Hoang Van Nang v. Director of Immigration

Read the full judgment text of HCAL 39/2026 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 23 March 2026.

1. By my Decision dated 20 February 2026, [2026] HKCFI 1022 (“Decision”), I dismissed the Applicant’s application made in these proceedings for leave to apply for judicial review.

Case No.HCAL 39/2026[2026] HKCFI 1654
Court
High Court CFI
Date23 Mar 2026
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

HCAL 39/2026

[2026] HKCFI 1654

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 39 OF 2026

________________________

BETWEEN

  HOANG VAN NANG Applicant
  and  
  DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION Putative
    Respondent

________________

Before: Hon Coleman J in Chambers (Open to Public)
Date of Decision: 23 March 2026

__________________

D E C I S I O N

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A.  Introduction

1.By my Decision dated 20 February 2026, [2026] HKCFI 1022 (“Decision”), I dismissed the Applicant’s application made in these proceedings for leave to apply for judicial review.

2.The Applicant’s application related to the Director of Immigration’s Decision dated 23 December 2025 to maintain and proceed with the prosecution against the Applicant on the charge of “Remaining in Hong Kong without the authority of the Director of Immigration after having landed unlawfully in Hong Kong”.

3.I refused the Applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review on the basis that the application had no merit, essentially because:

(1)  there was no proper identification of any specific or proper grounds of review, in the identification of any alleged public law wrong;

(2)  any attempt to re-run a non-refoulement claim in these proceedings would not be entertained; and

(3)  the subject of the intended challenge is a prosecutorial decision, which is not susceptible to judicial review on conventional administrative law grounds, and no unconstitutionality ground was advanced.

4.Pursuant to Order 53 rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, the Applicant had 14 days to appeal from my Decision to the Court of Appeal, had he wished to do so. That period expired on 6 March 2026.

5.By Summons dated 19 March 2026 (“Summons”), the Applicant has now sought an extension of time to appeal from my Decision.

6.Having considered the materials, it seems to me that this application can appropriately be dealt with on paper. This is my Decision.

B.  Analysis

7.The application for extension of time to appeal has no merit.

8.The Applicant’s affirmation filed in support of the Summons, also dated 3 March 2026 merely states that:

(1)  he would like to apply for extension of time to appeal;

(2)  he does not speak English or Chinese, so had to seek help from friends to help submit his appeal; and

(3)  he hopes the Court will consider and allow him to file his appeal out of time.

9.It is trite that it is entirely in the discretion of the Court to grant or refuse an extension of time, and that the factors normally taken into account in deciding whether or not to grant an extension of time include: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the merits of the proposed appeal; and (4) the degree prejudice to the potential respondent if the application is granted. Of course, the Court will also consider all the circumstances and decide whether the overall justice of the case requires the exercise of the discretion to extend time.

10.First, in this case, I accept that the delay before the Summons was issued was 10 days and so may be regarded as not substantial. Secondly, however, the Applicant’s reasons for the delay are far from compelling.

11.Thirdly, as canvassed in my Decision, there was no merit in the application for leave to apply for judicial review. The Applicant failed to identify any proper public law grounds of review. It is trite that an appeal is not simply the opportunity of the Applicant to re-run the same arguments again, without demonstrating where the first instance decision went wrong. Where my Decision was partly based upon the fact that the intended challenge was to a prosecutorial decision not susceptible to judicial challenge on conventional grounds, it is unlikely that there could be any meritorious appeal from that Decision. In any event, under the present summons, the Applicant has failed to identify any intended grounds of appeal. There is no point in granting an extension of time for lodging a proposed appeal with no demonstrated apparent merit.

12.It is not necessary for me to consider any potential prejudice caused to the Director by any appeal.

C.  Result

13.In short, I see no proper basis upon which I would exercise my discretion to give an extension of time for the Applicant to appeal from the Decision.

14.In the circumstances, the application is dismissed.

  (Russell Coleman)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

The applicant, acting in person