Latif Shoaib v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office

HCAL 1205/2020

[2025] HKCFI 4021

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 1205 of 2020

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)

Following;

	consideration of documents only;          or
	consideration of documents and hearing the Applicant’s submissions in open court;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Philips Wong:

1.  Form 86 be amended as follows:- (1) the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non‑refoulement Claims Petition Office be named as the Putative Respondent; and (2) the Director of Immigration be named as the Putative Interested Party.

2.  The application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.

Observations for the Applicant:

Introduction

1.By Form 86 filed on 17 June 2020 (the “Form”), the Applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (the “Leave Application”) against (1) the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (the “Board”) dated 29 May 2020 (the “Board’s Decision”); and (2) the decision of the Director of Immigration (the “Director”) dated 14 August 2018 (the “Director’s Decision”).

2.The Director’s Decision had already been superseded by the Board’s Decision. The Director’s Decision is not susceptible to judicial review once appeal to the Board had been pursued (see Re: Moshsin Ali [2018] HKCA 549, at §§31-45). Accordingly, in so far as the Applicant seeks leave to apply for judicial review in relation to the Director’s Decision, the application fails in limine and is dismissed.

3.In the Form, the Applicant named both the Director and the adjudicator responsible for the Board’s Decision as the proposed respondents. The Applicant did not name any interested parties. As it is trite that the Board should be the proposed respondent whereas the Director should be the proposed interested party, I make an order to amend the Form on the court’s own motion.

4.The Applicant requested an oral hearing for the application. The hearing took place at 10:00 a.m. on 28 July 2025. The Applicant however only attended the hearing at around noon. The Applicant explained that he mistakenly went to the District Court in Wanchai. I granted indulgence to the Applicant and heard his Leave Application. When asked whether he had anything he wished to say in respect of the Leave Application, the Applicant indicated that he had nothing to say.

Background

5.The Applicant’s background, the basis of his claim and the arguments he advanced had been set out in detail in the Board’s Decision, and it is not necessary for me to repeat the same here. The hyperlink to the Board’s Decision[1] is included below for reference.

Discussion

6.The applicable legal principles relating to application of this sort are well established. The role of the Court in a judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal. The primary decision makers are the Director and the Board. Though in non-refoulement cases, the Court will adopt an enhanced standard in scrutinizing the decision of the Board due to the seriousness of the issue at hand, the Court should not usurp the role of the Board. Assessment of evidence, country of origin information (COI) materials, risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board (and the Director). The Court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board. (See Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524, at §14)

7.The Applicant did not provide any grounds in support of the Leave Application in the Form. In the supporting Affirmation, the Applicant provided a number of grounds which can generally be summarized as follows:-

(1)  The Board’s Decision and the Director’s Decision were not reasonable and fair (as required by the Wednesbury test). The Applicant claimed that his right to life is protected under Article 28 of the Basic Law and Article 2 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap. 383) (“HKBORO”).

(2)  The Board had failed to give the Applicant sufficient time and chance to arrange relevant evidence in support of his claim and appeal.

(3)  The Director had failed to appreciate or give proper importance or weight to the presence of state acquiescence in the Applicant’s case. This had led to an unfair outcome of the case. The Applicant claimed that he was tortured at the behest of the state law enforcement agencies as well as those in the high ups of the political circles. The Applicant submitted that the state should be rendered liable to the Applicant for the acts of the state and its public officials for failing to provide reasonable protection for its citizens under the duty of due diligence.

(4)  The Director had failed to take into account or give enough weight to the Applicant’s argument.

(5)  The Director had failed to consider or give enough weight to the evidence which supports the fact that the police in his country would not be able to protect.

(6)  The Director showed an unfair attitude towards the Applicant or the Applicant’s claims. There was corruption and incompetence of the administration in the Applicant’s country. Various human rights organizations had complied reports on the matter which supports the Applicant’s assertions.

(7)  The Director had failed to attain the high standard of fairness required by the Wednesbury test. As such, the Director’s Decision is unreasonable.

8.I do not consider any of the above Applicant’s contention meritorious. I shall briefly set out my reasons below. In so far as the Applicant’s complaints are made against the Director, I refer to my ruling in §2 above. I shall further consider such complaints as if the complaints were made against the Board as well.

9.In relation to point (1) above, the Board had properly considered the Applicant’s claim under Article 2 of the HKBORO and was entitled, and indeed correct in my view, to conclude that the Applicant had failed to prove that his absolute and non-derogable rights under the HKBORO would be violated upon his return to Pakistan (§§18-24, 49-50 of the Board’s Decision). There was no error committed by the Board in this regard.

10.In relation to Point (2) above, the Applicant attended the hearing before the Board on 9 April 2020. He was given the opportunity to present his case and evidence, and to answer the Board’s queries. However, the Applicant indicated that he had nothing to supplement and refused to answer any questions despite the Board’s warnings (§7 of the Board’s Decision). I further note that the Applicant at no time indicated to the Board that he needed more time to prepare his case or evidence. Accordingly, I do not consider the complaint of the Applicant meritorious. In any event, the Applicant has completely failed to identify precisely what evidence he intended to submit and the relevance thereof.

11.In relation to Point (3) above, the Applicant’s claim is based on the allegation that he was in fear of being killed by his lover’s family (§§9-10 of the Board’s Decision). There was no allegation or evidence to suggest that the state or any public officials were involved, or that the alleged acts of his lover’s family were committed on behalf of the state (§§35-41 of the Board’s Decision). Accordingly, this ground has no relevance in the context of the case.

12.In respect of point (4) above, the Applicant has failed to identify precisely what argument(s) he had advanced which the Board had allegedly overlooked or failed to give sufficient weight. As mentioned above, he had elected not to give further evidence or make submissions at the hearing before the Board. He even refused to answer the Board’s questions.

13.In respect of Point (5) above, the Applicant has failed identify the evidence which he alleged the Board had failed to take into account or give sufficient weight. Further and in any event, the Applicant has failed to explain how this is relevant to the claim in the light of the Board’s finding in §§18-24 of the Board’s Decision. There is also nothing to indicate that the Board’s observations on state protection are erroneous (§§25-26 of the Board’s Decision).

14.In relation to point (6) above, the Applicant has completely failed to demonstrate how the Board had allegedly demonstrated an unfair attitude towards him. The alleged corruption and incompetence of the administration in Pakistan is not relevant given the Board’s finding in §§18-24 of the Board’s Decision. In any event, the Board did consider the alleged problem in Pakistan (§25 of the Board’s Decision).

15.Point (7) above is a general assertion without particulars in support. The Applicant has failed to show how the Board had allegedly failed to attain the high standard of fairness or that the Board’s Decision was unreasonable.

16.Having fully considered the Board’s Decision. I do not find any error of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality. Neither has the Applicant been able to demonstrate any of the same. There is nothing to indicate that the Board had failed to take into account any relevant matters. The Board’s Decision was comprehensive. In particular, the Board was entitled to reject the Applicant’s claims based on the evidence (§§18-24 of the Board’s Decision). The grounds in support of the Leave Application summarized above should be considered in the light of such findings. The Board’s Decision satisfies the enhanced Wednesbury test and is not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational. There is plainly no basis to say that the Board had failed to assess the Applicant’s claims properly.

17.In the premises, I am not satisfied that the Applicant’s intended challenge of the Board’s Decision is reasonably arguable with any realistic prospects of success. Accordingly, I refuse to grant leave for judicial review.

18.Leave application of this sort is meant to be a filtering process and I am not expected to give elaborated reasons for my decision (see Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14, at §23). Suffice for me to state that in reaching the decision, I have considered all the relevant documents before me, as well as the grounds advanced by the Applicant.

Conclusion

19.In the premises, I make an order that the Form be amended as described above and the Leave Application be dismissed.

Dated the 4^th day of September 2025.

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

Form CALL-1