Re Dian Lestari and Another

CACV 192/2024, [2025] HKCA 645

On Appeal From [2025] HKCA 39

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 192 OF 2024

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 78 OF 2019)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Cheng J (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.On 3 January 2025, this court (Chow JA and Cheng J) handed down a judgment dismissing the 1^st Applicant’s appeal, but allowing the 2^nd Applicant’s appeal, against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan given on 7 May 2024 refusing to grant leave to both Applicants to apply for judicial review. The Applicants had sought to review the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dismissing their appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) rejecting their non-refoulement claims.

2.The facts and issues in the 1^st Applicant’s appeal, as well as the court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in our judgment.[1] We will not repeat them here.

3.The 1^st Applicant subsequently applied, by a Notice of Motion filed on 7 January 2025, for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. In the Notice of Motion, the 1^st Applicant states that she disagrees with the decisions by the Board and the Director, and contends that her case was not determined fairly (which she already raised in the appeal). She also contends that she would face hardship if she was to relocate to other parts of Indonesia upon refoulement.

4.The 1^st Applicant lodged written submissions in support of the application on 20 January 2025. In the written submissions, the 1^st Applicant essentially repeats her complaints against the Board (which again she already raised in the appeal).

5.Having considered the 1^st Applicant’s Notice of Motion and written submissions, we see no reason to depart from the usual practice of determining an application of this kind on the papers. We have, therefore, determined the 1^st Applicant’s application on the basis of the documents filed.

6.The matters stated by the 1^st Applicant do not constitute grounds for granting leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. The 1^st Applicant has failed to identify any question of great general or public importance for the Court of Final Appeal to determine, as required by section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484. Nor is any such question apparent to us from the matters she has raised.

7.Neither the Notice of Motion nor the written submissions identify any supposed error in our judgment and they raise no ground that is reasonably arguable before the Court of Final Appeal.

8.We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b).

9.For these reasons, the Notice of Motion dated 7 January 2025 is dismissed.

The 1^st Applicant acting in person