Muhammad Iftikhar Ahmad v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 48/2022 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 11 March 2026.
1. By a Form 86 filed on 12 January 2022 (the “ Form ”), the Applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (the “ Leave Application ”) against the “Director of Immigration Decision 16 December 2021”. I take this as a reference to the Decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non refoulement Claims Petition Office (the “ Board ”) dated 16 December 2021 (the “ Board’s Decision ”), as the Board’s Decision is the decision which is dated 16 December 2021.
|
HCAL 48/2022 [2026] HKCFI 1135 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 48 of 2022
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3) Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Sabrina Ho:
Observations for the Applicant: Introduction 1.By a Form 86 filed on 12 January 2022 (the “Form”), the Applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (the “Leave Application”) against the “Director of Immigration Decision 16 December 2021”. I take this as a reference to the Decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non refoulement Claims Petition Office (the “Board”) dated 16 December 2021 (the “Board’s Decision”), as the Board’s Decision is the decision which is dated 16 December 2021. 2.In the Affirmation in support of the Leave Application, the Applicant exhibited a copy of the Board’s Decision, confirming his intention to seek leave for judicial review against the board’s Decision. 3.In the Form, the Applicant named both the Director and the Board as the putative respondents, and did not name any interested party. I will amend the Form on my own motion to name the Board as the only putative respondent and the Director as the putative interested party. 4.The Applicant requested an oral hearing for the Leave Application. The hearing took place on (the “Hearing”) but the Applicant was absent. Notice of Hearing was issued to the Applicant in advance at the Applicant’s address provided by the Immigration Department on 15 December 2025. The said Notice has not been returned as undelivered. 5.On 20 January 2026 and 26 January 2026, attempts were made to contact the Applicant by phone at the Applicant’s number provided by the Immigration Department but in vain. I take the view that sufficient notice had been given to the Applicant in respect of the Hearing. I will proceed with the Hearing in the absence of the Applicant. Background 6.The Applicant’s background, the basis of his claim and the arguments he advanced had been set out in detail in the Board’s Decision, and it is not necessary for me to repeat the same here. The hyperlink to the Board’s Decision is included below[1] for reference. Discussion 7.In the Affirmation, the Applicant raised various grounds in support of the Leave Application, I will summarise them below[2]:
8.The relevant legal principles are well established. The Court’s role in a judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal. The primary decision makers are the Director and the Board. Though in non-refoulement cases, the Court will adopt an enhanced standard in scrutinizing the decision of the Board due to the seriousness of the issue at hand, the Court should not usurp the role of the Board. Assessment of evidence, country of origin information (COI) materials, risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board (and the Director). The Court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board: see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at para. 14. There must be a reasonably arguable case with a realistic prospect of success before leave for judicial review will be granted: see Peter Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676. 9.Having considered all the relevant materials before me, I do not consider the Applicant’s intended challenge against the Board’s Decision to be reasonably arguable with any realistic prospect of success. 10.I have reviewed the Board’s Decision in detail. The Board had fully considered the Applicant’s evidence and his grounds for challenging the Director’s decision in refusing his claim for non-refoulment protection. The Board found that the Applicant concocted the problems he had with his business associates, Zahid Bukhari (“ZB”), Nabil Butt (“NB”) and Sahil Petroleum (“SP”). The Board did not believe that he left Pakistan because of any fear of ZB, NP and SP as the Applicant claimed: see the Board’s Decision paras. 53‑95. As noted by the Board in paragraphs 96-97 of the Board’s Decision, the Applicant admitted that it was only hearsay from the others that ZB, NB and SP bribed the police and he did not have any evidence that the Pakistani police were corrupt. The Applicant had never sought assistance from the higher level of the Pakistani police or the authorities, hence he is not in a position to say that state protection is not available in Pakistan: see the Board’s Decision paras. 96-97. The Board also considered there are internal relocation options available to the Applicant in Pakistan: see the Board’s Decision paras. 108-113. On the above bases, the Board held that the Applicant has failed to established his non-refoulment claim and rejected his appeal: see the Board’s Decision paras. 114-134. I do not consider there to be any error of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. 11.With respect to the Applicant’s complaint in paragraph 7 (a) above, as explained in paragraph 10 above, I do not consider the Board’s Decision to be unfair or unreasonable. 12.As to paragraph 7 (b) above, as noted in paragraphs 53-56 of the Board’s Decision, the Applicant was given sufficient opportunity to present his case before the Board. 13.As to paragraphs 7 (c) and (d), the Board had considered the COI and the conditions of the Pakistani authorities and police. In particular, the Board noted that the Applicant confirmed that there is no evidence showing that the Pakistani police was corrupt and it was merely hearsay that the police were bribed by ZB, NB and SP. Further, the Applicant did not even seek assistance from the Pakistani authorities or police, see paragraph 10 above. 14.Leave application of this sort is meant to be a filtering process and this Court is not expected to give elaborated reasons for its decision: see Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14 at para. 23. I have considered all the relevant materials in reaching the present decision. Conclusion 15.For the reasons stated above, I will dismiss the Leave Application.
Dated the 11th day of March 2026
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1
[1] https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2022/HCAL000048_2022_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf [2] I will take the reference to the Director of Immigration in the grounds as a reference to the Board, given that the Leave Application concerns the Board’s Decision.
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||