Limbu Meenu v. Director of Immigration Department

HCAL 2088/2025

[2025] HKCFI 4531

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 2088 OF 2025

________________

________________

__________________

D E C I S I O N

__________________

A.  Introduction

1.By her Form 86 dated 16 September 2025, the Applicant seeks leave to apply for judicial review so as to challenge the decision made on 5 September 2025 by the Director of Immigration not to grant her an extension of stay.

2.Having considered the Form 86, together with the Applicant’s affirmation of the same date filed in support, I am satisfied that I can deal with this application on the papers. This is my Decision.

B.  Basis of Intended Challenge

3.The Form 86 does not set out any description of the relief sought, or the grounds on which relief is sought. That is a breach of the mandatory rules found in Rules of the High Court Order 53 rule 3.

4.However, the background to the intended challenge can be seen set out in the Applicant’s affirmation, which also has a section at the end which is said to identify the grounds for her application. The materials identify that the impugned decision made on 5 September 2025 was in fact the result of her second request for reconsideration of a decision originally made by the Director on 28 April 2025. That decision arose in the following circumstances.

5.The Applicant came to Hong Kong as a Foreign Domestic Helper, though she does not identify when she came.

6.Apparently she married her husband (“Husband”) on 5 February 2025. Thereafter, on a date she does not provide, she applied for an extension of stay and change of status under the sponsorship of the Husband. She says that since she filed the application the Husband has been employed as a marketing manager earning a monthly salary of HK$25,000. She also identifies that she and the Husband had a daughter, born on 30 July 2025. The daughter currently lives with her and the Husband in Hong Kong.

7.The application for extension of stay and change of status was rejected by the Director on 28 April 2025. It was rejected, she says, because the Director was not satisfied that the Husband was capable of supporting her living as a dependant in the HKSAR at a standard well above the subsistence levels.

8.The Applicant made her first application for reconsideration on 2 May 2025, and at the same time applied for documents submitted in the minutes of the application for extension of stay under the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance so as to have a better understanding of the reasons for refusal. From that material produced (though it is not attached to her application in these proceedings), the Applicant understood that the application had been rejected because the Director raised concerns about the genuineness of the Husband’s employment and due and outstanding loans.

9.Thereafter, the Applicant submitted further documents which included an employment letter issued by her employer, MPF contributions records, IRD records and bank statements showing the transactions for salary in support of the employment of the Husband. Representations were also made for the outstanding loans and photos of gold jewellery were provided as proof of assets.

10.However, the reconsideration request was refused by letter dated 24 July 2025.

11.The second reconsideration request was made by the Applicant on 6 August 2025, and requested the Director to consider that she had given birth to her daughter and to consider the adverse effects on the daughter of rejecting the Applicant’s visa application.

12.However, the second reconsideration was rejected by letter dated 5 September 2025.

13.The only attachment/exhibit to the affirmation is a copy of the letter dated 5 September 2025. In short, it stated that after careful consideration of all the information made available on the circumstances of the case, the request for reconsideration of the original 28 April 2025 decision was refused, as no new grounds had been raised for reconsideration. Therefore, the letter pointed out, the refusal decision previously conveyed by the letter of 28 April 2025 still stands.

14.Under the heading ‘Ground for my application for leave to Judicial Review’ in her affirmation, the Applicant made the following points:

(1)  The Husband had been working for the same employer since August 2024, earning a stable income, and all documentary evidence had been provided to show the genuineness of that employment. But the Director failed to consider the documentary evidence submitted.

(2)  She submitted that she had clearly demonstrated assets in the form of gold jewellery and the outstanding loans were already written off, so no adverse effect should be drawn from the fact of outstanding loans.

(3)  The Director failed to consider that a daughter was born in the marriage, and if the Applicant were to return to India, that would lead to a lot of hardship for the whole family.

(4)  Leave should be granted for judicial review because the Applicant’s case is based on unfair rejection of her extension of stay application and her application should have been approved.

15.In essence these points identify that the Applicant’s complaint is that the Director failed to consider certain materials provided, and that the application for extension of stay should have been granted, and because it was not that makes the rejection unfair.

C.  Consideration

16.As I have indicated above, it is a mandatory requirement of the rules governing applications for leave to apply for judicial review that the applicant sets out on the application form the relief claimed and the grounds put forward in support of that relief. Any relevant grounds would, of course, be the usual public law grounds such as illegality, procedural impropriety, or irrationality.

17.Further, it is not for the Court to seek to divine potential public law grounds of review from the materials provided by an applicant.

18.This is all because the Court exercising its judicial review jurisdiction does not sit as some form of appellate body. The Court exercising its judicial review jurisdiction is concerned with the integrity of the decision-making process, not the underlying merits of the decision. Whether or not to grant a visa is a matter for the Director (to whom the relevant statutory powers have been given), and the weight to be given to the various matters in the consideration of that decision is also a matter for the Director, subject only to possible judicial interference on traditional public law grounds.

19.Not only has the Applicant failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of the rules, the complaints made in her affirmation either (1) do not amount to public law grounds of review, or (2) fail to identify any such grounds at all, or (3) plainly are without basis.

20.The criticism that the Director has failed to consider certain matters put forward in support of the application is directly countered by the content of the decision letter, which states that the decision was made “after careful consideration of all the information made available and circumstances of the case”.

21.Further, a general claim that a decision is “unfair” does not, with respect, identify a public law ground of review. There is no allegation of illegality, and there is no proper basis identified to support an allegation of any procedural impropriety. For an applicant to establish an arguable case on irrationality (or Wednesbury unreasonableness), the hurdle is high. The Applicant has not put forward anything arguably capable of clearing that hurdle.

22.It also seems to me to be relevant that the challenge is connected to the original rejection of the application for the extension of stay visa and change of status, given on 28 April 2025. Any intended judicial review challenge to that decision was well out of time by the date of the present Form 86. Whilst the Form 86 identifies as its target the second reconsideration decision given on 5 September 2025, it is trite that merely asking for reconsideration of a previous decision does not of itself extend the time within which a judicial review challenge should be made. That would of course be only more so if there is a second request for reconsideration. That is also particularly so where – as in this case – the Director has identified that the reconsideration request does not identify any new grounds for reconsideration of the previous refusal.

23.In so far as there is some reference to the position of the daughter or family hardship, and even assuming that fact can be said to amount to new circumstances previously unknown to the Director (which is far from clear), it is well settled that there is no legal requirement for the Director to take into account such humanitarian or compassionate factors in making his immigration decisions. Further, if the Director chooses to take such factors into consideration, the weight to be accorded to them is a matter for him, subject only to interference on irrationality grounds. The materials provided by the Applicant do not identify any such reasonably arguable ground.

D.  Result

24.The Applicant has failed to identify any reasonably arguable public law grounds of appeal with any realistic prospect of success. Further, there is at least significant doubt as to whether the application is out of time.

25.Therefore, the Applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review is dismissed. I make no order as to costs.

The applicant, acting in person