Tran Thi Tam v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
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HCAL 842/2020 [2025] HKCFI 3742 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 842 of 2020
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) YW Hew:
Observations for the Applicant: Introduction 1.The Applicant is a national of Vietnam. By a Form 86 filed on 8 May 2020 (“Form 86”), and a supporting affirmation also filed on 8 May 2020 (“the Affirmation”), she sought leave to apply for judicial review of a decision dated 26 March 2020[1] that was exhibited to the Affirmation, and which is one of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“TCAB”)/Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“NRCPO”) (“TCAB Decision”). 2.The Applicant sought an oral hearing of her application, but did not appear at such. I have hence dealt with her application on the papers. 3.I have hence amended the Form 86 of my own motion to reflect the identity of the proper putative respondent and interested party, and the decision in respect of which relief is sought. I will use the abbreviations and definitions from the TCAB Decision unless otherwise specified herein. Background 4.The Applicant’s background and case as to the incidents underlying her claim for non‑refoulement relief are set out in the TCAB Decision. I will not repeat them but, in essence:
Legal Principles 5.An applicant, even one acting in person, is required to identify the grounds of judicial review clearly and succinctly in the Form 86, and to fully and frankly disclose all material facts and potential legal answers (Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, unrep HCAL 21/2015, 22 December 2016, Chow J. (as he was then) at §142; Leung Kwok Hung, unrep., HCAL 83/2012, 28 September 2013, Lam J. (as he was then) at §35; Begum Khadija [2018] HKCA 571; Khan Kamran [2020] HKCA 380). 6.It is trite that the role of the Court in a judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal, and that the Court should not usurp the role of the TCAB/NRCPO which is (and together with the Director are) the primary decision‑makers. The assessment of evidence, COI materials, and credibility, risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the TCAB/NRCPO and the Director, which are entitled to make evaluations based on the evidence available and to decide the weight to be given to them. While the Court will adopt an enhanced standard in scrutinising the decision of the Board due to the seriousness of the issue at hand, the court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the TCAB/NRCPO. (Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328; Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524; Re Kartini [2019] HKCA 1022; Re Rupinder Singh [2021] HKCA 886). 7.In order for me to give leave for judicial review, I have to be satisfied that there is an intended ground of review which is reasonably arguable, which is one that enjoys a realistic prospect of success (Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676). As a leave application of this sort is meant to be a filtering process, I am not expected to give elaborate reasons for my decision (see Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14, at §23). Discussion 8.As the Applicant has not identified or set out any grounds of judicial review in the Form 86 or Affirmation[6], there is no allegation of any procedural unfairness in relation to, of any error of law in, and/or of any irrationality/failure to meet the enhanced Wednesbury test in, the TCAB Decision. 9.However, given the seriousness of the issues at hand, I have considered the TCAB Decision with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, applying the enhanced Wednesbury standard and bearing in mind the need for a high standard of fairness. 10.The TCAB/NRCPO began by setting out the Applicant’s immigration and procedural history and general background (Paragraphs 1 to 7), then listed out the documents that had been submitted in support of her claim before summarising of her case from the NCF and Interview (Paragraphs 8 to 23). Consideration was then given to relevant COI and conclusions were drawn relating to such (Paragraphs 24 to 27), to internal relocation (Paragraphs 28 to 32), and of the legal principles relating to each of the 4 types of risk (Paragraphs 33 to 43). 11.The decision-maker then outlined what had happened at the oral hearing (Paragraphs 44 to 48) before setting out his observations and views on the evidence adduced and his findings as to the Applicant’s credibility and future risk (Paragraphs 49 to 68). In summary, and by this stage, he had concluded from the evidence that:
12.The TCAB/NRCPO then moved on to find that the Applicant did not have a valid claim for Torture Risk, BOR 3 Risk, Persecution Risk, or BOR 2 Risk. In doing so it had regard to its earlier conclusions and other relevant topics such as state acquiescence and the lack of a Convention reason in relation to persecution (Paragraphs 69 to 88). Accordingly, it dismissed the appeal/petition and confirmed the Director’s Decision (Paragraph 89). 13.I do not, from my examination and scrutiny, see that the Applicant has any reasonably arguable case that there was procedural unfairness (bearing in mind the need for a high standard of fairness), an error of law, and/or irrationality/failure to meet the enhanced Wednesbury test sufficient to vitiate the TCAB Decision. This is especially so as to the assessment, reasoning, and findings regarding the Applicant’s evidence and credibility, state protection, the risk of harm, Torture Risk, Persecution Risk, BOR 3 Risk, BOR 2 Risk[7], and internal relocation, which are all matters primarily within the province of the decision-making body. 14.There is hence no basis for the court to intervene by way of judicial review, and I am not satisfied that there are any reasonably arguable grounds for judicial review which enjoy a realistic prospect of success. Conclusion 15.In the circumstances I have ordered that the application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed and made the other orders above. Dated the 2nd day of September 2025 Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1 [1] https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2020/HCAL000842_2020_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf [2] The risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115. [3] The risk of violation of the right to life under article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383. [4] The risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383. [5] The risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. [6] The Applicant’s only substantive allegation in the Affirmation is that “I do not agree with the [TCAB Decision]”, which does not amount to a ground of judicial review. [7] Even if the TCAB/NRCPO erred in law in considering the potential scope of BOR 2 Risk, that would not in and of itself vitiate the TCAB Decision given the TCAB/NRCPO’s rejection of BOR 3 Risk and the absence of any public law basis to vitiate such. There is hence no basis for me to grant leave to apply for judicial review on that ground (See RM v Muttrie (HCAL 166/2015, 3 March 2016) M. Ng. DHCJ. (as she was then) at §52, Kulwinder Kaur [2022] HKCA 49 at §§54 59, Sandhu Vinny [2022] HKCFI 2327 at §§24-26, [2023] HKCA 1261 at §§30, 32-33). |
Cases cited in this judgment