Melon Sheikh v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 3441/2019 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 28 November 2025.
1. By a “Notice of application for leave to apply for judicial review” in the prescribed Form 86 filed on 20 November 2019, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“ Leave Application ”). The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“ Board ”) dated 7 November 2019 (“ Board’s Decision ”) dismissing the applicant's appeal against the decisions of the Director of Immigration (“ Director
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HCAL 3441/2019 [2025] HKCFI 5688 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 3441 of 2019
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Levy: The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed. Observations for the Applicant: Introduction 1.By a “Notice of application for leave to apply for judicial review” in the prescribed Form 86 filed on 20 November 2019, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“Leave Application”). The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“Board”) dated 7 November 2019 (“Board’s Decision”) dismissing the applicant's appeal against the decisions of the Director of Immigration (“Director”) dated 1 November 2019 (“Director’s Decision”). The Board’s Decision can be viewed at the following hyperlink: - 2.The basis of the applicant’s claim was that, if refouled to Bangladesh, he would be harmed or killed by people from Awami League as a result of his support for the rival party, Bangladesh National Party. The Board’s reasoning and findings were set out in detail in the Board’s Decision and it is not necessary for me to repeat them. Unless otherwise specified, I shall also adopt the Board’s abbreviations and descriptions stated in the Board’s Decision. 3.At the applicant’s request for a hearing of the Leave Application, this court scheduled a hearing on 13 November 2025. The applicant attended the hearing in person. After having heard from him, this court informed him that the decision would be reserved, and be sent to his updated address. Discussion 4.The Leave Application operates as a ‘filtering’ process and there is no requirement or expectation to give elaborate reasons for my decision.[1] It is sufficient to state my observations after considering the Board’s Decision and the applicant’s materials adduced. 5.In a proper Form 86, an applicant is required to identify the grounds of judicial review clearly and succinctly[2], and further to make full and frank disclosure of all material facts to be verified by an affidavit. The applicant’s Form 86 and the supporting affirmation provided no such grounds. 6.At the hearing, this court reminded the applicant that he had provided no written grounds at all, and asked him if he wanted to say anything in support of the Leave Application. The applicant only stated that he could not go back to his country and needed to stay in Hong Kong longer. 7.As the Courts have repeatedly stated, a finding of fact is exclusively within the realm of the Board, which a court in a judicial review will not interfere with unless such finding involved an error of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality.[3] In the present case, the Board found that the applicant’s evidence was vague and unsubstantiated, to have been exaggerated, imaginative and highly implausible. The Board rejected the applicant’s evidence and found that there was not a real risk of harm. These are findings of fact, which the court in a judicial review will not interfere with, subject to there being any public law errors 8.Bearing in mind the enhanced standard that should be adopted in scrutinizing the Board’s Decision, this court is satisfied that the Board correctly applied the law relating to all the grounds and observed a high standard of fairness. I am satisfied that the Board was entitled to reach the conclusion that the applicant had not faced and would unlikely face risk of harm after having rejected the applicant’s evidence. The applicant has not advanced any grounds, whether written or oral, in support of the Leave Application. The applicant has not shown any errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The applicant’s intended challenge to the Board’s Decision is not reasonably arguable with realistic prospects of success such that would enable this court to grant leave[4]. Order 9.The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed. Dated the 28th day of November 2025
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1 [1] Re Zunartyah [2018] HKCA 14 at [23]. [2] Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21/2015, 22 December 2016 at [142]. [3] Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328; Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524. [4] Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676 |
Cases cited in this judgment