Ad (also known as At) v. Rt
Read the full judgment text of HCMC 1/2022 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 6 January 2026.
1. Unless otherwise stated, I shall adopt the definitions used in the Judgment dated 26 August 2025 ( “the Judgment” ), which was given after the trial on ancillary relief ( “the AR Trial” ) in the present case.
Cited by 5 cases · Cites 2 cases
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HCMC 1/2022 [2026] HKCFI 124 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE MATRIMONIAL CAUSES NO 1 OF 2022 _________________
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_________________ DECISION _________________ INTRODUCTION 1.Unless otherwise stated, I shall adopt the definitions used in the Judgment dated 26 August 2025 (“the Judgment”), which was given after the trial on ancillary relief (“the AR Trial”) in the present case. 2.By the Judgment, this Court made, among other things, the following orders:
3.This Decision contains this Court’s determination on the following matters (“the Determination”) which have been raised by the parties by way of written submissions:
THE PAYMENT SCHEDULE 4.H has been ordered to make a lump sum payment of HK$41.7 million, subject to a deduction of HK$844 and of the net sale proceeds of the 12D Flat. 5.W proposed that the said sum shall be paid by 2 instalments:
6.On the other hand, H suggested that the lump sum be paid in 4 years by 5 instalments:
7.When deciding on the payment schedule, this Court has to bear in mind that H has been allocated the illiquid and risk laden family assets, namely, the shares in private companies, of which he is the key-man of the business involved. It has been held in the Judgment that letting H to hold those companies would facilitate the raising of funds. 8.Another factor which this Court should consider is that while it is preferable to achieve a clean break between H and W as soon as possible, this desire should be weighed against the feasibility of the payment schedule and the reality. An unduly tight schedule which H cannot comply with would only lead to more litigations and that would not be in the best interest of Daughter nor the parties. Indeed, even W’s counsel recognises that the payment schedule should reflect the reality of H’s liquidity. 9.The difficulty which this Court faces in the present case is that little is known about the current financial circumstances of H’s companies. Although W’s counsel has drawn this Court’s attention to the cash-rich position of H&H HK as reflected in its 2022 audited financial statements (which shows that H&H HK had HK$22.9 million of “cash and cash equivalents” at the time), I do not think that necessarily means that H is able to draw the entirety of such “cash and cash equivalents” without affecting the operation and viability of H&H HK (even if it is assumed that H&H HK is currently holding “cash and cash equivalents” of no less than the said amount). 10.W’s reference to the financial position of H&H HK prior to 2022 is even less helpful. 11.W also suggested that H should generate further liquidity by selling stakes in his companies. In my view, this Court should not fix the payment schedule on the basis that H shall sell his stakes (or even part of such stakes) in his companies. This is because:
12.W also argued that adverse inference should be drawn against H on the basis of his failure to provide any audited or management accounts (or bank statements) of H&H HK for the periods after 2022 upon W’s requests made in her Questionnaire. 13.I do not think it is appropriate to draw such an inference against H, when W did not pursue the same requests by way of application for specific discovery upon H’s refusal to supply her with the documents. From H’s answers, it could be seen that H was of the view at the material time that provision for such documents was unnecessary because H&H HK had been valued by the single joint expert. If W considered that such a reply was not to the point or in any way inadequate, then it would be up to her to take the matter further, but she did not. 14.Looking at all the matters in the round, I tend to think that H’s proposed payment schedule should be adopted in principle, because this is a schedule which, according to H’s own case, is feasible. This Court is much more confident that this schedule (subject to the adjustment to be set out in the following paragraph) would be something which is achievable. 15.The only adjustment which I would make to H’s proposed schedule is that I would order H to make more frequent payments (every 6 months rather than every 12 months), but for a smaller amount for each instalment, so that W would receive some cash on a more frequent basis rather than having to wait for a full year before she gets another round of cash from H. When I do the adjustment, I would keep the annual payable amount within HK$7 million (except the last instalment which would be more than HK$7 million even under H’s own proposal). 16.W submitted that, in the event this Court is minded to give H more than a year to pay the lump sum, then that should only be done on the basis that H undertakes to pay interest on any outstanding sums at judgment rate from the date of the Decree Absolute. 17.I refuse to make such an order on interest or to ask H for any such undertaking, because in my view, that would be wrong in principle. In this regard, it must be borne in mind that, in the circumstances of the present case which have been explained in the Judgment, H should be given the illiquid part of the assets. It is because of this that the Court had stated in [488] of the Judgment that “[the lump sum payment] unavoidably would have to be satisfied by instalments”, for it was anticipated that H would need time to raise money. In my view, it would not be fair if H is ordered to bear interest right from the beginning, because the non-payment of instalments which are not yet due should not be viewed as if H were already in default from the start. PERIODICAL PAYMENTS 18.W submitted that her needs should continue to be met by periodical payments from H until she receives full payment of the lump sum of HK$41.7 million. 19.On the other hand, Ms Booth submitted on behalf of H that the order on maintenance pending suit should be discharged upon H paying the first instalment of the lump sum, and no further order of periodical payment should be made. 20.In this regard, attention should be drawn to [488] and [489] of the Judgment which read:
21.I maintain my view as highlighted above. 22.Following the 1st payment of HK$7 million, W will have more than adequate money to fund her monthly expenses as well as to pay off her liabilities[1] which her counsel referred to in paragraph 7 of her submission dated 30 October 2025. It would be most unfair if H has to continue with his monthly payment to W thereafter. 23.I therefore agree that an order as suggested by H should be made. LITIGATION FUNDING 24.The relevant order for litigation funding in the present case was made on 3 July 2023, under which H has been ordered to pay W’s lawyers in the sum of HK$120,000 per month (“the Litigation Funding Order”). 25.It is submitted by W that the Litigation Funding Order should remain until the question of costs of the AR Trial has been concluded (whether by reason of the order nisi becoming absolute[2] or upon the determination of any application to vary the said costs order nisi). 26.H’s proposal is a bit more complicated. It is suggested that the Litigation Funding Order should be discharged:
whichever is earlier. 27.In my view, the adjudication on the question of cessation of the Litigation Funding Order is a straight forward one which only requires us to go back to the basic principle that, in order to obtain litigation funding, the burden is on the applicant to demonstrate that she cannot reasonably procure legal representation by any other means. To the extent that she has assets, the applicant has to demonstrate that they cannot reasonably be deployed, either directly or as the means of raising a loan to fund legal services: WW v LLN formerly known as LSM [2020] 2 HKLRD 487, [2020] HKCA 178, at [20(1)]. 28.Considered in such light, the yardstick in my view must be the time when W receives the 1st instalment of HK$7 million from H. Since then, she must be able to procure legal representation with such funds (even if part of the funds would have to be used towards W’s needs as well as for settling W’s various debts). 29.I therefore hold that the Litigation Funding Order shall cease upon H paying the 1st instalment of the lump sum. SALE OF THE 12D FLAT 30.It has been ordered pursuant to the Judgment that Sister shall sell the 12D Flat within 3 months after the date of the Decree Absolute, and that the net sale proceeds shall be paid to W. 31.Since then, Sister has proposed to buy the 12D Flat for HK$5,480,000, which both H and W have accepted. 32.What W would like to make sure is that either the relevant HSBC mortgage shall be redeemed or a deed be obtained from HSBC to release W from her guarantee. 33.In this regard, H has not stated any objection through his counsel’s submissions. 34.As far as Sister is concerned, she has, through her solicitors’ letters dated 9 October 2025 and 22 October 2025 respectively, confirmed that she would agree to remove W as a guarantor of the said mortgage. 35.Given the above latest development, I propose that this Court would only give an order herein so as to clarify that, despite paragraph 8 of the order dated 26 August 2025, H and W are at liberty to sell their beneficial interest in the 12D Flat to Sister at HK$5.48 million, and that any costs of the transaction should be shared between H and W. However, since Sister has not been invited to make submissions on the consequential directions and orders for such a sale, I do not think it is appropriate for this Court to give further directions in this regard. Insofar as it is considered necessary, H, W and Sister are at liberty to seek further order by consent, or for further directions such that any disputed matters may be adjudicated on paper. DAUGHTER’S SCHOOL FEES 36.W’s counsel informed this Court that Daughter is now studying in a school which does not issue invoices but rather provides termly statements and operates on a direct debit system. It was therefore proposed that an order for direct payment by H is a practical direction to bring the order for school fees into effect, as this would ensure timely payment of Daughter’s school fees, and avoid unnecessary administrative steps by W. 37.H did not make any submission on this matter, apart from saying that this is not a matter which is properly placed before the Court for adjudication, and that neither was it raised at the trial. 38.I do not understand why it is said that the mechanism for payment of Daughter’s school fees is not properly placed before this Court. As Mr Marwah for W pointed out, this Court has expressly directed parties to agree on the necessary further order/directions to bring the orders under the Judgment into effect (at [496]). The order on the payment of school fees must be one of those orders. 39.I therefore accede to W’s application. ORDER 40.For the above reasons, I make the following orders:
COSTS 41.I take the following tentative view on the costs matter in relation to the Determination:
42.I therefore make a costs order nisi that:
43.The above order nisi shall become absolute in the absence of application to vary (which, if any, will be disposed of on paper) within 14 days hereof.
Mr Shaphan Marwah, instructed by Hugill & Ip, for the petitioner Ms Madeleine Booth, instructed by Haldanes, for the respondent | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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