China Energy Development Holdings Ltd v. Yeung Ka Sing, Carson
Read the full judgment text of HCA 784/2021 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 4 September 2025.
1. The Plaintiff’s application in paragraph 4 of its summons amounts to asking for advance permission at any time up to a day before trial to substitute the Plaintiff’s existing expert witness for a different expert witness, Ms Minesha Wong. The Plaintiff’s position today is that the advance permission is sought up to a week before trial. Whilst Ms Wong has made an affirmation to say that she has been the point of contact with P’s solicitors in the preparation of Mr Sperry’s report and that she
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HCA 784/2021 [2025] HKCFI 4323 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE ACTION NO. 784 OF 2021 ________________________ BETWEEN
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________________________ D E C I S I O N ________________________ 1.The Plaintiff’s application in paragraph 4 of its summons amounts to asking for advance permission at any time up to a day before trial to substitute the Plaintiff’s existing expert witness for a different expert witness, Ms Minesha Wong. The Plaintiff’s position today is that the advance permission is sought up to a week before trial. Whilst Ms Wong has made an affirmation to say that she has been the point of contact with P’s solicitors in the preparation of Mr Sperry’s report and that she would adopt his report in full, she has not at present prepared any expert report to that effect, or to fully explain the nature of her involvement in the preparation of her report. 2.As Ms Tang, counsel for the Defendant, has pointed out, the applicable principles are set out in Chinachem Charitable Foundation Ltd v Chan Chun Chuen [2009] 5 HKC 190 at [19] to [27]. It is a matter of case management, bearing in mind that the primary aim in exercising the court’s powers is to secure the just resolution of disputes in accordance with the parties’ substantive rights, and bearing in mind considerations such as fairness to the parties, the explanation for the change of witness, and so on. 3.In the present case, the Plaintiff’s explanation for why it may ultimately wish to seek a substitution of experts is understandable, given Mr Sperry’s condition. However, it does not follow that the Plaintiff should be given blanket permission to make this decision at any time up to the eve of the trial, or even one week before. I accept Ms Tang’s submission that it would be unfair for the Defendant to have to bear the burden of preparing two sets of cross-examination on the basis that either expert witness may be called. Whilst Ms Wong may be prepared to adopt Mr Sperry’s report, this does not mean that the line of challenge to her evidence would be the same as if Mr Sperry were to give evidence. In particular, given that Ms Wong appears to have only had a relatively small part to play in the preparation of Mr Sperry’s report, the Defendant may seek to cross-examine her on the basis that she is not in a position to speak to the contents of her report, or indeed to the discussions between the parties’ experts. Furthermore, the Defendant at present does not know the full extent of Ms Wong’s involvement, so preparation of even this line of cross-examination would be somewhat hampered. 4.The Plaintiff was given leave to adduce evidence from one, not two, experts; the Defendant is entitled to know the identity of that expert. 5.If and when the Plaintiff makes an application for substitution of its expert, that application will be considered based on the circumstances prevailing then. 6.I therefore dismiss paragraph 4 of the Plaintiff’s summons of 22nd August 2025. There is no objection to an order in terms of paragraphs 1-3 and 5 of the summons, and I make an order in those terms.
Mr Jacky Lam, instructed by Lawrence Chan & Co., for the Plaintiff Ms Valerie Tang, instructed by Tam, Pun & Yipp, for the Defendant |
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under HCA 784/2021