Inna Bazhenova and Another v. Ooo Securities (HK) Group Ltd
Read the full judgment text of HCA 2569/2024 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 20 June 2025.
1. By Inter-Partes Summons dated 27 December 2024 (“the Summons”), 1 st Plaintiff (“P1”) and the 2 nd Plaintiff (“P2”) (collectively, “Ps”) apply for:
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HCA 2569/2024 [2025] HKCFI 2745 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE ACTION NO 2569 OF 2024 ______________
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_______________ D E C I S I O N _______________ Introduction 1.By Inter-Partes Summons dated 27 December 2024 (“the Summons”), 1st Plaintiff (“P1”) and the 2nd Plaintiff (“P2”) (collectively, “Ps”) apply for:
2.On 3 January 2025, upon the undertaking by D not to dispose of or deal with or diminish the value of the Shares until the substantive hearing of the Summons, directions were given by Au-Yeung J for the filing of evidence and the Summons was adjourned for substantive argument. The ancillary disclosure order was made by the learned Judge which leaves only the application for the asset preservation order under paragraph 1 of the Summons. The 1st Affirmation of He Chuan (“He 1st”)[1], the managing director of D, was filed pursuant to the ancillary disclosure order. 3.The main affirmations filed in respect of the Summons are:
4.Today is substantive hearing of the Summons. Mr Ng and Mr Tam, counsel, appear for the Ps and Mr Chan SC and Mr Chiu, counsel, appear for D. Background Facts 5.In this action, essentially, Ps claim that:
Applicable Principles 6.O.29, r.2(1) of RHC provides:
7.The applicable principles under O.29, r.2 are set out in Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2025, Vol.1, §29/8/7. These include the following:
Discussion 8.The above principles are not in dispute. 9.However, Mr Chan has submitted that the present application is misguided and should be dismissed. Two main grounds are relied upon: (1) the Shares are not in the possession of D (“the Not in Possession Ground”); and (2) damages will plainly be an adequate remedy (“Damages are Adequate Ground”). 10.In respect of the Not in Possession Ground, Mr Chan submitted, which was not contested by Mr Ng, that on the plain wording of O.29, r.2(1) of RHC, that the Court may make an order under O.29, r.2(1) of any property which is subject matter of the cause or matter in the possession of a party to the cause or matter. Mr Chan drew analogy with proprietary injunctions which are not ordinarily granted where the relevant asset is not or no longer held by the defendant. I agree with this submissions and indeed it is consistent with my recent Decision in Siraj Ahmed v Rafeeq Ahmed & Ors [2025] HKCFI 2472 (see §39). I do not believe Mr Ng contested that an analogy could be drawn with proprietary injunctions. 11.Mr Chan relied on He 2nd at §8[16], where it was deposed that the Shares are presently registered in Ps’ own names and “not through intermediaries, such as D or CCASS, or any depository bank such as Deutsche Bank”. He expressly stated that as D is not the registered shareholder and does not have “direct access to the share certificates or any electronic form of the subject shares”, D has no authority or power to deal with such shares. Whilst Mr Ng took issue whether Mr He had stated on affirmation that he does not have possession of the Shares, I think whilst the word “possession” was not used, in effect that is what he was saying when he stated that he has no direct access to the share certificates. 12.It was further clarified at He 2nd, §10[17] that the assertion in Bazhenova 1st that the Shares were deposited into Ps’ brokerage accounts with D is factually incorrect. In particular, it was stated that the screenshots exhibited in Bazhenova 1st do not reflect the true factual position and the screenshots were not provided or endorsed by the current management or directors of D. It was suggested that the incorrect screenshots may have been a direct result of some misconduct of Mr Issac See, a former employee of AMTD (but was dismissed in April 2024) who was responsible for handling the transaction under the SPA on behalf of AMTD and liaising with D. The screenshots that were exhibited show (as deposed to in Bazhenova 1st, §26)[18] as at 20 October 2023: (1) 115,812 Digital Shares and 2,751,368 Idea Shares were deposited into P1 Account[19]; and (2) 6,096 Digital Shares and 144,807 Idea Shares were deposited into P2 Account[20]. 13.Mr Chan in his written skeleton submissions had submitted that given what was stated in He 1st and He 2nd, namely, that the Shares are not presently in D’s possession, that is conclusive at the interlocutory stage. He referred to Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2025, Vol.1, §24/7/1 but that paragraph is in relation to the conclusiveness of an affirmation of whether a party has or has had any documents other than those disclosed in the context of an application for specific discovery. At the hearing, I believe that Mr Chan agreed with me that the threshold was a serious issue to be tried and that what the defendant states on affirmation on possession of property, in a case where a proprietary injunction and by analogy asset preservation order is sought, is not conclusive. 14.For the purposes of a preservation order, akin to proprietary injunction, it is for Ps to adduce some reasonable evidence of the Shares being held by or under the control of D. See Zhang Yan & Ors v ASA Bullion Limited [2019] HKCFI 179 at §§11(4) per Recorder Eugene Fung SC and 13-16 and Welly Grace Limited & Ors v Keung Yee Man & Ors [2023] HKCFI 3082 at §30 per Recorder Eugene Fung SC. As noted by the learned Recorder in Welly Grace Limited at §27, the function of a proprietary injunction is to preserve the property in the defendant’s hands which is said to belong to the plaintiff. The same is apposite to the preservation order sought by Ps in the present case. Moreover, the court is not concerned with the relative merits of the rival claims. Rather, the party seeking the preservation order has to demonstrate a serious issue to be tried on the merits which include whether the property is in the possession of the defendant. 15.In the present case, I am plainly satisfied that there is reasonable evidence adduced by Ps that there is a serious issue to be tried that the Shares are in the possession of D as they were deposited in the P1 Account and P2 Account by AMTD on 20 October 2023 and has remained in the “Designated Securities Account”:
16.Although it is undisputed that the Shares were registered in Ps’ name, and that is the latest position as confirmed by Conyers, the registrar of the Shares, on 17 January 2025[27], I cannot agree with the bare assertion as they were not registered in D’s name, D does not have possession of the Shares. Besides, this is only one piece of evidence I will have regard to but in light of the matters in the preceding paragraph, I take the view that there is a serious issue to be tried on possession of the Shares by D. 17.As I am not satisfied that there is no serious issue to be tried that the Shares are in the possession of D and consequentially, I do not accept Mr Chan’s submissions that no preservation order under O.29, r.2 can be made and/or it will be futile and/or there is no practical utility to make such an order. 18.In respect of the Damages are Adequate Ground, there is no dispute that if damages are plainly adequate then the preservation order should not be granted: see Samtani v Samtani [2012] 4 HKLRD 872 at §79 applying Feng Loy Chuen v Lim Yiong Lin [1977] HKLR 471. See also Shih Rick Ju-Feng & Ors v Lo Yueh-Li & Ors [2022] HKCFI 1272 at §8. 19.From the SOC, it is plain that Ps are seeking damages against D and has not made any proprietary claim to the Shares. Ps are also seeking for the sale of the Shares by D. Whilst Mr Ng had submitted that Ps had no choice to commence this action to compel D to dispose of the Shares and the wrongful refusal has debarred Ps from triggering AMTD’s make-whole adjustment obligation, so it is not just about damages, but ultimately any inability to trigger the AMTD’s make-whole adjustment plainly sound in damages. 20.In oral submissions, Mr Ng further pointed to evidence that it is highly doubtful whether D operated any substantial and legitimate business given that D never answered Ps’ queries, have gone silent since 28 July 2024, no one answered the door to D’s registered office or answered the phone etc: see Bazhenova 1st, §§59-69[28] and 76 and 2nd Affirmation of Marrin, §5[29]. He had further submitted a supplemental authority, Steven Gee QC, Commercial Injunction, 7th Edn, §2-025, to the effect that where the defendant has no assets or assets against which a judgment could be readily enforced, this can itself be a strong factor in favour of granting an injunction. 21.Mr Chan however objected to Mr Ng raising this ground as it was not raised in the evidence filed nor in Ps’ Skeleton Submissions, and it would be unfair for this court to consider this ground when D could have filed evidence on its financial means and assets’ position. I have sympathy with this submissions. 22.In any event, I am of the view that the matters relied on by Mr Ng viewed against the evidence that D, a Hong Kong incorporated company, remains a licensed entity regulated by the Securities and Futures Ordinance to carry out Type 1, 4 and 9 regulated activities (see He 2nd, §15[30]) is not sufficient to demonstrate that D has no assets to execute any judgment against. 23.Given that I am satisfied that damages would be an adequate remedy and there is no basis to contend that D will not be able to satisfy the Ps’ monetary claim against it, I am not satisfied that something ought to be done for the preservation of the Shares. In all the circumstances of this case, I would not exercise my discretion to make an order under O.29, r.2 of RHC. Disposition and Orders 24.Accordingly, I will dismiss paragraph 1 of the Summons. 25.I shall now hear the parties on costs. [Submissions on Costs] 26.Notwithstanding Mr Ng’s submissions that I should order no order as to costs in view of the conduct of D in not answering their enquiries as to the whereabouts of the Shares which necessitated commencement of this action, I was not persuaded that costs should not follow the event. 27.Having considered D’s Statement of Costs submitted to me at the hearing and Mr Ng’s objections (which I agreed with to some extent as there would be some duplication of the work by three fee earners of D’s solicitors with the involvement of counsel, and some time spent were on the high side), adopting a broadbrush approach, I have summarily assessed D’s costs of the Summons at HK$773,000.[31]
Mr Ernest Ng and Mr Fergus Tam, instructed by H. Y. Leung & Co. LLP, for the 1st and 2nd Plaintiffs Mr Anthony Chan SC leading Mr Byron Chiu, instructed by Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, for the Defendant [1] [A/10/93-97]. [2] [A/9/63-92] [3] [A/13/115-126]. [4] [A/12/107-114]. [5] Statement of Claim (“SOC”), §1 [A/3/27]. [6] SOC, §2 [A/3/27]. [7] SOC, §5 [A/3/29]. [8] SOC, §§6-7 [A/3/29]. [9] SOC, §§9-11 [A/3/30-31]. [10] SOC, §§14-15 [A/3/31-33]. [11] SOC, §20 [A/3/34]. [12] SOC, §§17-18 [A/3/33]. [13] SOC, §§24.3, 25 and 26 [A/3/35-36]. [14] SOC, §§27-30 [A/3/36-39]. [15] SOC, §§31-32 and Prayer [A/3/39-41]. [16] [A/12/110-111]. [17] [A/12/111]. [18] [A/9/77]. [19] [B1/13/166]. [20] [B1/14/167]. [21] [B1/7/95]. [22] [B1/7/97]. [23] [B1/7/98]. [24] [B2/22/307]. [25] [B2/19/234]. [26] He 1st, §6 [A/10/96]. [27] [B2/24/316-317] [28] [A/9/85-87 & 88]. [29] [A/8/60-61]. [30] [A/12/113]. [31] Immediately after the hearing, after I retired to my chambers, I had discovered that I had made a mechanical calculation error such that the figure pronounced in court was incorrect. I have caused my clerk to inform the parties of the correct figure and I do apologize to the parties for the error. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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