Khan Bilawal v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 1172/2020 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 7 November 2025.
1. By Form 86 filed on 12 June 2020 (the “ Form ”), the Applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (the “ Leave Application ”) against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non‑refoulement Claims Petition Office (the “ Board ”) dated 15 May 2020 (the “ Board’s Decision ”).
Cites 3 cases
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HCAL 1172/2020 [2025] HKCFI 5131 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 1172 of 2020
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Philips Wong: The application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed. Observations for the Applicant: Introduction 1.By Form 86 filed on 12 June 2020 (the “Form”), the Applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (the “Leave Application”) against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non‑refoulement Claims Petition Office (the “Board”) dated 15 May 2020 (the “Board’s Decision”). 2.The Applicant requested an oral hearing for the application. The hearing was originally scheduled to take place on 8 September 2025. Notice of Hearing dated 18 August 2025 was issued to the Applicant at the address provided by the Applicant on the Change of Address filed on 23 October 2021. The Court however received the returned mail (stating no such person) on 11 September 2025. On 4 and 5 September 2025, attempts were also made to contact and remind the Applicant of the hearing by phone but in vain. Eventually due to the Tropical Cyclone Warning Signal hoisted on 8 September 2025, the hearing was adjourned to the next day, i.e. 9 September 2025. Attempt was again made to remind the Applicant of the hearing on 9 September 2025 by phone on 8 September 2025 but in vain. The Applicant did not attend the hearing. 3.It is the duty of a litigant to give the court an address to which correspondence or notice can come to his attention in a timely manner. The consequence of any delay or failure occasioned by the ineffectiveness of such an address would fall on the shoulder of the litigant (Re Hasmi Rizwan Imran [2018] HKCA 439, at §15). 4.As proper notice of the hearing had been given to the Applicant via the address he provided to the Court (on the Notice of Change of Address), I consider it appropriate to proceed with the Leave Application in the absence of the Applicant. Background 5.The Applicant’s background, the basis of his claim and the arguments he advanced had been set out in detail in the Board’s Decision, and it is not necessary for me to repeat the same here. The hyperlink to the Board’s Decision is included below[1] for reference. Discussion 6.The applicable legal principles relating to application of this sort are well established. The role of the Court in a judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal. The primary decision makers are the Director of Immigration (the “Director”) and the Board. Though in non-refoulement cases, the Court will adopt an enhanced standard in scrutinizing the decision of the Board due to the seriousness of the issue at hand, the Court should not usurp the role of the Board. Assessment of evidence, country of origin information (COI) materials, risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board (and the Director). The Court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board. (See Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524, at §14) 7.In the Form, the Applicant simply stated that the Board had reached the Board’s Decision wrongly, and that the Board’s Decision was not reasonable and fair (as required by the Wednesbury test). No particulars were provided in support of such general assertions. In the supporting Affirmation, the Applicant simply exhibited the Board’s Decision and did not state or explain the grounds in support of the Leave Application. 8.I have considered the Board’s Decision in detail. I do not find any error of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality. Neither has the Applicant been able to demonstrate any of the same. There is nothing to indicate that the Board had failed to take into account any relevant matters. The Board’s Decision was comprehensive with adequate reasons provided. The Board was entitled to find that the Applicant’s evidence was suspicious and unreliable, and reject his claims (§§39-82 of the Board’s Decision). The Board’s Decision satisfies the enhanced Wednesbury test and is not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational. I am not satisfied that the Applicant’s intended challenge of the Board’s Decision is reasonably arguable with any realistic prospects of success. Accordingly, I refuse to grant leave for judicial review. 9.Leave application of this sort is meant to be a filtering process and I am not expected to give elaborated reasons for my decision (see Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14, at §23). Suffice for me to state that in reaching the decision, I have considered all the relevant documents before me. Conclusion 10.In the light of the reasons provided above, I make an order that the Leave Application be dismissed. Dated the 7th day of November 2025
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
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