Chiu Han Lee Henry and Others v. Willie Chiu
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HCAP 41/2024 [2026] HKCFI 1550 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE PROBATE ACTION NO. 41 OF 2024 ____________
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_______________ D E C I S I O N _______________ A. INTRODUCTION 1.This is the Plaintiffs’ application by way of Summons dated 11 December 2024 (“Summons”) for
2.By the time of this hearing, Willie did not oppose the Interlocutory Injunction Application and so that was granted. What he opposes is that the Plaintiffs be appointed APL, and the Plaintiffs do not insist that they themselves be appointed. 3.At the hearing, I have also made other orders, including requiring Willie to lodge all title deeds relating to 6 properties owned by the deceased in Hong Kong and USA into Court pending appointment of the APL. That has been complied with by Willie after this Hearing. 4.What remain to be dealt with in this Decision are:
B. BACKGROUND 5.Mr Chiu Pong To (“Father”) passed away in 2014, at the age of 1993, survived by 7 children. The parties, Sidney and Anna are full-blood siblings born to Father and Madam Hung Lai Lin (“Mother”). 6.According to the Plaintiffs, Chiu Shun Kuen Cecilia (“the Deceased”) is their half-blood eldest sister born to the Mother, but this is disputed by Willie. 7.The Deceased lived in Hong Kong for most of her life until she was allegedly abducted by Willie in mid-2022, and subsequently taken to Singapore and then to Mainland China. She died on 20 August 2024 in Shanghai, never married and had no issue. 8.During her lifetime in Hong Kong, the Deceased used to assist Father in his garment business. 9.On 24 May 2022, Willie commenced HCMH 46/2022 (“HCMH Proceedings”) and sought appointment of himself and Sidney as the Committee of the Deceased by reason of her lack of mental capacity to manage and administer her property and affairs. In support of his application, Willie filed, amongst others, (a) his own affirmation affirming to the Deceased’s dementia and deteriorating health and (b) 2 medical reports of 2 psychiatrists respectively, who certified the Deceased as a mentally incapacitated person and opined that mental recovery was “difficult” or “unlikely”. 10.Whilst the HCMH Proceedings were pending, the Deceased assigned 4 properties in Hong Kong (“the 4 HK Properties”) and 2 properties in the United States (“the 2 USA Properties”) (collectively “the Six Properties”) to Willie and Jia without consideration (the “Impugned Conveyancing Transactions”) and using the Deceased’s funds to cover the transaction costs and stamp duty (together with any further sums that may be found to have been misappropriated by Willie, “the Misappropriated Funds”).
11.On 16 September 2022, shortly after the Impugned Conveyancing Transactions were discovered by Plaintiffs, Willie claimed that the Deceased was examined by the same doctor who purportedly opined that the Deceased was not suffering from any mental health disorders. Willie then sought leave to discontinue the Mental Health Proceedings (“the MH Discontinuance Application”). 12.Pending resolution of the MH Discontinuance Application, between 7 and 11 October 2022, the Deceased executed, amongst others, a general power of attorney (the “GPoA”) appointing Wille as her attorney, an enduring power of attorney (the “EPoA”) again appointing Willie as donee, a Purported 2022 Will naming Willie sole executor and sole beneficiary, and 4 Deeds of Confirmation regarding the 4 HK Properties. 13.Meanwhile, the Deceased had been taken out of Hong Kong. After failing to persuade Willie to bring the Deceased back, the Plaintiffs intervened in the HCMH Proceedings. DHCJ H. Au-Yeung (as he then was):
14.The Deceased had gone missing since 14 June 2022, and her contact with her siblings were cut off since around March 2023. During the currency of the HCMH Proceedings, the 1st and 3rd Plaintiffs and Anna had on 3 occasions travelled to Mainland China to search for her. On each occasion, they went the day after Willie informed them of the Deceased’s purported whereabouts, only to find that the Deceased had been removed from the identified location shortly before their arrival. 15.Willie claimed that it was the Deceased who refused to come back to Hong Kong. He also alleged that the Deceased’s condition improved after Anna stopped administering her daily medical prescriptions with ‘Quetiapine’. He had medical evidence purportedly in support. 16.At the hearing on 20 June 2024, DHCJ H. Au-Yeung (as he then was), directed that there be a call-over hearing every 6 months to allow the court to monitor the IC’s management of the Deceased’s Estate pending her return. 17.On 20 August 2024, the Deceased passed away in Shanghai. However, Willie did not inform the siblings of it until 9 days later, on 29 August. By then, the Deceased’s remains had already been cremated. 18.As a result of the Deceased’s death, H. Au-Yeung J discharged the IC on 3 September 2024 by virtue of section 27(4), MHO. 19.Shortly thereafter, Willie approached the tenants of the Deceased’s properties to collect rent, thereby breaching the various injunctions. 20.On 13 November 2024, Willie applied to discontinue the HCMH Proceedings with no order as to costs and to lift all injunctions made against him and Jia. This prompted the Plaintiffs to commence the present action on 14 November 2024 to seek a declaration that the 2002 Will is null and void due to the Deceased’s lack of testamentary capacity, duress and/or undue influence at the time of the making of that Will; and that letters of administration of the Deceased’s estate (“the Estate”) be granted to the Plaintiffs as co-administrators. 21.On 04 December 2024, the Plaintiffs lodged an ex parte application to H. Au-Yeung J for leave to commence contempt proceedings against Willie. On 06 January 2024, leave was granted to the Plaintiffs. 22.The Plaintiffs took out the present Summons on 11 December 2024. At the call-over hearing on 27 December 2024 (the “Call-Over Hearing”), this Court granted, amongst others, interim-interim injunctive relief against Willie and Jia (“the Interim Injunction”) and further directed the Plaintiffs’ solicitors to administer and manage matters relating to the tenancies of three landed properties of the Deceased’s Estate, which they duly did. 23.On 21 February 2025, unbeknown to and without effecting service upon the Plaintiffs, Willie filed an Affirmation of Testamentary Script, wherein he referred, for the first time, to the existence of a purported will dated 28 April 2018 (“the 2018 Will”). The Plaintiffs only became aware of the 2018 Will upon receipt of Willie’s Defence and Counterclaim filed on 8 May 2025. Willie alleged that the 2018 Will was discovered by him on 29 December 2024, two days after he attended the Call-Over Hearing, at a property jointly owned by him and the Deceased, known as 33 Leonie Hill Road #13-907, OUE Twin Peaks, Singapore (“Singapore Property”). The 2018 Will was among personal belongings of the Deceased and Willie retrieved from a warehouse. 24.The Defence and Counterclaim denied abduction of the Deceased. Willie made cross-allegations against Henry and Anna for getting financial advantage of millions of dollars from the Deceased; he alleged that the HCMH Proceedings were, amongst others, to seek recovery of misappropriated funds from Anna. Willie denied misappropriation of the Deceased’s assets. He alleged that the Deceased gave the Six Properties to him pursuant to a “Trust Arrangement”. He also alleged that the Deceased always avoided preparing a will and that it was the other siblings who pressurized her to into making one. The Deceased had been examined by various doctors, who found her medical condition to have improved so as to be mentally capable of executing the 2022 Will, EPoA and GPoA. Willie seeks to propound the 2022 Will, alternatively the 2018 Will. 25.At this hearing, Willie accepts that the Six Properties form part of the Estate. It is Willie’s pleaded case that he and Jia were entrusted by the Deceased to manage the Six Properties on her behalf. All the rents generated from the Mega Cube 305 and 306 Offices and the Casa Marina Property were directly deposited into the Deceased’s bank account. Rent from the Ho King Property was deposited into Jia’s bank account only because the tenant requested that the payments be made to the registered owner. All the rental income generated from the HK Properties did not belong to Willie and Jia. C. LEGAL PRINCIPLES ON APPOINTMENT OF APL 26.Under section 40(1) of the Probate and Administration Ordinance, Cap. 10, (“PAO”),
27.The Court appoints an APL only out of necessity and expediency. Relevant considerations would include the condition of the Estate, the nature of the assets comprised in the Estate, whether there is a likelihood of dissipation or jeopardy of assets and whether there is a need to collect the “fruits of the Estate”. An appointment would be necessary or expedient if, eg, it is required to protect the estate by collecting, managing or safeguarding the assets or to enable legal action to be taken against third parties, pending the resolution of the probate dispute. See Chow Lily v Chow Wai Wai Violet [2023] HKCA 167, at §14.1 (CA). 28.The costs of the APL are likely to be substantial and that is a matter to be taken into account. The APL is expected to keep the costs of administration as low as possible under all circumstances and no satellite litigation will be sanctioned unless absolutely necessary: Chinachem Charitable Foundation Limited v Chan Chun Chuen and ors, unreported, HCAP 8/2007, §§5-11, and 15, Andrew Cheung J (as he then was). 29.It is not necessary in an application for APL to consider the underlying disputes between the parties or comment on the merits of the case in the probate action: Re Yien Chi Ren [2009] 5 HKLRD 413, §8, DHCJ Horace Wong SC. 30.An APL, like a trustee, should remain neutral and leave the beneficiaries to fight the battle among themselves: Cheung Ting Kau, Vincent v Koo Siu Ying and another, unreported, HCEA 25/2013, 18 February 2016 at §§90-92, DHCJ Yee. D. CIRCUMSTANCES FIT FOR APPOINTMENT OF APL 31.This action is plainly one “touching the validity of the will” within the meaning of section 40 of the PAO. 32.The factual disputes can be left to trial, but there are objective reasons to question whether the Estate was/is at risk of dissipation:
33.Just these few matters would make it necessary and expedient to appoint an APL who should independently protect the Estate instead of putting his own interests above those of the Estate. E. SCOPE OF POWERS OF THE APL 34.I now come to the specific disputed clauses in the draft order. Clauses 7 – collecting in of assets Clause 8(1) – dealing with tenancy matters 35.The Plaintiffs propose that the APL be empowered to collect in assets wherever they are located, by taking all necessary steps, including by applying for ancillary grant of probate (if applicable) in any foreign jurisdiction in which the Deceased’s assets are situated. They also suggest that the APL be empowered to deal with the tenancy matters of the 6 Properties and 4 properties in Xiamen (“4 PRC Properties”), but not the Singapore Property. Mr Chu, however, submits that the APL’s powers should be limited to collecting in and protecting the estate of the Deceased in Hong Kong. 36.Mr Fung, solicitor for the Plaintiffs, points out that by statute, an APL (though not with a full grant), “shall have all the rights, duties and powers of a general administrator other than the right of distributing the residual of the estate”: s.40(2) PAO. The APL is to “act under the directions of the court” and is subject to its “immediate control”: s.40(3) PAO. The aim is to protect and preserve the estate pending the probate litigation. The extra-territorial assets form part of an estate, having regard to the definition of “estate” in section 2 of PAO as meaning “the movable and immovable property passing on the death of” the deceased. 37.However, section 24A of the PAO provides that assets and liabilities of the estate in an application for grant cover Hong Kong assets only. Hong Kong courts do not have the jurisdiction to govern assets of an estate outside Hong Kong, which have to be dealt with and administered according to the law of the relevant foreign jurisdiction.
38.The law of the foreign jurisdiction has to be followed before the APL can handle the Estate. Otherwise, the APL may be guilty of intermeddling with the Estate. 39.Even the Plaintiffs’ own proposed APLs (PwC) take the view that “separate legal proceedings and/or probate proceedings are expected in Mainland China and the US (in both States of Hawaii and New Jersey) because these jurisdictions do not recognize Hong Kong grants and may not have equivalent laws in relation to a role of [APL]. The APLs would need to work with lawyers in these jurisdictions as to the relevant local legal procedures which may even require the APLs to be physically present at the local courts when requested.” 40.In the light of s.24A PAO, what the APL can do is to collect in eg the title deeds of the extra-territorial assets, like those of the 2 USA Properties and the 4 PRC Properties, if they are in Hong Kong. Mr Chu points out that the PRC Properties are not the subject matter of the Summons but I do not consider that it matters. This Court is dealing with matters of principle. 41.The statutory provisions in §36 do not give power to the Hong Kong Courts, which they do not have, to authorize the APL to manage extra-territorial assets, eg by renting them out. 42.Further, without disrespect, Mr Fung’s reliance on Re Estate of Oung Chin Liang Fung, HCMP 2347/2015, 14 September 2015, G Lam J (as he then was) is misplaced.
43.I have considered whether to authorize the APL to take legal advice on how the extra-territorial assets can be managed by the APL, but decide not to. This is because the APL has no status outside Hong Kong. The Hong Kong order does not bind the foreign court where the immovable property is located. It may thus be more appropriate for the persons directly interested in the Estate to apply to the relevant jurisdiction for an APL to be appointed or for interim measures to be adopted. 44.I therefore authorize the APL, insofar as landed properties are concerned, to manage the tenancies of the 4 HK Properties only. The Singapore Property shall be dealt with separately under Clause 13 below. 45.I therefore would reword Clauses 7 and 8(1) as follows:
Clause 8(2) – outgoings of landed properties 46.This Clause authorizes the APL to handle all matters concerning the outgoings of the landed properties of the Deceased including but not limited to the payment of property tax, government rates and rent, management fees, insurance premia, maintenance and repair costs, and utilities expenses. 47.It is obviously undesirable to expose the Estate to fines, penalties or liabilities for not paying what is due in relation to the landed properties, whether they are in Hong Kong or not. I grant the authority under this Clause. Clause 8(3) – maintenance of the Bank Accounts 48.The Plaintiffs ask that the APL be authorized to handle all matters concerning the maintenance of the Bank Accounts of the Deceased, including but not limited to the usage of banking functions, the setting up of time deposits and the payment of expenses. 49.All bank accounts of the Deceased have been frozen. However, I do not see why, as a measure to protect the Estate, the APL should not be allowed to set up time deposits and pay for expenses. I grant the order sought. Clauses 8(5) – handling outgoings of landed properties of Father 50.Father owned 3 landed properties in Hong Kong, 3 in the USA and the Lien Yi Co Ltd. The Plaintiffs propose that all matters concerning the outgoings of those assets, including but not limited to the payment of property tax, government rates and rent, management fees, insurance premia, maintenance and repair costs, and utilities expenses should be handled by the APL, such authority to continue until the Probate Registry issues a grant of representation in respect of Father’s estate or until 8 December 2026, whichever is earlier. 51.These outgoings used to be settled by the IC using the Deceased’s funds, but that was for the purpose of managing and administering her property and affairs. To continue to do so after her death is to deplete the Deceased’s Estate. 52.As of today, no grant letters of administration have been issued in respect of Father’s estate because of dispute between 2 camps of subsidiaries. There is no legal basis for the Court to benefit one estate at the expense of another without consent of all beneficiaries of the Estate. I decline to grant an order under Clause 8(5). Clause 9 – APL to open a bank account 53.The Plaintiffs suggest that the APL be empowered to open a bank account to receive monies payable to the Estate and to pay from the account expenses and outgoings of the Deceased. I see no objection to this, especially since the APL is empowered to lease out, at least, the 4 HK Properties, and have to make payments of various kinds. Clause 11 – to engage lawyers for legal advice 54.The Plaintiffs suggest that the APL be authorized to engage lawyers in Hong Kong and in the USA to give legal advice, and for the APL:
55.Given: (i) continuation of the interlocutory injunction imposed on Willie and Jia at this hearing; (ii) the deposit of the title deeds of the Six Properties into Court to be passed on to the APL for safekeeping, there is no need, still less urgency, to litigate over those Six Properties. If Willie can succeed in his case at trial, those Properties would remain with him. If he fails, those Properties would be distributed among the beneficiaries and Willie would have a share as if the Deceased died intestate. 56.The Deceased’s bank accounts have been frozen. The rents which Willie and Jia had received from tenants of the Deceased had been paid into Court pursuant to the interim-interim injunction. In respect of the Misappropriated Funds, they appear to be conveyancing expenses and/or stamp duty for effecting the assignment of the Six Properties to Willie; there may be other funds. Viewed in the light of the value of the Estate (estimated to be HK$33m + US$160,000 = HK$34.25m cash in hand according to the letter of the Plaintiffs’ solicitor dated 5 December 2025, 10 properties in 3 jurisdictions and 2% shareholding in Lien Yi Co Ltd), it is likely that the Misappropriated Funds can comfortably be set off against the 1/6 share that Willie may get even if the Deceased is held to have died intestate. See Lai Wai Pang v Kwok Li Shuk Han, §9(2), A Cheung J (as he then was). 57.The Plaintiffs themselves have not identified any reason why immediate legal action is required, eg due to imminent expiry of limitation period; or, as in the case of Re the Estate of Lo Siu Fung HCAP 37/2015, 14 October 2015, Recorder Lisa Wong (as she then was), there were substantial sums of money of the estate that had been dissipated and the whereabouts of the proceeds of the sale of the deceased’s properties were unknown. 58.As for the investigation of the mental capacity of the Deceased, it is not something sought in the Summons. 59.Further, the burden of proof lies on the person who alleges that another does not have the mental capacity when signing an instrument: To Lee Wah Samuel v Yum Huin Ming [2019] HKCFI 1441 at §§10-15, L Chan J. This would apply to the issues over eg the assignment of the Six Properties, and the execution of the EPoA and GPoA. 60.Specifically, as regards wills, a person who propounds a will (in this case, Willie) has the legal or persuasive burden of satisfying the court that it is the will of the deceased. Where a person disputes the validity of a will (in this case, the Plaintiffs) on the grounds that there is want of due execution, or of testamentary capacity, or of the requisite knowledge and approval, that person bears an evidential burden of putting the relevant ground of challenge in issue. On the other hand, where a person seeks to challenge a will on the grounds that the testator was induced to make the will by fraud or by undue influence, such person (in this case, the Plaintiffs) bears the persuasive burden of establishing the fraud or undue influence. See Nina Kung v Wang Din Shin (2005) 8 HKCFAR 387 at §§171-178, Ribeiro PJ. 61.Mental or testamentary capacity of the Deceased is the bone of contention in the present action. The APL should remain neutral instead of utilizing funds of the Estate to investigate this matter when the burden of proof lies on the parties. 62.In the Estate of Wong Long Ming [2023] HKCFI 1008, Keith Yeung J granted an order for the APL to investigate the mental capacity of the Deceased but the authorities in §§59-60 above have not been referred to. That case is fact sensitive. 63.The Court would not allow the APL to spend money on fishing for causes of action. If, in the course of executing his powers the APL discovers something important, of course, he can always come to Court under the liberty to apply provision. 64.I decline to make the order under Clause 11. Clause 12 65.The Plaintiffs suggest that the APL be empowered and authorized to engage lawyers in the PRC to investigate the circumstances surrounding the Deceased’s death and to make enquiries with the relevant authorities, including the National Immigration Administration (國家移民管理局) and the US Consulate General Shanghai, with regard to the Deceased’s exit-entry record. 66.I can understand why the Plaintiffs find the circumstances leading to the death of the Deceased to be very suspicious. However, Clause 12 anticipates work to be carried out by the APL outside Hong Kong that does not assist in the collection and protection of the assets of the Estate. It is not clear if the PRC or US Consulate General in Shanghai would accept such an order from the Hong Kong Court. I decline to grant Clause 12. Clause 13 67.It is the Plaintiffs’ case that Willie has no beneficial interest in the Singapore Property because he allegedly made no contribution to the purchase price. The Plaintiffs ask that the APL be empowered to engage lawyers in Singapore to give an opinion on:
68.The Singapore Property is in the joint names of the Deceased and Willie, the beneficial interest of which would have passed to Willie upon the death of the Deceased. The year of purchase was 2018. There was nothing to show that the Deceased was mentally incapacitated at that time. At this stage, all that the Plaintiffs are relying on is a written document which purports to show that Willie owed the Deceased money in the purchase of the Singapore Property to allege that the beneficial interest remains with the Deceased. On its face, this document is not signed by anyone and its origin is unclear. 69.In my view, the better course is not to jump to think of litigation but to ascertain if Willie owes the Deceased money. The administration of the Singapore Property in terms of leasing it out is better left to the Singapore courts. There is presently no evidence of dissipation. It is neither necessary nor expedient to require the APL to consider legal action over the Singapore Property immediately. 70.I therefore only authorize the APL to investigate if Willie still owes the Deceased money. In view of the prima facie evidence that the debt may be incurred in 2018, there may be a need for the APL to act expeditiously, including to gather or preserve evidence from banks. Clause 14 71.The Plaintiffs suggest that the APL do prepare annual reports for the potential beneficiaries. Willie remains neutral on this. 72.I consider it appropriate for the APL to report to the beneficiaries on a yearly basis, to keep them informed of the state of the accounts, and any discoveries or observations of the APL. This can be a simple report of a few pages, with documents to be supplied if requested by a beneficiary. 73.For my part, I do not see the need to provide annual reports to the Court unless otherwise directed. If in the course of administration, the APL discovers anything worthy of the attention of the Court, he can always inform the beneficiaries or apply to the Court for directions under the liberty to apply provision. If the beneficiaries discover anything unusual, they may themselves take action. Clause 18 - costs 74.The Plaintiffs seek party-and-party costs to be paid out of the estate but submit that Willie should not be allowed costs because of the whole scheme of things caused by Willie and he resisted this application. 75.Willie seeks costs for himself out of the estate. He submits that the Court should not consider the merits of a person’s conduct in an application like the present. 76.One is talking about protecting the Estate. Having regard to each party’s pleaded case, one can anticipate room for the trial judge to hold that a party should bear some or all of the costs of this Summons, in view of that party’s conduct. I am of the view that costs of each party (including costs reserved in this Summons) should, in the first instance, be paid out of the Estate on a common fund basis, with the ultimate liability for costs to be reserved to the trial judge. Clause 19 -indemnity of costs to APL 77.The APL is entitled to indemnity for his costs on trustee basis. They should be paid once every 3 months out of the Estate. Clause 20 78.The Plaintiffs propose that the APL shall not settle any bill issued by their lawyers in Hong Kong, USA, Mainland China or Singapore by using the Deceased’s funds without the Court’s assessment of such bills. The parties have agreed that no order should be made on this Clause. F. WHO SHOULD BE APPOINTED? 79.The APL is required to deal with the assets in Hong Kong, to ascertain the whereabouts of the title deeds of the 4 PRC Properties and to ascertain if Willie owes the Estate money. No litigation is anticipated at this stage. The candidates proposed on each side have legal and accounting experience. Those proposed by Willie charge significantly less than those proposed by the Plaintiffs. In addition, PwC (nominated by the Plaintiffs) considers that it is “not commercially viable” to have the statutory cap under s.60(2)(b) PAO apply to the APL and the staff, given various issues outlined in section 2 of their letter dated 15 December 2025. In my view, some of those issues are just enquiries or investigation and not even legal proceedings. It is unreasonable to exclude costs arising thereunder from the statutory cap. 80.The intended administration is relatively simple and costs should be kept low. I therefore appoint Mr Tsang Kam Chuen nominated by the Defendant as APL. G. CONCLUSION AND COSTS 81.I summarize my orders as follows:
82.I thank Mr Fung and Mr Chu for their assistance.
Mr Fung King Yiu of Wong Poon Chan Law & Co., for the 1st to 3rd Plaintiffs Mr Ian Chu, instructed by Wong, Shum & Co, for the Defendant | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment