Baath Jarnail Singh v. Hong Kong Housing Society

HCAL 2426/2025

[2025] HKCFI 5266

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 2426 OF 2025

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D E C I S I O N

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A. Introduction

1.By Form 86 dated 29 October 2025, the Applicant seeks leave to apply for judicial review so as to challenge a decision (“Decision”) of the Hong Kong Housing Society. The Applicant describes the Decision as the refusal to transfer the tenancy of Flat B, 40/F, Tower 1, Kwun Lung Lau, 20 Lung Wah Street, Kennedy Town, Hong Kong (“Premises”) into his name after the death of his father Mr Ajit Singh (“Father”).

2.The Form 86 states that the Applicant is seeking a “Declaration”, but does not state the form or wording of the declaration being sought. Nor does the Form 86 identify any grounds on which that relief is sought.

3.The Applicant’s supporting affirmation simply repeats that he is applying for judicial review against the Decision, namely the refusal of the transfer of the tenancy agreement for the Premises into his name after the death of the Father. Again no grounds upon which any relief is sought have been set out.

4.The only attachment or exhibit to the affirmation is a letter from the Hong Kong Housing Society dated 30 September 2025, addressed to the Personal Representatives of the estate of the Father. That letter identifies that:

(1)  The Tenancy Agreement of the Premises was dated 9 December 2010, and entered into between the Father and the Hong Kong Housing Society.

(2)  As the Father passed away on 15 February 2024, and no grant of administration of his estate had been made, the estate had vested in the Official Administrator pursuant to section 10 of the Probate and Administration Ordinance Cap 10.

(3)  A Notice of Termination had already been served on the Official Administrator on 19 September 2024, which terminated the Tenancy Agreement on 31 October 2024.

(4)  The termination of the Tenancy Agreement was made pending consideration of the application by the Father’s son (i.e. the Applicant) to take over the Tenancy Agreement.

(5)  That application had been rejected, and the Applicant had been so informed and urged to quit and deliver up vacant possession of the Premises.

(6)  The letter was to provide confirmation of the termination of the Tenancy Agreement, and that the Personal Representative of the estate of the Father was required to quit and return all keys and deliver up vacant possession of the Premises to the Hong Kong Housing Society and settle all outstanding payments by 31 October 2025.

(7)  Failing that having been performed, legal action will be taken to recover possession of the Premises and all outstanding sums together with legal costs incurred without any further notice.

5.Though not clear from the Form 86, this letter may be the subject of the intended judicial review challenge. But the letter is not actually addressed to the Applicant, and seems to refer to a potentially earlier decision. In any event, it is clear that the Applicant had already been informed that his application for taking over the Tenancy Agreement had been rejected, as I say on a date perhaps earlier than 30 September 2025.

6.The Form 86 does not contain any request for an oral hearing of the application for leave to apply for judicial review. Having considered the papers filed, I am content that the matter can be dealt with on the papers.

7.This is my decision.

B.  Analysis

8.It is trite that it is a mandatory requirement of the Rules of the High Court Order 53 rule 3 that an application for leave to apply for judicial review must identify the relief sought and the public law grounds upon which it is said that the Court could and should grant leave. That is, an applicant must identify the public law grounds of the intended judicial review challenge, and a failure to do so is itself capable of being fatal to the application. It is the public law grounds identified by the applicant which are assessed as to whether they are reasonably arguable with any realistic prospect of success, the threshold hurdle for the grant of leave to apply for judicial review. It is no part of the Court’s role to look at the materials and seek to divine for itself potential grounds of judicial review which might be advanced on behalf of an applicant.

9.In this case, as I have already indicated, the Applicant has failed to identify any grounds of the intended judicial review challenge, whether in the Form 86 (as is mandatory) or even in the supporting affirmation.

10.In essence, all that the Applicant has identified is that he is dissatisfied with the Decision of the Hong Kong Housing Society in its refusal to permit him to take over the Tenancy Agreement previously enjoyed by the Father. But there is nothing to identify on what basis the Court exercising its judicial review jurisdiction might conceivably interfere with the Decision.

11.It is also not clear to me, or from the Form 86, why any declaration might be the appropriate relief in the circumstances. Certainly, the Court does not act as the original decision maker relating to tenancy matters, and also it does not sit in an appellate function.

12.Lastly, the uncertainty as to the actual date of the Decision (as made and notified to the Applicant) is at least unhelpful to the Applicant, who is required to demonstrate that he has made his application for leave to apply for judicial review as soon as possible, and in any event before the expiry of the long stop three-month period.

C.  Result

13.The Applicant having failed to identify any reasonably arguable public law grounds of review with any realistic prospect of success for the intended challenge to the Decision, the application for leave to apply for judicial review stands to be dismissed.

14.Therefore, I dismiss the application, with no order as to costs.

The applicant, acting in person