Circumwealth Co. Ltd. v. The Attorney General
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HCMP003209/1992 1992, No. MP 3209 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF HONG KONG HIGH COURT MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS ____________
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____________ Coram: The Hon. Mr. Justice Mayo in Court Date of hearing: 19 January 1993 Date of delivery of judgment: 4 February 1993 _______________ J U D G M E N T _______________ 1. The Applicant is the owner of land at 33-35 Kennedy Road. They submitted plans to the Building Authority to erect a 32 story residential building with 48 car parking spaces. It was provided in the plans that there should be a "run in/run out" from the proposed building on to a right of way over the northern part of the Applicant's land. Thereafter the right of way continued down to join Kennedy Road to the South. Almost immediately after leaving the Applicant's land to the East the right of way narrowed from just over 5 metres to its narrowest part which is 3.8 metres wide. Shortly beyond the boundary of the Applicant's land the right of way is joined by another right of way which serves as the exit ramp of a large complex of flats known as Phoenix Court. 2. It is common ground between the parties that the said right of way is a "street" within Section 16(1)(h) of the Building Ordinance Cap. 123. It is also I think agreed that the distance from the place where vehicles leave the proposed building to the boundary of the Applicant's land is approximately 11 metres. It is only after the boundary is crossed that one comes to the intersection where the Phoenix Court ramp joins the right of way. Almost immediately after this the right of way narrows to such an extent as not to comply with the normal requirements of the Highways and Transport Departments. T 3. The Applicant's plans were rejected by the Building Authority. The grounds given for the rejection were :
4. The Applicant appealed against this decision to the Appeal Tribunal. It is common ground that the issue between the parties relates to the interpretation of Section 16(1)(h). 5. The subsection reads :
6. In its Determination the Appeal Tribunal stated :
They went on to dismiss the Appeal. This is the decision which is the subject of this Judicial Review. 7. The Relief sought by the Applicant is :
8. The ground on which relief is sought is that the said Decision was made on an erroneous interpretation of Section 16(1)(h) and was in the circumstances ultra vires. 9. Mr. Warren Chan for the Applicant submitted that it was clear from the scheme of the Ordinance that what Section 16(1)(h) was attempting to deal with was the control of the Building. What the Authority had to satisfy itself on was the physical situation where traffic joined the street and not upon traffic problems which may arise elsewhere. What was important was to consider the place where traffic comes from the building and not what the situation may be some distance away. 10. Mr. Chan gave several examples of the sort of situation which he submitted came within the subsection. It would be relevant for the Authority to consider the use being made of any adjoining road or street at the place where vehicles would seek to enter it. The actual place of entry and the manner of entry would be relevant matters for consideration. Mr. Chan also accepted that the anticipated flow of traffic at the said place would also be a matter coming within the ambit of the subsection. 11. However, what was not legitimately within the scope of the subsection was a consideration of "general traffic problems in the street". Had the legislature intended the scope of the section to be thus enlarged additional words such as "and as a result thereof" would have been added. 12. It appeared from the Determination of the Appeal Tribunal that the main problems which arose related to physical circumstances which were some distance from the place where vehicles came out of the proposed building. 13. Mr. Cheung for the Attorney General argued that Section 19 of the Interpretation Ordinance Cap. 1 should be called in aid and that I should have regard to the general safety and convenience of traffic. The subsection referred to the safety and convenience of traffic "using the street" not simply to the place where vehicles entered the street. 14. Over and above this it was clearly incumbent upon the Building Authority to consider how "traffic using the street so expected to use the street" is to be affected by the "place" or "manner" of the proposed "means of access or other opening" to the street. 15. I have given this matter careful thought. I have come to the conclusion that Mr. Cheung's analysis of the situation is to be preferred to Mr. Chan's. I do not see how it would be possible to sensibly consider proposed plans in accordance with the subsection unless consideration is given to traffic conditions at the point of access to the street. "Traffic conditions" can not simply be considered in a vacuum. Clearly it is essential to bear in mind the sort of use which is likely to be made of the street or right of way. 16. I accept that it would be excessive for the Highways or Traffic Departments to consider traffic problems in an overall context but I do not think that the Appeal Tribunal have done this. Their concern has been to an area which in my view is sufficiently proximate to the "place" of "access" to be within the scope of matters properly canvassed by the subsection. I do not consider that their Determination was ultra vires. I would accordingly dismiss this application. I would make an order nisi that the Attorney General is to have his costs.
Representation: Mr. Warren Chan (Fung & Liu) for Applicant. Mr. M.Y. Cheung (Attorney General's Chambers) for Respondent. |
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