Hossen Mohammad Rasel v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
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HCAL 1109/2020 [2025] HKCFI 5317 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 1109 of 2020
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge (Non-Refoulement Claims) Lewis Law:
Observations for the Applicant: 1.By a Form 86 filed on 5 June 2020 (“Form 86”), the Applicant sought leave for judicial review of the decision of Ms Alexandra Lo, a member/adjudicator of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”), dated 29 May 2020 (“the Board’s Decision”). A copy of the Board’s Decision can be viewed by the following hyperlink[1]. 2.The Director of Immigration (“DI”)’s first-tier decision in this case was made on 25 July 2018. The Applicant made the DI also a putative respondent. On my own motion, the DI is named as a putative interested party to this application but not a putative respondent as his tier-one decision has been superseded by the Board’s Decision. 3.In the Applicant’s Form 86 and supporting affirmation, he has failed to identify any alleged errors of law, irrationality or procedural unfairness to make good his challenge against the Board’s Decision. In the oral hearing before me, the Applicant said he had nothing to add to the papers he has filed, and just emphasized that the same political problem he had still continues. 4.The Applicant is a Bangladeshi national. He claimed to come from a politically active family which supported the Awami League (“AL”). The Appellant said a First Information Report (“FIR”) falsely accusing him of murder had been filed against him in Bangladesh as a result of internal rivalry within AL. He was fearful of being found guilty of a crime he did not commit and would be executed because he had no confidence in the legal process in his country. 5.As recorded in the Board’s Decision, the Board made painstaking effort to analyse the credibility of the Applicant’s claims. There was an oral hearing for the Applicant to answer questions. The Board went into, amongst others, the contents of the alleged FIR against him, his knowledge about AL, his movement record and the discrepancies in his evidence. After an intense inquiry, the Board came to the finding that the Applicant’s factual assertions were fanciful and groundless. The Board took the view that the Applicant was not actually in danger or subjected to any genuine or substantial fear of ill-treatment. The Board further said that there was no, or no reliable evidence, that the Government or other authorities in Bangladesh had acquiesced in the alleged ill-treatment of the Applicant. There was also no evidence of any sustained or systematic breach of human rights by the State or that he could not access State protection. 6.I have considered the Board’s Decision vigorously but I am unable to detect any apparent legal error, irrationality or procedural unfairness. 7.It has been reiterated time and again that the primary responsibility for the factual assessment of whether any future risk of ill-treatment exists if an applicant returns to his/her home country lies with the Board and the DI. In the absence of any errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality, the Court would not reopen the Board’s findings or make a determination on the case afresh. The role of the Court in a judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal (see Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246). 8.The leave application to apply for judicial review is thus dismissed. Dated the 11th day of November 2025
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1 [1] https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2020/HCAL001109_2020_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
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Cases cited in this judgment