Wynn Resorts (Macau) S.A. v. Chan Yat Man and Another

HCA 1426/2025

[2025] HKCFI 6280

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 1426 OF 2025

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BETWEEN

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REASONS FOR DECISION

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A. Introduction

1.This is an application by the Plaintiff made by way of a summons filed on 10 November 2025 for:

(1) a continuation of two injunction orders, being:

(a) a Mareva order of DHCJ Kent Yee against the 1^st Defendant made on 15 August 2025 (the “1^st Injunction Order”) (and continued by an order of Eugene Fung J made on 7 November 2025); and

(b) the order of Eugene Fung J made on 7 November 2025 (the “2^nd Injunction Order”), granting leave for the 2^nd Defendant to be joined, and granting a Chabra order against it; and

(2) an order for ancillary disclosure against the 2^nd Defendant.

2.Following a hearing on 14 November 2025 at which I was addressed by Ms Natalie So for the Plaintiff and Ms Ingrid Yip for the Defendants, I granted both limbs of the Plaintiff’s application, I also ordered the Defendants to pay the Plaintiff’s costs of the ex parte application filed on 7 November 2025 together with costs of the application filed on 10 November 2025, summarily assessed in the amount of HK$400,000.

3.The upshot of my decision is that the 1^st Injunction Order and the 2^nd Injunction Order (collectively the “Injunction Orders”) are continued for a period of one year (up until 13 November 2026) and the ancillary order for disclosure is also granted against the 2^nd Defendant. The reasons for that decision are set out herein.

B. Background

4.The Plaintiff operates a casino and gaming resort in Macau SAR, of which the 1^st Defendant was a patron. The dispute which forms the subject of the current proceedings is said to arise out of a credit agreement between the Plaintiff and the 1^st Defendant, pursuant to which the Plaintiff contends it advanced some HK$10 million to the 1^st Defendant through the provision of gaming chips.

5.Following repayments of various amounts, it is the Plaintiff’s case that the sum of HK$3.84 million remained due and owing to it by the 1^st Defendant as at the time proceedings were commenced. This led to a writ being issued by the Plaintiff on 1 August 2025, pursuant to which the Plaintiff sought repayment of HK$3.84 million plus interest. The sum outstanding to the Plaintiff is said to have increased to HK$5,157,934.19 as at 14 November 2025 (which is the date of the hearing before me).

6.On 6 August 2025, the Plaintiff followed up with a summons for a Mareva order against the 1^st Defendant. The 1^st Injunction Order against the 1^st Defendant was granted by DHCJ Kent Yee on 15 August 2025. Under the terms of the 1^st Injunction Order, the 1^st Defendant was specifically enjoined from disposing of, dealing with or diminishing the value of, respectively, a duplex at Royal Ascot in Shatin (“Property 7”) and 990,099 shares in the 2^nd Defendant, which were identified as assets of the 1^st Defendant “within Hong Kong, whether in own name or not, and whether solely or jointly owned…” The 1^st Injunction Order applied up to a limit of HK$3.84 million.

7.On 3 October 2025, in default of the 1^st Defendant filing a notice of intention to defend, the Plaintiff entered judgment against the 1^st Defendant in the amount of HK$3.84 million plus interest, with costs of the action summarily assessed at HK$400,000. The 1^st Defendant has since issued a summons, seeking to set aside that default judgment.

8.On 4 November 2025, the Plaintiff’s solicitors, Messrs Johnson Stokes & Master, are said to have discovered that the 2^nd Defendant had entered into a provisional agreement for the sale and purchase (the “1^st SPA”) on 9 September 2025 for the sale of Property 7 and a car parking space that was also located at Royal Ascot (“CP E057”) for a consideration of HK$29.4 million, with completion fixed for 10 November 2025.

9.This was said to have been followed by a subsequent discovery that a second agreement had been entered into on 29 September 2025 (the “2^nd SPA”), pursuant to which the 2^nd Defendant had agreed to sell a second car parking space at Royal Ascot (“CP D078”) following a public auction, for a consideration of HK$890,000, with completion fixed for 12 November 2025.

10.This led the Plaintiff to apply on an ex parte basis on 7 November 2025 for a continuation of the 1^st Injunction Order and to join the 2^nd Defendant into the action for the purpose of seeking Chabra relief against it. Following a hearing before Eugene Fung J on 7 November 2025 (at which submissions were made on behalf of both Defendants), the 1^st Injunction Order was ordered to be continued and the 2^nd Injunction Order was granted against the 2^nd Defendant.

C. Continuation of Injunction Orders

C1. Continuation of Mareva and Chabra orders post-judgment

11.Turning first to the application for continuation of the Injunction Orders, there has been no material change in circumstances that would justify the discharge of either of the Injunction Orders.

12.For the avoidance of doubt, where a Mareva order is obtained prior to judgment being entered, the court has the power to order a continuation of the injunction until after judgment is entered into, in aid of execution. As is clear from the observations of Robert Goff J (as he then was) in Stewart Chartering v C&O Managements SA [1980] 1 WLR 460 at 461C-D, the continuation of a Mareva order until after judgment coheres with the policy underlying the grant of Mareva orders generally:

“The purpose of a Mareva injunction is to prevent a defendant from removing his assets from the jurisdiction so as to prevent the plaintiff from obtaining the fruits of his judgment; from this it follows that the policy underlying the Mareva jurisdiction can only be given effect to if the court has power to continue the Mareva injunction after judgment in aid of execution.” (emphasis added)

13.This is not seriously disputed by the Defendants. Instead, the gravamen of the Defendants’ opposition to the Plaintiff’s application is not to the Injunction Orders being continued per se but, rather, that the scope of the 1^st Injunction Order against the 1^st Defendant should be narrowed in scope so as to be confined to specific bank accounts he holds with the Bank of China (Hong Kong) Limited (“BOC”) and Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong) Limited (“SCB”), on the basis that the funds held in those bank accounts (respectively, the “BOC Account” and the “SCB Account”)) are in excess of not only the amount of HK$3.84 million claimed by the Plaintiff but also the amount of HK$5,157,934.19 said to remain unpaid up to 14 November 2025.

14.This much is plain from the supplemental skeletal submissions filed by the 1^st Defendant (with original emphasis):[1]

“Whilst D1 is not opposing to (sic) the continuation of an injunction order against his assets for 1 year until 14 November 2026, D1 seeks to vary/narrow the scope of the injunction order to the bank accounts under his name under the Bank of China (Hong Kong) Limited (“BOC”) and the Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong) Limited (“SCB”) on the grounds that the assets held under D1’s accounts with BOC and SCB are more than sufficient to cover the scope of the 15 Aug 2025 Order, the 7 [November] Order, and P’s claimed sum of HK$3.84 million or the sum of HK$5,157,934.19 under P’s Statement of Account upon obtaining Default Judgment … (without admitting to this sum as D1 has applied to set aside the Default Judgment).”

15.I pause here to note that the evidence supporting the arguments made by the 1^st Defendant for a variation of the 1^st Injunction Order were supplied under cover of an affirmation of Pang So Jing Belinda from Messrs KW Leung & Co filed on 13 November 2025 (i.e. the eve of the hearing before me). This was accompanied by the 1^st Defendant’s supplemental skeleton submissions, which were also dated 13 November 2025. Amongst the documents exhibited to Ms Pang’s affirmation were:

(1) a letter from BOC dated 11 November 2025, confirming that the BOC Account had been frozen by BOC since 19 August 2025;

(2) a printout of the 1^st Defendant’s BOC Account portfolio that was expressed on its face to have been retrieved on 6 November 2025;

(3) an email from SCB dated 12 November 2025, stating that the 1^st Defendant’s SCB Account was blocked on 15 August 2025 and that it continues to be blocked; and

(4) a printout of an interim portfolio valuation report of the 1^st Defendant’s SCB Account that was expressed on its face to have been retrieved on 6 November 2025.

16.In circumstances where a number of the underlying exhibits to Ms Pang’s affirmation appear to have been in the possession of the 1^st Defendant and/or his solicitors from a considerably earlier point in time and, in the case of the printouts relating to the BOC Account (and also the SCB Account), they were described on their face as having been retrieved as far back as 6 November 2025 (which was more than a week prior to the hearing before me and indeed on the day prior to the hearing before Eugene Fung J on 7 November 2025), I asked for an explanation as to why this evidence was only filed the day prior to the hearing before me. Somewhat disappointingly, I did not receive a satisfactory explanation from the Defendants.

17.Notwithstanding this, to the credit of Ms So (who appeared for the Plaintiff), she was prepared to proceed on the basis that this latest tranche of evidence could be taken into consideration by the court. Ms So took the position that none of this evidence, on proper analysis, was of assistance to the 1^st Defendant in his attempt to narrow the scope of the 1^st Injunction Order. In circumstances where the injunctive relief sought (and granted) against the 1^st Defendant was a Mareva injunction rather than a proprietary injunction that was targeted at specific assets, I consider Ms So to be right in her submission that there would be no warrant for narrowing the 1^st Injunction Order in the manner contended for by the 1^st Defendant.

18.Indeed, as Ms So went on to observe (again correctly in my view), the restraint imposed by the 1^st Injunction Order only applies up to a specified limit and, under the terms of that order, the 1^st Defendant is entitled to deal with assets which overtop that limit (albeit that limit has subsequently been increased to HK$5,157,934.19).

C2. Period of continuation of Mareva and Chabra orders

19.Turning next to the period of continuation sought for both Injunction Orders, the Plaintiff sought a continuation for the period of one year (up to 13 November 2026). In the case of the 1^st Injunction Order, this would be a further continuation to that which had been granted by Eugene Fung J on 7 November 2025. Ms So cited the decision of DHCJ Keith Yeung SC (as he then was) in Moral Luck Finance Ltd v Law Kin Leung [2018] HKCFI 1795 at [10] in support of the duration she sought. However, as I pointed out to Ms So in the course of argument, it is not apparent from the face of that decision as to why a one-year continuation was granted in that case.

20.I consider that the duration of any continuation sought must be tailored to the specific circumstances of each case. I accept Ms So’s argument that a one-year continuation would be justified in the context of the application before me, for the following reasons:

(1) First, it allows a reasonably sufficient period to enable the Plaintiff to proceed in executing the default judgment it has obtained against the 1^st Defendant (although I note that the 1^st Defendant has applied to set aside that default judgment).

(2) Secondly, ordering a continuation for one year (rather than for a succession of significantly shorter periods) would save the parties from expending unnecessary time and costs in having to return to the court repeatedly to seek orders for continuation. That is not to say that a lengthy order for continuation should necessarily be granted in other cases, but it would be appropriate in the present circumstances, given that judgment has already been entered into as against the 1^st Defendant.

(3) Thirdly, the period of one year strikes a fair balance between the competing interests of Plaintiff on the one hand, and the Defendants on the other. The Injunction Orders will be discharged if and when the Plaintiff manages to obtain satisfaction, whether by way of its enforcement efforts or otherwise. Indeed, it is always open to the 1^st Defendant to pay the sum of HK$5.1 million into court, whereupon the Defendants could apply for the Injunction Orders to be discharged.

D. Ancillary Disclosure Order against 2^nd Defendant

21.The disclosure order sought against the 2^nd Defendant is in the following terms:

“The 2^nd Defendants (sic) must inform the Plaintiff [in writing at once][2] of:-

a. All its assets of an individual value of HK$50,000 or more, whether in or outside Hong Kong, whether in its own name or not, and whether solely or jointly owned, giving the value, location and details of all such assets (in particular, the location and details of the Sale Proceeds (as defined below)); and

b. The amount(s) of (i) any outstanding mortgage loan and expenses in respect of as (A) Flat F, 39/F & 40/F (duplex), Block 7, Royal Ascot, No. 1 Tsun King Road, Shatin, New Territories, Hong Kong; (B) Carpark No. D078 on G/F Royal Ascot, No. 1 Tsun King Road, Shatin, New Territories, Hong Kong; and (C) Carpark No. E057 on G/F Royal Ascot, No. 1 Tsun King Road, Shatin, New Territories, Hong Kong (the “Royal Ascot Properties”) and (ii) the net sale proceeds the 2^nd Defendant received or expects to receive arising out of the sale of the Royal Ascot Properties pursuant to the Provisional Agreement for Sale and Purchase dated 9 September 2025 (Memorial No. 25100201460013) and the Memorandum of Agreement (for Sale and Purchase) dated 29 September 2025 (Memorial No. 25101401800029) (the “Sale Proceeds”).”

22.In my view, the disclosure order sought by the Plaintiff is of the kind that is typically ancillary to the Chabra injunction that has been granted against the 2^nd Defendant:

(1) It is designed to obtain clarity about the 2^nd Defendant’s assets, in circumstances where there is a credible basis for believing that the assets which form the subject of the disclosure order are, in fact, assets which belong beneficially to the Plaintiff (or are at least assets that are amenable to execution): XY LLC v Jesse Zhu and another [2017] 5 HKC 479 at [24], per Kwan JA (as she then was).

(2) Such disclosure orders are aimed at identifying and preserving assets which are the subject of freezing injunctions: see Gee, Commercial Injunctions, 7^th edition at [23-002] to [23-003].

23.I consider the application for a disclosure order to be justified and therefore granted it. For what it is worth, Ms Yip fairly accepted that the 2^nd Defendant would not resist the grant of the disclosure order sought against it, were I to order the continuation of the 2^nd Injunction Order which, for the reasons set out above, I was prepared to do.

E. Costs

24.The Plaintiff has been successful in its application. I thus ordered the Defendants to pay the Plaintiff’s costs of the ex parte application filed on 7 November 2025 together with the costs of the application filed on 10 November 2025, summarily assessed in the amount of HK$400,000.

25.Finally, it remains for me to thank counsel on both sides for their helpful submissions. I would like to commend Ms So in particular for the constructive approach she adopted at the hearing in relation to the evidence that was filed by the Defendants on the eve of the hearing, and for the coherent manner in which she organised her submissions, both in writing and orally, which I found to be of considerable assistance.

Ms Natalie So, instructed by Messrs Johnson Stokes & Master, for the Plaintiff

Ms Ingrid Yip, instructed by Messrs William KW Leung & Co, for the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants