Re Shilpe Farhana Easmin
Read the full judgment text of CACV 27/2024 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 30 July 2025.
1. This is the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Lung (“the Judge”) given on 9 January 2024 ( [2024] HKCFI 27 ) dismissing her application for leave to judicially review the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) which dismissed her appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) rejecting her non‑refoulement protection claim.
Cites 7 cases
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CACV 27/2024, [2025] HKCA 648 On appeal from [2024] HKCFI 27 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO. 27 OF 2024 (ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO. 3183 OF 2019) __________________________
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________________ JUDGMENT ________________ Hon Chu VP (giving the Judgment of the Court): 1.This is the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Lung (“the Judge”) given on 9 January 2024 ([2024] HKCFI 27) dismissing her application for leave to judicially review the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) which dismissed her appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) rejecting her non‑refoulement protection claim. 2.The applicant has consented to the appeal being determined by the Court of Appeal on the papers. 3.The applicant is a national of Bangladesh aged 39. She entered Hong Kong in May 2015 with permission to remain to work as a foreign domestic helper. After her employment was terminated on 30 June 2015, she did not depart and has since overstayed. On 23 July 2015 she was arrested by the police. She later raised a non-refoulement claim based on fear of being harmed or killed by the Awami League (“AL”) supporters who had been harassed, threatened and assaulted her because she and her husband supported and had worked for the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (“BNP”). The basis of her claim to the Director was set out in details in [6] of the Director’s decision and [5] to [19] of the Board’s decision. On her appeal to the Board, the basis of the claim was changed. She relied on domestic violence from her husband whom she claimed was an AL supporter and the president of a local AL unit whereas she and her family were BNP supporters. 4.By a Notice of Decision dated 23 October 2018, the Director rejected the applicant’s non-refoulement claim, having considered the torture risk[1], BOR 2 risk[2], BOR 3 risk[3] and persecution risk[4]. 5.The applicant’s appeal against the Director’s decision was heard before the Board on 26 September 2019. At the hearing, the applicant told the Board that only she and her family were BNP supporters whereas her husband and his family were AL supporters, and that in truth her husband was the only cause of her problem in Bangladesh. She explained she had experienced domestic violence from her husband throughout the marriage, and that consequently in 2014 she left with their children to live with her parents in Narail. After that, the AL supporters connected with her husband started to harass her and her family, including assaulting her brother. Her parents and her children later relocated to Dhaka. She and her husband have no contact since 2014. She knows her husband has remarried. 6.By a decision given on 23 October 2019, the Board dismissed the appeal. In gist, for the reasons given in [39] to [57], the Board found her evidence on the key aspects of the non-refoulement claim made to the Director was not reliable and the account she gave to the Director was not credible. The Board, however found her oral evidence relating to her claim of domestic violence compelling and persuasive. The Board accepted that she was subject to physical and psychological violence throughout her cohabitation with her husband from about 2000 to 2014, this was the prime motivation for her leaving Bangladesh to work in Qatar and then Hong Kong, and that her husband has a second wife and has not been in contact with her or their children. The Board also found that there was insufficient evidence of state involvement, the risk of harm from her husband was remote since he had remarried and has not been in contact since 2014, and state protection and internal relocation were reasonably available. The Board concluded that the applicant failed to establish her entitlement to non-refoulement protection under any of the applicable grounds. 7.The applicant filed a Form 86 and an affirmation on 28 October 2019 to seek leave to judicially review against the decision of the Board. She raised a number of grounds against the Director and the Board. The Judge heard the application at a hearing held on 1 November 2023. By a Form CALL-1 dated 9 January 2024, he dismissed the application, holding that the intended judicial review had no prospect of success. 8.The Judge summarised the applicant’s grounds against the Board at [11] and gave his reasons for rejecting them at [12] to [16] as follows:
9.By a notice of appeal filed on 19 January 2024, the applicant sought to appeal the Judge’s decision to this court on the following grounds:
10.The applicant has lodged a written submission which contended that the Board acted in a procedurally unfair manner without properly assessing the applicant’s credibility and high standards of fairness are required, citing extensively from cases on high standards of fairness and Wednesbury unreasonableness. Our reasons for decision 11.The general principles regarding an appeal in a non‑refoulement case have been set out comprehensively by the Court of Appeal in Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at §14. In sum, the role of the court in a judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal. Assessment of evidence and Country of Origin Information materials and risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board (and the Director), who are the primary decision makers. The court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board. Further, an appeal to the Court of Appeal is not an avenue for the applicant to re-argue the case. The Court of Appeal will not interfere with the first instance decision unless it is shown that the first instance judge has erred. 12.It is evident from reading the Board’s decision that there is no objective basis for the applicant’s complaints that the Board did not adequately investigate her claim or appreciate the gravity of her case, or that its assessment of the applicant’s credibility was procedurally unfair:
13.In light of the change in the basis of her non-refoulement claim and the Board’s rejection of her assertion that her husband was an AL supporter, the Board was entitled to hold that there was insufficient evidence to show state involvement. 14.Regarding the complaint of bias and unfairness against the Director, it is a vague, general and unparticularized assertion. In any event, the applicant had already appealed the Director’s decision to the Board. The applicant also failed to relate the legal principles and the judgments quoted in the written submission to her appeal and her claim. 15.In the circumstances, the applicant fails to show that her intended judicial review has a reasonable prospect of success. Leave to apply for judicial review ought therefore to be refused. 16.For the above reasons, the applicant’s appeal has no merits. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
The applicant, unrepresented, acted in person [1] This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383. [2] This refers to the risk of being arbitrarily deprived of life under article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap 383). [3] This refers to risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap 383). [4] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non‑refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. |
Cases cited in this judgment