Cb v. Apthorp, Brian Drew
Read the full judgment text of CAMP 42/2025 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 11 September 2025.
1. This is the plaintiff’s renewed application for leave to appeal against the judgment of Deputy District Judge David Chan in DCPI 357/2021 dated 23 July 2024 ( [2024] HKDC 1160 ) (“ Judgment ”).
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CAMP 42/2025, [2025] HKCA 809 On Appeal From [2024] HKDC 1160 & [2025] HKDC 208 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 42 OF 2025 (ON AN INTENDED APPEAL FROM DCPI 357/2021) ________________________ BETWEEN
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________________________ J U D G M E N T ________________________ Hon Anthony Chan J (giving the Judgment of the Court) : Introduction 1.This is the plaintiff’s renewed application for leave to appeal against the judgment of Deputy District Judge David Chan in DCPI 357/2021 dated 23 July 2024 ([2024] HKDC 1160) (“Judgment”). 2.After a 5-day trial, the judge dismissed the plaintiff’s claims. On 14 February 2025, the judge dismissed the plaintiff’s application for leave to appeal against the Judgment for the reasons set out in his decision ([2025] HKDC 208) (“Leave Decision”). On 28 February 2025, the plaintiff filed the present Summons under CAMP 42/2025 to seek leave to appeal from this Court. The grounds of the proposed appeal are set out in the Summons (“Proposed Grounds of Appeal”). 3.Having considered the papers and the submissions of both sides, we exercise our power to determine the application on paper without an oral hearing pursuant to O 59, r 2A(5) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A. Background 4.The background and the respective case of the parties had been set out in considerable detail in the Judgment at [1] to [52]. 5.In short, the plaintiff’s claims against the defendant are for personal injuries suffered, resulting from the defendant’s alleged indecent assaults during the plaintiff’s employment as his domestic helper from 5 September 2018 to 6 August 2019. 6.In her statement of claim, the plaintiff separated the alleged indecent assaults into four categories[1]: (1) the Body Check Assault; (2) the Sexual Massages; (3) the Whipping Incidents; and (4) the Video Watching Incident. Collectively, the judge referred to them as the “Sexual Abuses”[2]. 7.It is not necessary, for the present application, to set out the entirety of the background but to highlight the judge’s approach and summary of his findings. 8.The judge set out the key issues and applicable legal principles in his Judgment at [53]–[55] :
9.The judge then conducted a very detailed analysis of the evidence of both plaintiff and the defendant in respect of liability and came to the following conclusions :
10.The plaintiff now seeks leave to appeal based on the Proposed Grounds of Appeal. Proposed Grounds of Appeal 11.There are three Proposed Grounds of Appeal :
12.Before addressing the Proposed Grounds of Appeal, we outline the applicable legal principles for this application which are well-trodden. Legal Principles 13.Pursuant to s.63A(2) of the District Court Ordinance, Cap 336, leave to appeal shall not be granted by this Court unless it is satisfied that the intended appeal has a reasonable prospect of success or there is some other reason in the interests of justice why the appeal should be heard. Reasonable prospect of success means a prospect that is more than “fanciful” but without having to be “probable”. 14.Given that the Judgment is based upon the judge’s findings of primary facts, there is a high threshold for the plaintiff to surmount to successfully challenge the judge’s conclusions. 15.The applicable principles regarding appeals against findings of fact made by a trial judge are well established. This Court will not overturn the trial judge’s findings of fact unless they are plainly wrong. Absent any palpable error, such as where the finding was one (a) which there was no evidence to support; (b) based on a misunderstanding of the evidence; or (c) which no reasonable judge could have reached, this court will not interfere with the evaluation of the evidence or the weight attached by the trial judge to any piece of evidence. 16.The reasons for deference to be given to a trial judge were set out in Shine Grace Investment Ltd v Citibank NA & Anr [2022] HKCA 1341 at [60] and Cheung Yuk Ying Engracia v MacGregor Isabella [2023] 3 HKLRD 164 at [28]. 17.With these principles in mind, we turn to consider the merits of the Proposed Grounds of Appeal. Analysis 18.As an overview, we note that the plaintiff has not challenged any of the judge’s findings of fact. 19.The thrust of this leave application is the assertion that the judge incorrectly applied the burden of proof. This criticism is premised on the allegation that the defendant had “admitted” 3 of the 4 Sexual Abuses in his Defence and Counterclaim, thereby shifting the evidential burden onto the defendant to substantiate his positive defences. The plaintiff, therefore, argues that given the judge’s observations on the defendant’s evidence, the judge should have found that the defendant had failed to discharge his burden. Consequently, he should have been held liable for the Sexual Abuses[4]. Ground 1 20.There are two parts to Ground 1, namely, (a) the judge erred in failing to identify the issues; and (b) the judge failed to apply the correct burden of proof. 21.In neither the Proposed Grounds of Appeal, nor the plaintiff’s written statement has the plaintiff identified any error by the judge in “failing to identify issues”. 22.In the Judgment, the judge set out, in detail, the plaintiff’s pleaded case[5], the defence[6], the plaintiff’s reply[7], the key issues and applicable legal principles[8], the plaintiff’s evidence on liability[9], the defendant’s evidence on liability[10] and the judge’s analysis on the evidence and discussions on liability[11]. 23.We are unable to see how it can be said that the judge erred in failing to identify the issues of the case. The first contention under this Ground is illusory. 24.Turning to the plaintiff’s second contention, it is striking that the plaintiff asserts that the judge erred in his application of the burden of proof when no challenge is levelled at paragraph 53 of the Judgment, where the judge stated: “[b]roadly speaking the alleged Sexual Abuses are disputed in their entirety by the defendant”. 25.In this application, the plaintiff has not identified any error in the judge’s considerations of the “admissions”. This was also pointed out by the judge in the Leave Decision at [33]. To the contrary, the judge carefully outlined the extent of the defendant’s admissions to the plaintiff’s pleaded case[12]. 26.In any event, we have reviewed the pleadings, in particular the Defence and Counterclaim, and we agree with the judge that the Sexual Abuses were broadly disputed in their entirety by the defendant :
27.Whether or not there were “admissions” which shifted the burden of proof may be tested by asking if the plaintiff’s case were to be determined solely on the pleadings, would it have succeeded? The answer in this case is clearly in the negative. 28.None of the “admissions” were sufficiently broad to relieve the plaintiff from her obligation to prove her claim that the Sexual Abuses took place as pleaded. These were matters which had to be proved at trial.[19] 29.After careful consideration of the defendant’s evidence, the judge held that whilst he was not entirely convinced by the defendant’s case and evidence, he had far greater reservation over the plaintiff’s case, and the problems with the defendant’s case could not help the plaintiff in overcoming the burden of proof[20]. Consequently, the plaintiff’s claim was dismissed. 30.We do not find any error in the judge’s application of the burden of proof. Ground 1 is bound to fail. Ground 2 31.The plaintiff contends that the judge erred in making a general finding that the plaintiff had failed to prove her case without stating which aspects of the Sexual Abuses had not been proved. The plaintiff says this error was attributable to the “admissions”. The plaintiff was not required to prove what had been admitted, and it was for the defendant to prove his positive defences. 32.For the reasons set out above, there were no “admissions” which had the effect of relieving the plaintiff of the burden of proving her case. 33.The plaintiff’s contention that the judge failed to specify which aspects of her case were unproven is unfounded. The judge carefully assessed the plaintiff’s evidence. The Judgment contains a thorough analysis of the inconsistencies, contradictions and imperfections in the plaintiff’s pleadings, evidence in-chief and cross-examination[21]. The judge was clear as to why he rejected the plaintiff’s case. 34.As the defendant points out, the fact that the plaintiff has not specifically challenged the correctness of the judge’s analysis and factual findings is telling. 35.We reject Ground 2 as unarguable. Ground 3 36.The plaintiff submits that the judge erred in failing to reject the defendant’s positive defences. 37.This submission is bound to fail. 38.The judge did not dismiss the plaintiff’s case by accepting the defendant’s version of events, but because the plaintiff had failed to prove her case due, primarily, to the quality of her evidence[22]. At the risk of stating the obvious, rejection of the defendant’s case and evidence does not mean that the judge should agree with the plaintiff’s case. 39.Ground 3 is also rejected as unarguable. Disposition 40.Accordingly, the application is dismissed. 41.As this application is totally without merit, we make a further order under O 59, r 2A(8) that no party may, under rule 2A(7), request this determination to be reconsidered at an oral hearing. 42.There is no reason to depart from the general rule that costs should follow the event. We order that the plaintiff pays the defendant’s costs of this application. Having considered the defendant’s statement of costs lodged on 23 May 2025 for summary assessment, we assess the costs payable to the defendant at HK$80,000. Both the costs order and the summary assessment are on nisi basis, which shall become absolute in 14 days in the absence of any variation application made within such time. 43.The plaintiff’s own costs be taxed in accordance with Legal Aid Regulations.
Mr Erik Shum and Ms Yvonne Leung, instructed by Patricia Ho & Associates, for the Plaintiff Mr Jacky Ho, instructed by Haldanes, for the Defendant [1] Judgment, [6] [2] Judgment, [7] [3] [2023] HKDC 1792, [144]–[147] [4] Plaintiff’s written statement, Section B [5] Judgment, [6]–[29] [6] Judgment, [30]–[46] [7] Judgment, [47]–[52] [8] Judgment, [53]–[55] [9] Judgment, [56]–[170] [10] Judgment, [171]–[216] [11] Judgment, [217]–[286] [12] Judgment, [34]–[43] [13] Defence and Counterclaim, [11]–[20] [14] Defence and Counterclaim, [21]-[26] [15] Defence and Counterclaim, [23] [16] Defence and Counterclaim, [27]–[29] [17] Defence and Counterclaim, [30] [18] Plaintiff’s written statement, [9] & [9.4]; Judgment [43] [19] Leave Decision, [38]–[42] [20] Judgment, [285] [21] Judgment, [218]–[264] [22] Judgment, [267] |
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