Chan Long Ning, Christine v. Dickson Concepts (Retail) Ltd

Read the full judgment text of DCCJ 1660/2024 on BabelCite. This District Court judgment was delivered on 19 August 2025.

1. This is the defendant’s application for a restrictive proceedings order (“RPO”) against the plaintiff pursuant to Practice Direction 11.3.

Cited by 1 case · Cites 2 cases

Case No.DCCJ 1660/2024[2025] HKDC 1399
Court
District Court
Date19 Aug 2025
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

DCCJ 1660/2024

[2025] HKDC 1399

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1660 OF 2024

________________

BETWEEN

   CHAN LONG NING, CHRISTINE Plaintiff
  and  
   DICKSON CONCEPTS (RETAIL) LIMITED Defendant

________________

Coram: His Honour Judge Harold Leong in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 3 June 2025
Date of Decision: 19 August 2025

___________________

DECISION

___________________

1.This is the defendant’s application for a restrictive proceedings order (“RPO”) against the plaintiff pursuant to Practice Direction 11.3.

2.The plaintiff, acting in person, was absent in the substantive hearing. I note that she has sent an email dated 10 March 2025 to the defendant’s solicitors enclosing an affirmation of the plaintiff of the same date apparently made in support of her application to attend this hearing “by remote means”. In that affirmation, she stated that she would be “permanently relocating to Canada on 3 April 2025” but would remain “fully committed to these proceedings despite the relocation” etc.

3.Nevertheless, the plaintiff has not taken out any proper applications for remote hearing and no such order was granted.

4.In passing, I note that the plaintiff has similarly ignored proper legal procedures before and she has been directed repeatedly by the court to take out proper applications by way of inter-partes summons. Clearly, the plaintiff has chosen to ignore such again.

5.As such, I have directed that the hearing shall proceed in the absence of the plaintiff.

Background

6.The plaintiff was a former employee of the defendant commencing in December 2019 but her employment was terminated after her probation period following an unfavourable appraisal in March 2020.

7.The plaintiff handed in a letter of resignation dated 13 March 2020 (Hearing Bundle p. 245) stating, inter alia:

“Thank you so much for the opportunity given me to learn and develop, I have genuinely enjoy my time with this company, this is a difficult decision, however, considering my future personal goal and career development, I have accept the offer from another company and an employment contract had been signed…”

8.However, just two days later, on 15 March 2020, the plaintiff wrote an email to the defendant (Hearing Bundle p.248) purporting to “provide further information and supplementary reasons” to her resignation letter, stating, inter alia:

“…I reasonably fears of physical danger by disease and I am subject to ill-treatment by the company for quite a long time by over-low temperature and wrong chair design with potential hazards at my workplace…”

9.Subsequently, the plaintiff lodged a complaint of disability discrimination to the Equal Opportunities Commission (“EOC”) alleging that she was discriminated against because she had taken sick leave from work.

10.The EOC wrote a letter to the defendant on 12 August 2020 (Hearing Bundle p. 66) stating that:

“The Equal Opportunities Commission (the Commission) has conducted investigation into the complaint. Given that the available information appears not supporting the Complainant’s allegations, the Commission had decided to discontinue its investigation.”

11.On 16 June 2020, the plaintiff brought a claim in the Labour Tribunal against the defendant (LBTC 764/2020) for constructive dismissal and unilateral variation of the terms of the employment contract. This claim was settled at HK$3,000 on 9 July 2020 on a without admission of liability basis (Hearing Bundle p.61)

12.On 5 October 2022, the plaintiff commenced a personal injuries action against the defendant (DCPI 3360/2022) claiming loss and damages for post-traumatic stress disorder and depression as a result of various discriminating and bullying acts against her during her employment.

13.Master Stanley Ho struck out the PI action on 29 November 2023 with costs to the defendant.

14.The plaintiff did not appeal against the striking out order but instead, commenced the current proceedings on 27 March 2024 (DCCJ 1660/2024) alleging that she was (as translated)“dismissed by her superior based on discriminatory and fabricated reasons” and that she “suffered damages to her mental health and financial loss” (Hearing Bundle p.2).

15.The defendant applied to strike out the claim on 12 June 2024 as an abuse of process of the Court. Instead of serving an affirmation in opposition, the plaintiff filed an affirmation for leave to file and serve a draft Amended Statement of Claim, but without taking out any formal application.

16.Upon direction of the Master, the plaintiff eventually filed a proper summons for leave to file and serve the draft Amended Statement of Claim on 22 October 2024. This was one of the incidents mentioned in paragraph 4 above.

17.On 28 November 2024, Master Raymond Chu dismissed the plaintiff’s amendment application and allowed the defendant’s striking out application with costs.

18.The plaintiff appealed but this was dismissed by Deputy District Judge Isaac Chan on 2 May 2025. In particular, the learned deputy judge stated that:

a.  all the pleaded reliefs of the plaintiff falls squarely within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labour Tribunal;

b.  Further, the claims relating to the employment contract should also be struck out for being an abuse of process under the Henderson v Henderson principle; as those claims could have been brought in LBTC 764/2020;

c.  Claims concerning disability discrimination, insofar as it was founded on breach of contract, also falls within exclusive jurisdiction of the Labour Tribunal and should be struck out. And insofar that it is a standalone cause of action under the Disability Discrimination Ordinance (Cap. 487), this is time-barred with no justification to extend the time limit; and

d.  In respect of the plaintiff’s claim for her alleged psychiatric injuries, it also arose from the alleged disability discrimination and the alleged breach of employment contract and should similarly be struck out.

Legal Principles

19.HH Judge Mimmie Chan (as she then was) stated in her decision in Wong Yu Cho Rolly v Louie Wong DCCJ 145/2007 that, in determining whether an RPO should be made, the issues are:

a.  Is the plaintiff a vexatious litigant who has abused and is likely to continue abusing the process of the court?

b.  If yes, then what is the class of action to be prohibited under RPO?

20.As to the identification of a vexatious litigant, the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Ltd [2005] 1 HKLRD 473 stated:

“It is not difficult to recognise the activities of the vexatious litigant. The person concerned will almost invariably be unrepresented and will pursue abusive proceedings which usually exhibit some of the following features. Hopeless claims are instituted. Totally misconceived appeals are launched. Judgments of the court, both interlocutory and at trial and both first instance and appellate, may not be accepted. There are likely to be attempts, often repeated, to re-litigate the same matters as have already been determined. The materials filed will often be irrelevant, incoherent or scandalous…”

Considerations

21.From the background and evidence before the court, there is no doubt that the plaintiff displays many characteristics of a typical vexatious litigant. She is unrepresented. She has instituted multiple proceedings at multiple levels of judiciary and quasi-judiciary bodies. She did not accept various judgments and decisions (and preferred her own misguided interpretations of such). She often did not (and perhaps chose not to) follow proper legal procedures. She repeatedly attempted to re-litigate much the same matters despite those matters having been determined or settled.

22.The plaintiff has filed an affirmation in opposition on 4 February 2025. Her main argument appeared to be that a RPO was premature given that the striking out order of Master Raymond Chu was still under appeal at the time.

23.However, Deputy District Judge Isaac Chan has since handed down his decision on 2 May 2025 dismissing the appeal (paragraph 18 above).

24.In any case, the scope of the RPO sought by the defendant only prohibits the commencement of any fresh proceedings, thus the plaintiff’s argument is irrelevant.

25.The plaintiff’s remaining arguments in her affirmation were largely a re-argument of matters already determined by the courts.

26.The other consideration is whether the plaintiff will likely continue to abuse the process of the court.

27.I note that the plaintiff has indicated that she “will be permanently relocating to Canada”. However, she also stated that: “I remain fully committed to these proceedings despite the relocation and will ensure my full anticipation via remote means” (Affirmation dated 10 March 2025, Trial Bundle p.257).

28.Thus, the plaintiff has indicated her commitment to continue with her litigation activities and her claimed relocation to a foreign country would offer no comfort to the defendant.

29.Indeed, given the circumstances, it is unclear whether the defendant would be able to recover its costs from the plaintiff. This has amounted to some HK$165,000 for the striking out application and the appeal alone and has remained unpaid. This is a further justification that the plaintiff should be restrained from instituting further unfounded and cost-wasting proceedings.

Order

30.I would therefore give the order that the plaintiff be prohibited from commencing any fresh proceedings, by whatever originating process, in the District Court concerning any matters involving or relating to or touching upon or leading to the proceedings herein and the proceedings in LBTC 764/2020 and DCPI 3360/2022 against the defendant herein without the leave of the District Court.

31.Accordingly, I would grant order-in-terms of the (draft) Terms of the Restrictive Proceedings Order annexed to the defendant’s Submissions.

32.I would also order the plaintiff to pay costs of this application to the defendant to be summarily assessment if not agreed with certificate for counsel.

33.I note that the defendant has already served the Statement of Costs for Summary Assessment to the plaintiff. I therefore order that the plaintiff shall lodge and serve a Summary List of Objections within 28 days of this decision and the costs will be summarily assessed by paper disposal. If the plaintiff fails to comply with such direction, she is deemed to have elected not to raise any objection and the court will proceed to assess costs.

  (Harold Leong)
District Judge

The plaintiff acting in person being absent

Mr Raymond Tsang, instructed by Messrs Kennedys, for the defendant

Other Judgments in This Case

Further hearings and rulings under DCCJ 1660/2024