is the petitioning creditor’s appeal against the order of Deputy High Court Judge Le Pichon dated 28 August 2024 (“the Order”) dismissing the Petitioner’s winding up petition against XJ International Holdings Co Ltd (“the Company”) on the ground that there was a bona fide dispute of the petitioned debt on substantial grounds. The appeal raises the question of which is the proper party in a typical global note (in registered form), a form of debt securities often used in the international capital markets, to give notice of redemption of the bonds. BACKGROUND FACTS (i) The Bonds 2.The Company is an investment holding company incorporated in the Cayman Islands. Its shares are listed on The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (Stock Code 1765). The Company and its subsidiaries are engaged in the business of providing higher education and secondary vocational education primarily in the PRC and Malaysia. 3.Tequ Mayflower Limited (“the Issuer”) is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Company. 4.The Bank of New York Mellon is a banking corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of New York, USA, and has a branch in, amongst other places, London (“the Petitioner”). 5.The petitioned debt in the present case arises out of certain bonds, namely, “US$350,000,000 Zero Coupon Convertible Bonds due 2026” (“the Bonds”), constituted by a trust deed dated 2 March 2021 (“the Trust Deed”) entered into amongst the Issuer, the Company (as Guarantor) and the Petitioner (as Trustee). 6.Under the Trust Deed and an associated agreement called “Paying, Conversion and Transfer Agency Agreement” (“the Agency Agreement”) entered into, amongst others, the Issuer, the Company and the Petitioner dated 2 March 2021, the Petitioner is also constituted (i) the “Principal Agent”/“Paying Agent” of the Issuer/Company, and (ii) the “Common Depositary” (or “Common Depository”), being a depository common to Euroclear Bank SA/NV (“Euroclear”) and Clearstream Banking SA (“Clearstream”), in relation to the Bonds. 7.Pursuant to Clause 3.1 of the Trust Deed, the Bonds would initially be represented by a global certificate (“the Global Certificate”) issued on the same date as the Trust Deed, and the Global Certificate was to be:
8.Although the Global Certificate is physically in the custody of the Petitioner and registered in the name of the Nominee Company, the Bonds are held for the benefit of various parties who have accounts with Euroclear/Clearstream (“the accountholders”). 9.Under the terms of the Global Certificate, the accountholders, referred to as the “owners of interests in the Bonds”, are entitled to have title to the Bonds registered in their names and to receive individual certificates (“Definitive Certificates”) in certain specified circumstances. There is, however, no dispute that the specified circumstances have not occurred, and no Definitive Certificate has ever been issued in the present case. 10.The terms and conditions set out in Schedule 2 to the Trust Deed (“the Conditions”), as modified by the provisions of the Global Certificate, are applicable to the Bonds[1]. 11.Condition 8(D) of the Conditions provides for “Redemption at the option of the Bondholders” (“the Put Option”), and states as follows:
12.It is common ground that Condition 8(D) is intended to be applicable to the situation where a Definitive Certificate or Definitive Certificates has/have been issued to the accountholder(s). As earlier mentioned, only a Global Certificate representing the Bonds has been issued, and no Definitive Certificate has ever been issued to any accountholder in the present case. Hence, in relation to the redemption of the Bonds, the application of Condition 8(D) is modified by a provision in the Global Certificate under the sub-heading “Bondholder’s Redemption” (“the Modified Provision”), which states as follows:
13.Under Clause 2.2 of the Trust Deed, the Issuer covenants that it would, on any date when any Bonds become due to be redeemed in accordance with the Conditions, unconditionally pay to or to the order of the Trustee the principal amount of the Bonds becoming due for redemption on that date provided that, inter alia, subject to the provisions of Clause 2.4 (relating to payment after a default), payment of any sum due in respect of the Bonds made to the Principal Agent as provided in the Agency Agreement shall, to that extent, satisfy such obligation. 14.By Clause 5.1 of the Trust Deed, the Guarantor unconditionally and irrevocably guarantees, as “principal debtor”, the payment obligations of the Issuer under the Trust Deed or the Bonds by the time and on the date specified for payment. 15.Under Clause 9.1 of the Trust Deed, all moneys received by the Trustee thereunder would be held by it on trust to apply them, inter alia, in payment of any amounts (including any principal, premium, interest (if any) and any other amounts), owing in respect of the Bonds pari passu and rateably. 16.By Clause 10.19 of the Trust Deed, each of the Issuer and the Guarantor covenants to the Trustee that it would comply with and perform and observe the Trust Deed, the Agency Agreement, the Bonds and the Conditions relating to any Bonds, and the Trustee is entitled to enforce the obligations of the Issuer and the Guarantor under the Bonds and the Conditions as if the same were set out and contained in the Trust Deed, which shall be read and construed as one document with the Bonds. 17.By Clause 12.26 of the Trust Deed, the Trustee may, at its discretion, take any steps and/or actions and/or institute proceedings against the Issuer and/or the Guarantor to enforce payment of the Bonds after the Bonds have become due and payable. No holder of the Bonds was entitled to proceed directly against the Issuer or the Guarantor unless the Trustee, having become bound to do so, fails to do so within a reasonable period and such failure is continuing. (ii) The exercise of the Put Option 18.Between January and February 2024, the Petitioner received instructions (“the Instructions”) from the accountholders holding 100% (representing US$315,000,000) of the aggregate outstanding principal amount of the Bonds to exercise the Put Option on 2 March 2024. The Instructions were contained in:
19.On 1 February 2024, the Petitioner (as Principal Agent) sent a facsimile to the Issuer notifying it of the nominal value of the accountholders’ instructions electing to exercise the Put Option. On 9 February 2024, the Petitioner further sent an email to (among others) the Issuer and the Company notifying them of the principal amount due for payment on 2 March 2024 upon exercise of the Put Option. 20.It is the Petitioner’s case that the Put Option was validly exercised, and the Issuer/Company were required to pay the aggregate outstanding amount of the Bonds in the sum of US$324,679,040 on 2 March 2024, but they failed to do so. (iii) The winding-up petition 21.On 5 March 2024, the Petitioner served a statutory demand on the Company demanding for repayment of, inter alia, US$324,679,040, being the aggregate outstanding amount of the Bonds. The Company failed to satisfy the statutory demand for more than 21 days after the service of the statutory demand on it. On 27 March 2024, the Petitioner issued the present winding-up petition against the Company pursuant to s 327(3)(b) and (4)(a) of the Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance (Cap 32). 22.Between 5 March 2024 and 3 April 2024, certain accountholders holding, in aggregate, US$45,850,000 in nominal amount of the Bonds requested to cancel their exercise of the Put Option. On 12 March 2024 and 4 April 2024, the Issuer consented to those cancellation requests. The outstanding amount of the Bonds was thereby reduced to US$280,763,160.16 (“the Debt”), comprising US$277,435,200, being the net principal amount due, plus interest thereon (as at 5 July 2024). The winding up petition against the Company was amended accordingly. THE JUDGMENT 23.The Amended Petition was heard by the Judge on 8 August 2024, and she gave a written judgment (“the Judgment”) on 28 August 2024. 24.By the time of the hearing before the Judge, the Company’s opposition to the Amended Petition rested on the sole ground that there was a bona fide dispute of the Debt on substantial grounds. The Company contended that there was no proper or valid exercise of the Put Option in compliance with the Modified Provision, for the following reasons:
25.The Petitioner disagreed with the Company on both points. In respect of the first requirement concerning the giving of notice of exercise of the Put Option, the Petitioner’s case before the Judge was that, as a matter of construction, the party entitled to give notice was the accountholders[5], and they had given the requisite notice to the Petitioner. Its argument, as originally put at §24 of the Skeleton Submissions of the Petitioner dated 23 July 2024 (“the Petitioner’s First Instance Skeleton Submissions”) before the Judge, was that:
26.However, as recorded at §§44-45 of the Judgment, the Petitioner (through its former Senior Counsel, Ms Eva Sit, SC) informed the Judge at the hearing that the Petitioner would not be relying on the words within the parentheses in §24.2 of its written submissions, ie the words “(by the Petitioner qua holder of Global Certificate to itself qua ‘Principal Agent’)” quoted in §25 above. The Petitioner maintained, nevertheless, the rest of §24.2 of its written submissions[6]. Apparently, the Petitioner relied on the Instructions referred to at §18 above as the requisite notices of exercise of the Put Option given by the accountholders (being, on the Petitioner’s construction, the “holder of this Global Certificate” for the purpose of the Modified Provision) to the Petitioner (in its capacity as the Principal Agent) in satisfaction of the notice requirement under the Modified Provision. 27.In respect of the second requirement concerning the presentation of the Global Certificate for endorsement or exercise “if required”, the Petitioner’s position was that the deposit of the Global Certificate was only “if required” under the Modified Provision. The Principal Agent had confirmed that it had not required the Global Certificate to be presented for the exercise of the Put Option, since it already held it. Accordingly, there was no basis to suggest that the Put Option was not validly exercised[7]. 28.As noted by the Judge at §29 of the Judgment, the parties’ respective contentions raised two points of construction of the Modified Provision: (i) the entity entitled to give notice; and (ii) whether the phrase “if required” attached to the requirement to present the Global Certificate or to the time limits for the exercise of the Put Option under the Conditions. 29.The Judge held that the Company had demonstrated that there was a bona fide dispute on substantial grounds that the Put Option had not been validly exercised, and therefore a substantial dispute existed as to the existence of the Debt. In respect of the first point, the Judge’s reasoning was set out at §§63-67 of the Judgment, as follows:
30.In respect of the second point, the Judge likewise held that the Company’s construction was validly raised and plainly arguable[8]. 31.Accordingly, the Judge made the Order dismissing the petition with costs to the Company. THE APPEAL AND THE STRIKE OUT APPLICAITON 32.The Petitioner was not satisfied with the Judgment, and lodged a Notice of Appeal against the Order on 16 September 2024. In the Notice of Appeal, three broad grounds are raised:
In the Notice of Appeal, Grounds 1 and 2 are grouped under the sub-heading “Notice Issue”, while Ground 3 is under the sub-heading “Presentation Issue”. 33.It can readily be seen that the Petitioner’s contention under Ground 1 is different from, and inconsistent with, the case that it ran before the Judge. Before the Judge, the Petitioner argued that the phrase “holder of this Global Certificate” in the Modified Provision referred to the accountholders, whereas under Ground 1, the Petitioner contends that it refers to the Common Depository. 34.On 17 October 2024, the Company issued a summons (“the Summons”) to strike out §§4-11 of the Notice of Appeal on the ground of abuse of process of the court. GROUND 1 – THE PETITIONER’S PRINCPAL CONSTRUCITON 35.We shall deal with Ground 1 and the Summons together. (i) The parties’ arguments 36.Under this ground, the Petitioner contends that the Judge erred in holding that the phrase “holder of this Global Certificate” in the Modified Provision referred to the “Registered Holder” of the Bonds, ie the Nominee Company, and that a valid exercise of the Put Option required the Registered Holder to give notice of exercise of the Put Option to the Principal Agent. Instead, she ought to have held that, upon the true construction of the Modified Provision, the phrase “holder of this Global Certificate” referred to the person holding and having physical custody of the Global Certificate, ie the Common Depository. 37.In the Skeleton Argument for the Petitioner dated 20 March 2025 (“the Petitioner’s Skeleton Argument”), Mr Jat Sew-Tong, SC puts the Petitioner’s case in the following way[12]:
38.On behalf of the Company, Mr Victor Joffe, SC argues that the Petitioner should not be permitted to advance Ground 1, for the following reasons:
39.Mr Joffe further argues that on a true construction, the phrase “holder of this Global Certificate” in the Modified Provision means the Nominee Company, for the following reasons[14]:
(ii) The strike out application 40.The first question which arises for consideration is whether §§4-11 of the Notice of Appeal ought to be struck out on the ground of abuse of process. 41.Mr Joffe relies on the judgment of the Singapore Court of Appeal in JWR Pte Ltd v Edmond Pereira Law Corp and another [2020] 2 SLR 744 to support his argument that the Petitioner’s attempt to re-argue a point which it allegedly “conceded” before the Judge amounts to an abuse of process. In that case, the appellant in a negligence suit which had been dismissed at first instance sought to raise a new allegation of negligence against the respondents which was not raised during the trial. The appellant applied for leave to raise the new point and to amend the statement of claim to plead the new allegation, contending that the new allegation raised a point of law which did not require any fresh evidence, and the respondents could not have offered a satisfactory response to it even if it had been raised at the trial. The Singapore Court of Appeal refused to allow the appellant to raise and rely on the new allegation because if it were to entertain the appellant’s new case on appeal, it would not have all the relevant evidence and findings of fact before it, and there were gaps in the appellant’s case which would have been extremely prejudicial to the respondents. In short, the application was refused based on what is often referred to in this jurisdiction as the Flywin principle. At §32 of its judgment, the Singapore Court of Appeal went on to state as follows:
42.Strictly speaking, the Singapore Court of Appeal’s observation at §32 of its judgment about “abuse of process” was not necessary for its decision, because the court had already come to the view that the appellant should not be permitted to raise and rely on the new allegation in view of the existence of evidential gaps which would be extremely prejudicial to the respondents should the appellant be permitted to run the new allegation in the appeal (§30). We do not read the above observation of the Singapore Court of Appeal as intending to lay down any general proposition that a party who seeks to rely, in an appeal, on a new argument or ground which was not raised in the proceedings from which the appeal is brought is necessarily guilty of abuse of process. Neither do we consider that to be a sound, general proposition of law. 43.In our view, the question of whether a party should be permitted to rely on a new allegation or ground on appeal which was not raised in the proceedings below depends on an assessment of the fairness of the situation. As pointed out by the Singapore Court of Appeal at §27 of its judgment in JWR, “[t]he essential question … is whether the opposing party is unduly prejudiced by the raising of a new point or a totally new case against it”. 44.In the present case, while there could be a reasonable debate on whether the Petitioner’s relevant statement to the Judge (namely, that it would not rely on the contention that notice of the Put Option exercise had been given by the Petitioner qua holder of Global Certificate to itself qua Principal Agent) should properly be regarded as a “concession” on the true interpretation of the phrase “holder of this Global Certificate” in the Modified Provision, it is clear that the Petitioner’s Principal Construction sought to be advanced under Ground 1 is a departure from, and inconsistent with, the case that the Petitioner ran before the Judge. Nevertheless, the correct interpretation of the Modified Provision is a question of law. The Petitioner is not seeking to rely on any new evidence which was not before the Judge in advancing its new case before the Court of Appeal. Essentially, the parties are engaged in the same exercise that was engaged in the court below, save that the Petitioner is seeking to come to a different construction of the Modified Provision. The question which this Court is asked to consider, namely, the true construction of the phrase “holder of this Global Certified” in the Modified Provision, is also the same question that the Judge had to consider. If, as submitted by Mr Joffe, the construction of the Modified Provision now advanced by the Petitioner is inconsistent with the petition and/or the Petitioner’s evidence, that may well mean that the Petitioner cannot prove its pleaded case or make out a proper case for the winding up of the Company, or it may lead to the conclusion that there is a bona fide substantial dispute of the Debt. It does not follow, however, that the Petitioner’s conduct in seeking to put forward the new construction of the Modified Provision should be regarded as an abuse of the court’s process. 45.In passing, we noted that in the Summons, the Company is seeking to strike out the entirety of the “Notice Issue” as set out at §§4-11 of the Notice of Appeal. While §§4-10 of the Notice of Appeal is relevant to Ground 1, §11 is relevant to Ground 2, ie the Petitioner’s Alternative Construction that was argued before the Judge. We can see no basis for striking out §11 of the Notice of Appeal on the ground of abuse of process in any event. 46.In all, we are not persuaded that §§4-11 of the Notice of Appeal ought to be struck out on the ground of abuse of process. (iii) The meaning of “holder of this Global Certificate” 47.The relevant principles for construction of a commercial contract are well-settled, and do not have to be repeated here. 48.In his oral submissions on the proper construction of the phrase “holder of this Global Certificate” in the Modified Provision, Mr Jat places heavy reliance on the fact that the Bonds in the present case took the form of a “global note structure”, which is a form of debt securities often used in the international capital markets. The essential features of a global note structure were explained by Kwan J (as she then was) in Re Jinro (HK) International Ltd (No 2) [2003] 4 HKC 637, at §30-40, and more recently by Deputy High Court Judge Jenkin Suen, SC, in Re Leading Holdings Groups Ltd [2023] 4 HKLRD 71, at §§51-65. The learned Deputy Judge reviewed a number of English authorities, including the judgments of the English Court of Appeal in Elektrim SA v Vivendi Holdings 1 Corp [2008] EWCA Civ 1179, and Secure Capital SA v Credit Suisse AG [2017] EWCA Civ 1486. Mr Jat has also referred us to a helpful summary of the global note structure in Geoffrey Fuller, The Law and Practice of International Capital Markets (3rd edn), at §§1.131-1.132. From the above authorities, one can extract the following salient features of the global note structure which are relevant to a proper understanding of the roles of different parties in the present case:
49.In our view, the correct identification of the party which should be regarded as being the “holder of this Global Certificate” in the Modified Provision depends largely on a proper reading of the provisions of the Trust Deed, Conditions and Global Certificate. They together make up a set of contemporaneous documents which constitute the Bonds and set out the rights and obligations inter se amongst various parties to the Bonds, and ought to be read together and as a whole. 50.The following provisions in the Trust Deed, Conditions and Global Certificate are relevant to the proper interpretation of the phrase “holder of this Global Certificate” in the Modified Provision:
51.The above provisions, read together, would strongly support the Company’s argument that for the purpose of the Trust Deed, Conditions and Global Certificate, the expressions “Bondholder”/“holder of the Bonds”/“holder” (in relation to a Bond) all mean and refer to the person in whose name the Bonds are registered; in other words, the registered holder of the Bonds. It is not in dispute that the person in whose name the Bonds are registered is the Nominee Company. Hence, the phrase “holder of this Global Certificate” in the Modified Provision would likewise mean and refer to the Nominee Company. 52.We are not persuaded by Mr Jat’s arguments advanced in support of the Petitioner’s Principal Construction referred to in §§37(4) to (7) above:
53.There is one other difficulty with the Petitioner’s Principal Construction. As pointed out by Mr Joffe, on the Petitioner’s pleaded case[17] and evidence[18], the Common Depository did not give notice, but received notice, of exercise of the Put Option. Further, it appears not to be in dispute that there is no evidence that the Petitioner (qua Common Depository) ever gave notice of exercise of the Put Option to the Principal Agent[19]. Although, as mentioned at §19 above, there was a facsimile and an email sent by the Petitioner to the Issuer and/or the Company on 1 and 9 February 2024 relating to the exercise of the Put Option, Mr Ma on behalf of the Petitioner has expressly disavowed either as being the requisite notice for the exercise of the Put Option[20]. 54.Faced with this evidential gap about the giving of notice of exercise of the Put Option by the Common Depository, Mr Jat developed a new argument in the course of the hearing of the appeal, to the effect that no notice of exercise of the Put Option was required to be given before there could be a valid exercise of the Put Option, because:
55.We see considerable difficulty with this new argument, not least because (i) it is contrary to the express requirement in the Modified Provision that, in order to exercise the Put Option, notice is required to be given by the holder of the Global Certificate to the Principal Agent, and (ii) it is common ground that Condition 8(D) has no application to the redemption of the Bonds because that condition in its unmodified form is intended to be applicable only to the situation where Definitive Certificate(s) has/have been issued, but no Definitive Certificate has ever been issued in the present case. In our view, the use of the words “may be” in the Modified Provision does not give the Bondholder a free or unrestricted choice of the manner of exercise of the Put Option. In the absence of any other relevant provision, if the Bondholder wishes to exercise the Put Option, it is bound to do so in the manner as prescribed by the Modified Provision. 56.For the purpose of disposing of this appeal, it is not necessary for us to reach a definitive view on the true construction of the phrase “holder of this Global Certificate” in the Modified Provision. Although the construction of a written contract is a question of law and the court may, in appropriate circumstances, be willing to go more deeply in an issue of construction if the resolution of that issue would determine whether there is a bona fide dispute of the petitioned debt on substantial grounds, the legal test is still the same. In a creditor’s winding up petition, if the court comes to the conclusion that the debt is bona fide disputed on substantial grounds, the petition ought to be dismissed, leaving it to the petitioner to establish the existence of the debt in ordinary civil litigation. 57.In our view, it is at least reasonable arguable that, upon the true construction of the Modified Provision, the phrase “holder of this Global Certificate” means and refers to the registered holder of the Bonds (ie the Nominee Company). If this construction of the Modified Provision is correct, the absence of evidence that the Nominee Company ever gave notice of exercise of the Put Option to the Principal Agent in accordance with the requirement of the Modified Provision would mean that there was no valid exercise of the Put Option. It follows that the Judge was correct to conclude that the Debt was bona fide disputed on substantial grounds. GROUND 2 – THE PETITIONER’S ALTERNATIVE CONSTRUCTION 58.The conclusion in §57 above also disposes of the Petitioner’s Alternative Construction under Ground 2. GROUND 3 – THE PRESENTATION ISSUE 59.The conclusion in §57 above means that strictly speaking, Ground 3 does not require determination. For the sake of completeness, we shall briefly deal with it. 60.Under the Modified Provision, the Bondholder’s redemption option may be exercised by the holder of the Global Certificate “…presenting this Global Certificate for endorsement or exercise (if required) within the time limits specified in the Conditions”. The Petitioner argues that the words “if required” qualify the requirement of presentation of the Global Certificate (ie the words preceding “if required”), while the Company argues that they qualify (or attach) to the time limits for exercise of the Put Option (ie the words following “if required”). 61.There is some force in Mr Jat’s submission that it is unnatural and makes little commercial sense to read “if required” as referring to the time limits for exercising the Put Option, because (i) had the parties intended the words “if required” to qualify the timing requirement, it would have been natural and reasonable for those words to be placed after the words “within the time limits specified in the Conditions”, and (ii) the time limits for the exercise of the Put Option are prescribed by Condition 8(D), namely, not more than 60 days and not less than 30 days prior to Put Option Date (2 March 2024), and are not variable at the option of the Bondholder. 62.On the other hand, the Petitioner’s reading of the words “if required” is not without its own difficulties. As submitted by Mr Joffe, the Global Certificate would always be required for one reason or another: if it is an entire redemption, the certificate would need to be cancelled; while if it is a partial redemption, the certificate needs to be endorsed. Furthermore, there is nothing in the Trust Deed, Conditions or Global Certificate which states or implies that the requirement of presentation of the Global Certificate is at the option of the Petitioner. 63.We accept that a natural reading of the provision would tend to suggest that the words “if required” are intended to qualify the preceding words in the Modified Provision (“presenting this Global Certificate for endorsement or exercise”). We also take note of the fact that the parties have not been able to proffer any situation where a redemption of the Bonds would not require the presentation of the Global Certificate for cancellation (in the case of full redemption) or endorsement (in the case of partial redemption). That does not necessarily mean, however, that the requirement of presentation of the Global Certificate is optional, or can be dispensed with at the will of the Petitioner. The requirement for the delivery up of the Global Certificate for cancellation or endorsement is not for the benefit of the Petitioner, but for the Issuer, being the party called upon to redeem the Bonds (wholly or partially). Hence, the Global Certificate is required to be presented to the Principal Agent (as agent of the Issuer). In our view, the true meaning of the words “if required”, and whether there was a valid exercise of the Put Option in the absence of any evidence of presentation of the Global Certificate to the Principal Agent in accordance with the Modified Provision (or any acknowledgement by the Petitioner that it held the Global Certificate in its capacity as the Principal Agent for the Issuer), are moot, and we agree with the Judge that the Presentation Issue also gives rise to a bona fide substantial dispute of the Debt. DISPOSITION 64.The Notice of Appeal and Summons are both dismissed. An overall costs order nisi is made that the Company shall have 80% of the costs incurred in the proceedings in the Court of Appeal (including costs incurred in resisting the Notice of Appeal and pursing the Summons), to be taxed if not agreed, with certificate for 2 counsel only. The above costs order nisi shall become absolute unless an application is made to vary the same within 14 days from the date of this judgment. In the event that an application is made to vary the order nisi, the application shall be dealt with on paper, and the Court will give further directions on the conduct of the application, including the filing of submissions and costs statement/objections in respect of the application.
Mr Jat Sew-tong, SC leading Mr Justin Ho, instructed by Allen Overy Shearman Sterling, for the Petitioner Mr Victor Joffe, SC leading Mr Du Jinsong and Mr Shaun Elijah Tan, instructed by Chan King Wong and Co., for the Company The Official Receiver, absent [1] See the definition of the expression “Conditions” in the Trust Deed, and Clauses 3.1 and 3.2 of the Trust Deed. In the Global Certificate, it is also stated that “[t]he Conditions are modified as follows in so far as they apply to the Bonds in respect of which this Global Certificate is issued.”. [2] See §39 of the Judgment. [3] See §41 of the Judgment. [4] See §§59-60 of the Judgment. [5] See the opening and reply submissions of Ms Eva Sit, SC (the Petitioner’s former Senior Counsel) before the Judge at Bundle C, pp 477-478 and 521-524. [6] See Ms Sit’s reply submissions to the Judge at Bundle C, p 524, lines G-H. [7] See §§24.3 and 24.4 of the Petitioner’s First Instance Skeleton Submissions. [8] See §68 of the Judgment. [9] See §§4-10 of the Notice of Appeal. [10] See §11 of the Notice of Appeal. [11] See §§12-13 of the Notice of Appeal. [12] See §§8-26 of the Petitioner’s Skeleton Argument. [13] See §§8-14 of the Company’s Skeleton Submissions. [14] See §§18-26 of the Company’s Skeleton Submissions. [15] Clause 3.4 of the Trust Deed. [16] See §26 of the Company’s Skeleton Submissions. [17] See §25 of the Amended Petition. [18] See §32 the 1st Affirmation of Ma Chi Hoo filed on 11 June 2024. [19] See §§48 and 49 of the Judgment. [20] See §40 of Mr Ma’s 1st Affirmation, and §47 of the Judgment. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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