Re Yegbessi Romaric Bruno
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CACV 184/2025, [2025] HKCA 854 On Appeal From [2025] HKCFI 1287 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO 184 OF 2025 (ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 2328 OF 2019) ________________________
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________________________ J U D G M E N T ________________________ Hon Au JA (giving the Judgment of the Court): 1.This is the applicant’s appeal against the order of Deputy High Court Judge To (“the Judge”) dated 3 April 2025 ([2025] HKCFI 1287) (“the Leave Decision”) refusing his application for leave to apply for judicial review against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) dated 29 July 2019 (“the Board’s Decision”), whereby the Board dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 29 August 2018 (“the Director’s Decision”) refusing his non-refoulement claim. 2.The applicant failed to attend the hearing of the appeal held on 2 September 2025. Upon telephone inquiry by the court clerk, the applicant claimed that he was not aware of the hearing as he did not receive the Notice of Hearing dated 23 July 2025. This court thus directed the applicant to state his reasons for absence in writing for the court’s consideration. As of this date, no written correspondence has been received from the applicant. 3.In the circumstances, the applicant has not provided any further explanation for not attending the hearing of the appeal. In relation to the alleged explanation that he had not received the Notice of Hearing, we reject it as a bare assertion, since according to the court record, the Notice of Hearing was sent to the last known address of the applicant and was not returned undelivered by the Post Office. We will therefore proceed to consider and determine his appeal on paper. BACKGROUND 4.The applicant is a national of Benin and Nigeria.[1] He last entered Hong Kong on 11 June 2017 as a visitor and overstayed. He surrendered to the Immigration Department and made a non-refoulement claim on 14 July 2017, on the basis that, if refouled, he would be harmed or killed by his paternal uncle because of their land dispute. Details of the applicant’s claim were summarised by the Judge at [3] - [8] of the Leave Decision. 5.By the Director’s Decision, the Director dismissed the applicant’s non-refoulement claim on all applicable grounds including torture risk[2], BOR2 risk[3], BOR3 risk[4], and persecution risk[5]. 6.The applicant appealed the Director’s Decision to the Board on 10 September 2018. The applicant attended an oral hearing before the Board on 4 March 2019. By the Board’s Decision, the Board dismissed the applicant’s appeal, and confirmed the Director’s Decision. The Board’s reasons were summarised by the Judge at [9] - [12] of the Leave Decision:
THE LEAVE DECISION 7.On 13 August 2019, the applicant filed a Form 86 to apply for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision. No ground of review was given by the applicant in his Form 86 or supporting affidavit. 8.The applicant attended an oral hearing before the Judge on 17 March 2025.[6] By the Leave Decision, the Judge refused to grant him leave to apply for judicial review. His reasons were stated at [14] - [16] of the Leave Decision:
THIS APPEAL 9.In his Notice of Appeal filed on 9 April 2025, the applicant stated:
10.The applicant lodged his written submissions on 28 July 2025. In those submissions, he cited various legal authorities in relation to the high standards of fairness and procedural fairness, but failed to elaborate on how they apply to his case. DISCUSSION 11.The Court of Appeal’s general approach in dealing with appeals in non-refoulement cases is set out in Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14]. In particular, in an appeal against refusal of leave to apply for judicial review in non-refoulement cases, the Court of Appeal will only examine the decision of the judge in light of the grounds advanced by the applicant. If no viable ground is put forward to reverse the judge’s decision, the appeal should be dismissed. The court’s role is not to examine the decision maker’s decision afresh as if it were a fresh application for judicial review (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14(6)]). 12.Further, the assessment of evidence, County of Origin information (“COI”), risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board and the Director. The court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board: Re Kartini [2019] HKCA 1022. 13.In our view, the applicant’s allegations have no substance. The applicant’s complaints are all against the Board’s Decision and not the Leave Decision. His complaints are also all general and vague without specific particulars or evidence in support. General assertions of his fear if refouled also do not constitute proper grounds of appeal: Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar [2022] HKCA 627 at [6]. More importantly, he fails to point out how the Judge erred in his decision. His allegations therefore do not constitute proper grounds of appeal. 14.In any event, we have considered the Leave Decision carefully and are unable to see any arguable ground of appeal against the decision. The Judge considered the allegations raised by the applicant and gave detailed reasons for his decision. We see no basis to disturb the Leave Decision. 15.The applicant’s appeal against the Leave Decision has no merit and is dismissed.
The applicant acting in person, absent [1] Although the applicant provided his Benin passport to the Immigration Department, the Board found that the applicant is a national of both Nigeria and Benin: see [33] - [37] and [45] of the Board’s Decision. [2] This refers to the risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115. [3] This refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383. [4] This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383. [5] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. [6] The applicant was absent in the original oral hearing held on 27 January 2025. The oral hearing was then adjourned to be heard on 17 March 2025. |
Cases cited in this judgment