Sunani v. Torture Claims Appeal Board
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 1814/2024 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 24 June 2025.
1. The Applicant is a 36-year-old national of Indonesia who arrived in Hong Kong on 23 September 2019 with permission to work as a foreign domestic helper until the expiration of her employment contract or within 14 days of its early termination, but when her last employment was prematurely terminated on 24 January 2022, she did not depart and instead overstayed, and 30 December 2022 she surrendered to the Immigration Department and raised a non-refoulement claim for protection on the basis that
Cites 5 cases
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HCAL 1814/2024 [2025] HKCFI 2592 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO. 1814 OF 2024
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan: The application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed. Observations for the Applicant: 1.The Applicant is a 36-year-old national of Indonesia who arrived in Hong Kong on 23 September 2019 with permission to work as a foreign domestic helper until the expiration of her employment contract or within 14 days of its early termination, but when her last employment was prematurely terminated on 24 January 2022, she did not depart and instead overstayed, and 30 December 2022 she surrendered to the Immigration Department and raised a non-refoulement claim for protection on the basis that if she returned to Indonesia she would be harmed or killed by her former husband for having another relationship with another man in Hong Kong. She was subsequently released on recognizance pending the determination of her claim. 2.The Applicant was born and raised in Java, Indonesia. After leaving school she worked as a domestic servant in Indonesia and Taiwan to make her living until 2016 when she returned to Indonesia to marry her former husband and raised a family with a daughter in her home district. 3.However, soon she discovered that her husband was often without work or income but had incurred many debts, and instead demanded the Applicant to work to support their family and to help him to pay off his debts, and if she refused, he would beat her severely. 4.To avoid his further abuses, the Applicant in September 2019 came to Hong Kong to work as a foreign domestic helper in order to remit money to her husband from her monthly salaries, during which she met and formed a relation with a local Hong Kong resident, but when her last employment was prematurely terminated on 24 January 2022 that she was unable to remit any money to her husband in Indonesia, and when he threatened to kill her upon her return, she was afraid to depart and therefore overstayed in Hong Kong, and subsequently obtained a divorce against her husband, and for which he made further death threats against her, and so she surrendered to the Immigration Department and raised her non-refoulement claim for protection, for which she completed a Non-refoulement Claim Form (“NCF”) on 13 June 2023 and attended screening interview before the Immigration Department with legal representation. 5.By a Notice of Decision dated 11 August 2023 the Director of Immigration (“Director”) rejected the Applicant’s claim on all the applicable grounds including risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (“Torture Risk”), risk of her absolute or non-derogable rights under the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383 (“HKBOR”) being violated including right to life under Article 2 (“BOR 2 Risk”), risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of HKBOR (“BOR 3 Risk”), and risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (“Persecution Risk”). 6.In his decision the Director took into account of all the relevant circumstances of the Applicant’s claim and assessed the level of risk of harm from her former husband upon her return to Indonesia as low due to the low intensity and frequency of past ill-treatment from him, that there is no evidence of any real intention of her former husband to seriously harm or kill her other than angry words and empty threats made on the phone, that in any event it was a private marital dispute between just the 2 of them only without any official involvement that state or police protection would be available to the Applicant if resorted to, and that reliable and objective Country of Origin Information (“COI”) show that reasonable internal relocation alternatives are available in Indonesia with a large population of 270 million people spread across a vast territory of more than 1.9 million square kilometers that it would not be unduly harsh for the Applicant as an able-bodied adult with working experience to move to other areas of the country away from her home district in large cities such as Jakarta where it would be difficult if not impossible for her former husband to locate her. 7.On 22 August 2023 the Applicant lodged an appeal to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) against the Director’s decision, and for which she attended an oral hearing on 21 November 2023 before the Board during which she gave evidence and answered questions raised of her claim by the Adjudicator for the Board. On 28 December 2023 her appeal was dismissed by the Board which also confirmed the Director’s decision. 8.In its decision the Board accepted the Applicant’s claim of fear of harm from her former husband over their marital dispute but found no reliable evidence of any real intention of her former husband to seriously harm or kill her other than some angry words and empty threats, and that in any event it was a private personal dispute between the 2 of them without any official involvement that state or police protection would be available to the Applicant upon her return to Indonesia as well as reasonable internal relocation alternatives for her to move safely to other parts of the country away from her home district without any risk of being located by her former husband that her claim for non-refoulement protection failed on all applicable grounds. 9.On 10 October 2024 the Applicant filed her Form 86 for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s decision, but no ground for seeking relief was given in her Form or her supporting affirmation of the same date in which she just stated that she does not agree with the decision but without putting forth any proper ground for her intended challenge. 10.By then the Applicant was also out of time with her application, as Order 53 rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap. 4A requires that an application for leave to apply for judicial review be made promptly and in any event within three months from the day when grounds for the application first arose unless the Court considers that there is good reason to extend the period within which the application shall be made. 11.As the last day of the three-month period for her to file her Form 86 fell on 28 March 2024, the Applicant was therefore more than 6 months late with her application, and in considering whether to extend time, the Court shall have regard to (i) the length of the delay; (ii) the reason for the delay; (iii) the merits of the intended application; and (iv) any prejudice to the putative respondent and to public administration: AW v Director of Immigration [2016] 2 HKC 393. 12.In the Applicant’s case, a delay of more than 6 months must be considered as very substantial and inordinate, for which she did not provide any explanation or reasons in her Form or affirmation, and as record shows that the decision was sent on the same day of 28 December 2023 to her then reported address which the same as stated in her present application without being returned through undelivered post, I am unable to see any good or valid reason for her such serious delay. 13.As for the merits, if any, of her intended application, as noted above that the Applicant has also failed to put forth any proper ground for her intended challenge. As such, and in the absence of any error of law or irrationality or procedural unfairness in her process before the Board or in its decision being clearly and properly identified by the Applicant, I do not find any merits in her intended application either. 14.As has been repeatedly emphasized by the Court of Appeal, judicial review does not operate as a rehearing of a non-refoulement claim when the proper occasion for the Applicant to present and articulate his claim is in the screening process and interview before the Immigration Department and in the process before the Board where the evaluation of the risk of harm is primarily a matter for the Director and the Board as they are entitled to make such evaluation based on the evidence available to them that the court will not usurp their role as primary decision makers in the absence of any legal error or procedural unfairness or irrationality in their decisions being clearly and properly identified by the Applicant, as judicial review is not an avenue for revisiting the assessment by them in the hope that the court may consider the matter afresh: Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328; Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and Nupur Mst vDirector of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524. 15.In the Applicant’s case, the fact is that it has been established by both the Director and the Board in their respective decisions that the risk of harm in her claim if real is a localized one and that it is not unreasonable or unsafe for her to relocate to other part of Indonesia, there is simply no justification to afford her with non-refoulement protection in Hong Kong: see TK vJenkins & Anor [2013] 1 HKC 526. 16.Having considered the decisions of both the Director and the Board with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, I do not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in either of them, nor any failure on their part to apply high standards of fairness in their consideration and assessment of the Applicant’s claim. 17.Moreover, the Applicant recently on 14 February 2025 filed an affirmation requesting to withdraw her application as she has now been granted a dependent visa by the Immigration Department. 18.In the premises, as I am for the given reasons not satisfied that there is any prospect of success in the Applicant’s intended application for judicial review, and in view of her latest confirmation to withdraw her application for her stated reason, I accordingly dismiss her leave application. Dated the 24th day of June 2025
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence Form CALL-1
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Cases cited in this judgment