Re Lippo Ltd
Read the full judgment text of HCMP 909/2025 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 19 September 2025.
1. At the hearing of the petition presented by Lippo Limited (力寶有限公司) (“ Company ”), I sanctioned the scheme of arrangement between the Company and the “Scheme Shareholders” (as defined in §4 below) (“ Scheme ”) pursuant to ss.673 and 674 of the Companies Ordinance (Cap. 622) (“ Ordinance ”) and confirmed the reduction of the Company’s share capital in connection with the Scheme pursuant to s.229 of the Ordinance. These are the reasons for my judgment.
Cites 6 cases
|
HCMP 909/2025 [2025] HKCFI 5034 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 909 OF 2025 ___________________
___________________
__________________________________ REASONS FOR JUDGMENT __________________________________ 1.At the hearing of the petition presented by Lippo Limited (力寶有限公司) (“Company”), I sanctioned the scheme of arrangement between the Company and the “Scheme Shareholders” (as defined in §4 below) (“Scheme”) pursuant to ss.673 and 674 of the Companies Ordinance (Cap. 622) (“Ordinance”) and confirmed the reduction of the Company’s share capital in connection with the Scheme pursuant to s.229 of the Ordinance. These are the reasons for my judgment. A. BACKGROUND 2.The Company[1] was incorporated on 30 January 1973 as a private company limited by shares under the former Companies Ordinance (Cap. 32) (“Former CO”). On 30 July 1991, the Company changed to its present name. The Company’s shares have since 21 March 1973 been listed on the Main Board of The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited (“HKEx”) (stock code: 226).[2] 3.The Company is an investment holding company. It holds equity interests in subsidiaries and associates (together “Group”) whose principal businesses include property investment and development, food business, healthcare services, mineral exploration, and securities and treasury investment.[3] A significant part of the Group’s business is carried out by a principal subsidiary, Lippo China Resources Limited (力寶華潤有限公司) (“LCR”), whose shares are also listed on the Main Board of HKEx (stock code: 156).[4] The Company through a wholly owned subsidiary, Skyscraper Realty Limited, holds 74.99% shareholding in LCR. 4.The Company’s issued shares are 493,154,032 ordinary shares, of which 369,800,219 shares (representing 74.98% of its issued shares) are held by its parent company, Lippo Capital Limited (“Lippo Capital”). The remaining 123,353,813 shares (representing 25.02% of the Company’s issued shares) (“Scheme Shares”) are held by other shareholders (collectively “Scheme Shareholders”) whose shares will be acquired and cancelled upon the Scheme becoming effective. 5.On 16 May 2025, the Company and LL Capital Holdings Limited (“Offeror”), a wholly owned subsidiary of Lippo Capital,[5] jointly announced that the Offeror had requested the Board of the Company to put forward a proposal which comprises privatisation of the Company by way of the Scheme, withdrawal of listing of the Company’s shares on HKEx and distribution in-specie of the shares in LCR (“Proposal”). 6.By joint announcement dated 28 May 2025 issued by the Offeror and the Company pursuant to Rule 3.5 of the Code on Takeovers and Mergers (“Takeovers Code”) (“Joint Announcement”), further details of the Proposal were provided. 7.Lippo Capital and 4 individuals holding 242 Scheme Shares (collectively “Individual Concert Parties”) are parties acting in concert with the Offeror for the purpose of the Takeovers Code.[6] 8.The details of the Proposal are set out in a composite scheme document dated 23 July 2025 (“Scheme Document”) which contains, inter alia, an explanatory statement (“Explanatory Statement”), a notice of the meeting of the Scheme Shareholders (“Notice”) convened at the direction of the court for the purpose of considering and voting on the Scheme (“Court Meeting”), a letter from the Board, a letter from the Independent Financial Adviser (“IFA”) and the Scheme. The Scheme Document has incorporated and reflected the comments made by this Court at the convening hearing held on 15 July 2025. 9.The reasons for putting forward the Scheme are as follows:
10.Upon the Scheme becoming effective:
B. DISCUSSION B1. Applicable principles 11.The Company applies for an order to sanction the Scheme under s.673 of the Ordinance. 12.The approach of the Court in considering whether to sanction a scheme of arrangement between a company and its shareholders has been summarised in Re Chong Hing Bank [2021] HKCFI 3091, §27 (citing Re China Agri-Industries Holdings Limited [2020] HKCFI 570, §4, per Harris J). In short, the court will consider:
B2. Permissible purpose 13.It is well-established that privatisation of a listed company is a permissible and acceptable purpose for a scheme of arrangement (Re Chong Hing Bank Ltd, §28; Re China Agri-Industries Holdings Limited, §5). B3. Sufficiently similar legal rights 14.The Scheme Shareholders hold ordinary shares in the Company. They will receive the same Scheme Consideration in exchange for their shares and will have the same right to elect between the Cash Alternative and the Scrip Alternative (except the “Non-Qualifying Shareholders” as defined in §31 above) under the Distribution. They have sufficiently similar legal rights and could consult together with a view on their common interest at a single meeting. B4. Court Meeting duly convened 15.The Court Meeting was duly convened in accordance with the order made at the convening hearing on 15 July 2025 (“Order”) in that:
B5. Sufficient information about the Scheme 16.The Scheme Shareholders were provided with sufficient information about the Scheme to make an informed decision whether or not to support it by the following means. 17.In the Scheme Document, the Company provided:
B6. Approval by requisite majority 18.As submitted by Mr Jose Maurellet SC[20], the Scheme constitutes a takeover offer under s.674(4) of the Ordinance and, therefore, must be approved by Scheme Shareholders representing not less than 75% of the voting rights of the shareholders present and voting at the Court meeting (majority in value test) and the votes cast against the Scheme should not exceed 10% of the voting rights attached to all “disinterested shares” in the company (negative 10% test).[21] The term “disinterested shares” is defined in s.674(3)(a) of the Ordinance. 19.In the present case, the “disinterested shares” comprise all the Scheme Shares other than the 242 Scheme Shares held by the Individual Concert Parties. 20.As recorded in the Order:
21.The Court Meeting was convened and held on 20 August 2025:[24]
22.In the premises, the Court Meeting was duly constituted for the purpose of compliance with the requirements of the Ordinance, and the Scheme has been approved by the requisite majority of the Scheme Shareholders as required by s.674(2)(a) of the Ordinance. B7 Discretionary considerations 23.In considering whether an intelligent and honest man acting in accordance with his interests as a member of a class might reasonably approve the scheme, the Court would be slow to differ from the majority’s view, as normally businessmen are much better judges of what is to their commercial advantage (Re Chong Hing Bank Ltd, §38). 24.In the present case, there are no factors which warrant the Court exercising its discretion against sanctioning the Scheme. 25.First, Lippo Capital and the Individual Concert Parties did not attend or vote at the Court Meeting. This meets the requirements under Rule 2.10 of the Takeovers Code (Re Chong Hing Bank Ltd, §§66-67). 26.Second, the IFA, having considered the terms of the Proposal, recommended the disinterested Scheme Shareholders to vote in favour of the Scheme. There is nothing before the Court to suggest that the Scheme Shareholders who voted in favour of the Scheme did not act in accordance with his interests as a member of the class. 27.Third, whilst the turnout rate at the Court Meeting was modest – only approximately 25.12% of the Scheme Shares were present and voting[25] – I do not consider the low turnout rate to be a factor against sanctioning of the Scheme. There is nothing to suggest that the vote was unrepresentative of the class or that the low turnout rate was the result of any defect in the notification process or any other factor that might call the vote into question. 28.To the contrary, the Scheme Document was duly dispatched to the Scheme Shareholders and has been published on the Company’s website since late July 2025. The Scheme Shareholders were afforded ample time and opportunity to consider the Proposal and decide whether or not to attend and vote at the Court Meeting or raise any objection at the sanction hearing. 29.Fourth, the Offeror has provided an undertaking to be bound by the Scheme and to do all acts and things as may be necessary or desirable to give effect to the Scheme[26] (see §20(1) above). 30.There are 2 other matters which concern the Distribution to which I now turn. B8. Arrangement for Non-Qualifying Shareholders 31.According to the Company, the Scrip Alternative, if made available to those Scheme Shareholders residing in the relevant jurisdictions[27], may trigger applicable legal or regulatory requirements including the requirement to issue a prospectus or to register the Distribution unless the exemptions apply[28] (collectively “Non-Qualifying Shareholders”). The Board, having considered the additional time and resources necessary to comply with such requirements, formed the view that it would be necessary and/or expedient to exclude the Scheme Shareholders in the relevant jurisdictions from electing the Scrip Alternative so that they will only be entitled to receive the Cash Alternative (“Arrangement”). 32.The proposed exclusion of the Non-Qualifying Shareholders from having the right to elect the Scrip Alternative was an issue raised and addressed by the Company at the convening hearing. This Court expressed a reservation as to whether Rule 13.36(1)(a) of the Listing Rules is engaged. 33.Mr Maurellet submits that Rule 13.36(1) of the Listing Rules applies to the Scrip Alternative even though it involves distribution of the shares in LCR (as opposed to shares in the Company), for the following reasons:
34.Despite the cogent submissions of Mr Maurellet, I am inclined to the view that Rule 13.36(1)(a) of the Listing Rules does not apply to the Scrip Alternative for the following reasons:
35.If, contrary to my view, Rule 13.36(1)(a) applies to the Arrangement, Mr Maurellet submits that the Company is entitled to rely on the exemption in Rule 13.36(2)(a) given that:
36.I agree with Mr Maurellet that if Rule 13.36(1)(a) applies to the Scrip Alternative, the Arrangement comes under the exemption in Rule 13.36(2)(a), which permits the Company to exclude the offer of the Scrip Alternative to “any shareholder that is resident in a place outside Hong Kong provided the directors of the issuer consider such exclusion to be necessary or expedient on account either of the legal restrictions under the laws of the relevant place or the requirements of the relevant regulatory body or stock exchange in that place”. B9. Prohibition on Financial Assistance 37.Finally, there remains for consideration a distinctive feature of the Proposal – the Distribution – which is inter-conditional with the Scheme. At the convening hearing, the Company very fairly drew to the Court’s attention that the Distribution may raise a concern as to whether it offends the principle that a company cannot provide financial assistance for acquisition of its own shares. 38.To address this issue, the Company has placed before the Court a legal opinion from independent counsel, Mr John Scott SC and Mr Han Sheng Lim (“Opinion”). The Opinion analyses whether, in the context of the Proposal, the Distribution constitutes financial assistance by the Company and, if so, whether any statutory exception is engaged. 39.Mr Maurellet adopts the analysis in the Opinion and submits that:[32]
40.As I explain below, I accept the analysis set out in the Opinion insofar as it concludes that the Distribution prima facie constitutes financial assistance for the reasons there articulated. 41.However, I am unable to accept the contention that the Board’s declaration of a special distribution out of distributable reserves, without more, suffices to bring the Distribution within the Dividend Exception. In my view, the phrase “dividend lawfully made” in s.277(a)(i) of the Ordinance, as a matter of both ordinary company law principles and the legislative intent underpinning the Dividend Exception, requires the relevant organs vested with the power to declare a dividend to pass the requisite resolutions in accordance with the requirements of the Ordinance and the articles of association before the company can rely on the Dividend Exception. B9.1 Statutory Framework 42.The statutory prohibition against a company providing financial assistance for acquisition of its own shares is contained in ss.274 to 289 of the Ordinance. 43.S.275(1) of the Ordinance provides that:
44.S.274(1) sets out non-exhaustive forms of “financial assistance”, including financial assistance given by way of gift, guarantee, security, indemnity, release or waiver, and relevantly, “any other financial assistance given by a company if the net assets of the company are reduced to a material extent by the giving of the assistance”. 45.The term “financial assistance” is not defined in the Ordinance. As the Opinion correctly observes, it is necessary to have regard to English authorities, given the common legislative lineage and close textual similarity between s.275(1) of the Ordinance and the equivalent provisions found in s.151(1) of the Companies Act 1985 (“CA 1985”) which has since been replaced by s.678(1) of the Companies Act 2006 (“CA 2006”). Where local and foreign legislation are in pari materia, case law on the foreign legislation is material (Mansion House Securities Ltd v Chong Chi-Yan [1987] HKLR 60, at 63H, per Clough JA). 46.S.275(1) of the Ordinance is derived from s.47A(1) of the Former CO, which in turn was modelled upon the now-repealed s.151(1) of CA 1985. S.151(1) provided in materially identical terms that:
47.S.151(1) CA 1985 (insofar as it applied to private companies) was repealed with effect from 1 October 2009,[33] inter alia, on the basis that shareholders and creditors were adequately protected by other aspects of company law and that the prohibition produced arbitrary outcomes.[34] The prohibition was retained for public companies in s.678(1) CA 2006 in terms materially similar to s.151(1) CA 1985. In these circumstances, s.275(1) of the Ordinance, s.151(1) of CA 1985 and s.678(1) of CA 2006 are properly to be regarded as in pari materia for the purposes of construction.[35] B9.2 Distribution prima facie constitutes financial assistance 48.The modern approach to identifying financial assistance was considered in Chaston v SWP Group plc [2003] BCC 140, where Arden LJ (as she then was) explained that the words “financial assistance” have no technical meaning and that the Court must look to the commercial realities of the transaction as a whole. The ultimate question is whether, as a matter of commercial reality, the transaction in question “smoothed the path to the acquisition of shares” (§§32, 38, 39). 49.This fact-sensitive and commercial approach builds upon the earlier decision of Charterhouse Investment Trust v Tempest Diesels Ltd [1986] BCLC 1, in which Hoffman J (as he then was) held that financial assistance can be constituted by “a net transfer of value” which reduces the price a purchaser would have to pay for the shares “if the transaction as a whole had not taken place”. 50.Applying these principles to the present case, the Court must look beyond the separate provision of the Scheme Consideration (to paid by the Offeror) and the Distribution (to paid by the Company) under the Proposal and consider whether, as a matter of commercial reality, the Distribution operates to assist the Offeror’s acquisition of the Scheme Shares. I agree with the Opinion that it does. 51.Although the Distribution is structurally distinct from the Scheme Consideration, the commercial reality is that the Distribution forms an integral and inseparable part of the overall return the Scheme Shareholders will receive under the Proposal. The Scheme Document makes it clear that “there will not be a situation where the Scheme Shareholders will only receive one but not the other”, and invites Scheme Shareholders to assess the premiums by reference to the combined value of the Scheme Consideration and the Distribution. That being the position, the Scheme and the Distribution should be regarded as a composite offer when assessing the commercial substance of the transaction. 52.I agree with the Opinion[36] that the following factors, taken together, lead to the conclusion that the Distribution prima facie constitutes financial assistance. 53.First, the Distribution will reduce the net assets of the Company. As the Scheme Document provides, the Distribution will be funded out of the Company’s distributable reserves,[37] which will be available for distribution to the shareholders by way of dividend if they remain as shareholders of the Company. The payment of the Distribution thus falls within the category of “any other financial assistance given by a company if the net assets of the company are reduced to a material extent by the giving of the assistance” under s.274(1)(d)(i) of the Ordinance. 54.Second, the Distribution constitutes “a net transfer of value” of the type envisaged by Hoffman J in Charterhouse, in that it reduced the price the Offeror would otherwise have to offer to acquire the Scheme Shares. Both the Joint Announcement and the Scheme Document (rightly) presented the Distribution as part of the overall consideration, and shareholders were invited to vote by reference to premiums calculated on the combined entitlement. Viewed in that way, the Company’s Distribution enabled the Offeror to acquire the Scheme Shares at a price materially lower than what the Offeror would have to pay if the Proposal had not been structured to include the Distribution. Putting it in another way, the Distribution “smoothed the path” to the Offeror’s acquisition of the Scheme Shares in the sense articulated in Chaston. By substantially enhancing the total value receivable by Scheme Shareholders, the Distribution made the Proposal commercially attractive and facilitated its approval by the requisite statutory majorities. 55.Finally, the Distribution is assistance given “before or at the same time as the acquisition takes place” within s.275(1). As stated in the Scheme Document:
56.Accordingly, at the time the Scheme becomes binding and effective, the Company comes under an obligation to make the Distribution. 57.For the reasons set out above, I hold that the Distribution prima facie constitutes financial assistance within the meaning of ss.274 and 275 of the Ordinance. B9.2 Dividend Exception 58.Notwithstanding a transaction constitutes financial assistance, it may fall outside the statutory prohibition if it comes within any of the exceptions contained in ss.277 to 282 of the Ordinance. 59.For present purpose, the relevant provision is s.277(a)(i) of the Ordinance, which provides that:
60.Mr Maurellet, adopting the Opinion, argues that the Distribution falls within the Dividend Exception on the following basis:[40]
61.I agree that “dividend lawfully made” comes within the legislative intent underpinning the Dividend Exception and, therefore, should not fall foul of the prohibition against financial assistance. The rationale was explained in the Jenkins Report in this way:
62.However, I am unable to agree that the Distribution, without more, can be regarded as “dividend lawfully made” within the meaning of s.277(a)(i) of the Ordinance. While a distribution from distributable reserves may take the form of a declaration of dividend, it cannot without more be treated as a “dividend lawfully made” unless and until the organs having the power to declare a dividend (in this case, the Board and the general meeting) have in fact passed the resolutions to that effect. There are 2 main reasons for this. 63.First, s.277(a)(i) itself mandates that the Dividend Exception only applies to “dividend lawfully made”. This must be a reference to a declaration of dividend made in accordance with the requirements of the Ordinance and the articles of association of the company concerned:
64.Second, it is well established that without a declaration of dividend by the organs having the power to do so, a dividend cannot be said to have been made to the shareholders, and the shareholders acquire no enforceable right to claim it. A dividend is only made when it has been declared in accordance with the company’s articles, and confirmed or approved by the shareholders in general meeting:
65.In my view, the safeguard contemplated by the legislature in enacting the Dividend Exception is that the dividend must be properly declared in compliance with the provisions of the Ordinance and the company’s articles. It is only upon such declaration that the company’s liability to pay the dividend arises, and the payment of the dividend becomes the discharge of a lawful liability; and it is only upon the declaration of a dividend in accordance with the provisions of the company’s articles that equality of treatment between holders of the same class of shares is ensured. 66.In light of the foregoing, while I accept that the nature and economic substance of the Distribution is akin to a distribution of a dividend (as Mr Maurellet puts it), I am unable to accept that it qualifies as a “dividend lawfully made” for the purposes of s.277(a)(i) in the absence of the requisite resolutions passed by the Board and the general meeting approving the Distribution as a declaration of dividend. To treat the Distribution as “dividend lawfully made” in the absence of the requisite resolution would, in my view, be inconsistent with the wordings of s.277(a)(i) of the Ordinance and would undermine the legislative safeguards that the Dividend Exception was designed to preserve. 67.For the same reason, while I agree that the Court’s scrutiny of the Scheme provides a significant safeguard to the Scheme Shareholders, that is not the safeguard contemplated by the Dividend Exception, which was crafted on the basis that the statutory requirements for declaring a dividend provides the necessary protection. 68.In the present case, the power to declare dividends are conferred on the Board and the general meeting in that (1) article 154 provides that “the Company in general meeting may declare dividends in any currency, but no such dividends or distributions shall exceed the amount recommended by the Board”;[45] (2) article 155(A) provides that “the Board may from time to time pay to Members such interim dividend as appear to the Board to be justified by the profits of the Company”; and (3) article 156 provides that “No dividend, distribution or other moneys payable by the Company on or in respect of any share shall bear interest against the Company nor be payable except out of the profits of the Company lawfully available for distribution of the Company in accordance with the Companies Ordinance”. 69.To address the issue, Mr Maurellet upon taking instructions from the Board, provides an undertaking to the Court that the Board would pass the requisite resolutions so as to bring the Distribution within the Dividend Exception, and to submit the minutes recording resolutions to be passed by the Board within the same day of the sanction hearing. I am satisfied that, upon such undertaking, the Distribution will fall within the Dividend Exception. B10. Confirmation of Reduction of Capital 70.As regards the Reduction of Capital, under s.229 of the Ordinance, the Court will confirm a reduction which has been approved by a special resolution of members if the following requirements are satisfied:
71.A technical reduction which is integral to a scheme satisfies the above criteria (Re Chong Hing Bank Ltd, §69; Re China Power Clean Energy Development Company Limited [2019] HKCFI 2098, §10). 72.This is a case where the Reduction of Capital should be confirmed for the following reasons:
Mr Christopher Chain SC leading Ms Alice Lau, instructed by Howse Williams, for the Company (for convening hearing only); Mr Jose Maurellet SC leading Ms Alice Lau, instructed by Howse Williams, for the Company (for sanction hearing) [1] Formerly known as Public Finance (H.K.) Limited (萬眾財務(香港)有限公司) [2] Petition §2 [3] Petition §4 [4] Chan 1st §36 [5] Petition fn 2 [6] Skeleton (Sanction) §28 [7] The amount is determined by multiplying the VWAP per LCR Share for the last 3 months ended on and including the Last Tarding Date of HK$0.9167 by the ratio of the Scrip Alternative of 615 LCR Shares for every 1,000 shares [8] Joint Announcement dated 28 May 2025; Scheme Document, pp.34, 49 and 89 [9] Scheme Document, p.12 [10] The combined value of the Scheme Consideration and the Scrip Alternative is calculated based on the closing price of HK$0.820 per LCR Share as quoted on HKEx on 16 May 2025 multiplied by the Distribution ratio of 0.615 plus the Scheme Consideration [11] Scheme Document p.88 [12] Chan 3rd §13 [13] Chan 5th §11(2) [14] Chan 5th §11(1) [15] Re Cheung Kong (Holdings) Ltd [2015] 2 HKLRD 512, §33 per Ng J. [16] Re Chong Hing Bank Ltd, §30(4). [17] Re Chong Hing Bank Ltd, §32 [18] Letter from IFA [19] Explanatory Memorandum [20] Leading Ms Alice Lau [21] Re Allied Properties (HK) Ltd [2020] 5 HKLRD 766 (CA), §27; Re Chong Hing Bank Ltd, §33 [22] Undertaking given by Offeror dated 9 July 2025 [23] Undertakings given by Individual Concert Parties dated 9 July 2025 [24] Chairman’s Report [25] Chairman’s Report §5 [26] Re Chong Hing Bank Ltd §§40, 41 [27] Being Canada, the Philippines, Singapore and the United States [28] Opinions on foreign laws rendered in June/July 2025 and further opinions rendered in September 2025; Chan 2nd §§41-42; Chan 3rd §13(a)-(b); Chan 4th §18 [29] Chan 3rd §13(c) [30] Scheme Document, pp.127-128 [31] Chan 3rd §13(d) [32] Skeleton (Sanction) §40 [33] https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1985/6/section/151 [34] Opinion §13 [35] Opinion §15 [36] Opinion §20 [37] Letter from the Board [38] Explanatory Memorandum §2 [39] Questions and Answers p.11, Letter from the Board p.35 [40] Skeleton (Sanction) §§40(2), (3), 41 [41] Opinion §28 [42] Jenkins Report [43] Hansard HL Deb vol. 424 (27 October 1981), lines 24-31 [44] The principle in Bond v Barrow has been adopted and followed in recent authorities, including Foojit Limited v The Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs [2019] 11 WLUK 283 (at §57) and BM Electrical Solutions Ltd [2020] EWHC 2749 (Ch) (at §45) [45] Article 154 [46] Petition §56 [47] Poll results of EGM |
Cases cited in this judgment