Botor Jocelyn Ertis v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 1417/2025 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 19 December 2025.
1. By a “Notice of application for leave to apply for judicial review” in the prescribed Form 86 filed on 20 June 2025, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“ Leave Application ”). The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“ Board ”) dated 30 May 2025 (“ Board’s Decision ”) dismissing the applicant’s appeal against a decision of the Director of Immigration (“ Director ”) dated 7 Ap
Cites 9 cases
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HCAL 1417/2025 [2025] HKCFI 6146 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 1417 of 2025
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3) Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Levy: The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed. Observations for the Applicant: Background 1.By a “Notice of application for leave to apply for judicial review” in the prescribed Form 86 filed on 20 June 2025, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“Leave Application”). The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“Board”) dated 30 May 2025 (“Board’s Decision”) dismissing the applicant’s appeal against a decision of the Director of Immigration (“Director”) dated 7 April 2025 rejecting the applicant’s non-refoulement claim based on all applicable grounds. The Board’s Decision is set out in the following hyperlink: - 2.The basis of the applicant’s claim was that, if refouled to Philippines, she would be harmed or killed by (i) her husband due to the domestic dispute with him; and (ii) the creditor for an unpaid loan. The reasoning and findings were set out in detail in the Board’s Decision and it is not necessary for me to repeat them. Unless otherwise specified, I shall also adopt the Board’s abbreviations and descriptions stated in the Board’s Decision. 3.On 3 July 2025, the Removal Assessment and Litigation (Removal and Deportation) Section (1) of the Immigration Department faxed a letter to the court, informing the court that the applicant would like to withdraw her judicial review application. Enclosed with the said letter was the applicant’s signed letter in English dated 2 July 2025. In the memo, the applicant stated that she would like to withdraw the Leave Application ass she wanted to go home as soon as possible. In the circumstances, this court will dispose of the Leave Application on paper. Discussion 4.The leave application operates as a “filtering” process and there is no requirement or expectation to give elaborate reasons for my decision.[1] It is sufficient to state my observations after considering the Board’s Decision and the applicant’s materials adduced. 5.In a proper Form 86, an applicant is required to identify the grounds of judicial review clearly and succinctly[2], and further to make full and frank disclosure of all material facts to be verified by an affidavit. The applicant’s Form 86 and the supporting affirmation provided no such grounds. 6.As the Courts have repeatedly stated, a finding of fact is exclusively within the realm of the Board, which a court in a judicial review will not interfere with unless such finding involved an error of law, procedural unfairness, or irrationality.[3] In the present case, the Board found that the applicant’s evidence was unreliable and questionable. The Board did not accept that she had a genuine fear of harm either from her husband or from the alleged creditor. The Board further found that state protection as well as internal relocation would be reasonably available. These are findings of fact, which the court in a judicial review will not interfere with subject to there being any public law errors. 7.Bearing in mind the enhanced standard that should be adopted in scrutinizing the decision of the Board, this court is satisfied that the Board correctly applied the law relating to all the grounds and observed a very high standard of fairness. The applicant has not shown any errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision, nor were such grounds identified in the Form 86 or otherwise. The applicant’s intended challenge to the Board’s Decision is not reasonably arguable with any realistic prospects of success such that would enable this court to grant leave[4]. Withdrawal application 8.Apart from the application to withdraw the Leave Application referred to above, there is nothing outstanding in this action. In the circumstances, I make an order to dismiss the Leave Application, and hereby order the dismissal of the Leave Application: see Re Manik Md Mahamudun Nabi [2022] HKCA 471; Ngo Xuan Tuyen v Torture Claims Appeal Board [2024] HKCA 1140. 9.On 11 August 2025, the Department of Justice wrote to the court, informing us that the applicant was removed from Hong Kong on 14 July 2025. Order 10.The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed. Dated the 19th day of December 2025
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1 [1] Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14 at §23. [2] Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21/2015, 22 December 2016 at §142. [3] Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328; Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524. [4] Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment