Yadali Butt v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office

Read the full judgment text of HCAL 198/2021 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 24 March 2026.

1. By a “Notice of application for leave to apply for judicial review” in the prescribed Form 86 filed on 22 February 2021, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“ Leave Application ”). The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“ Board ”) dated 10 February 2021 (“ Board’s Decision ”) dismissing the applicant's appeal against the decisions of the Director of Immigration (“ Director

Cites 10 cases

Case No.HCAL 198/2021[2026] HKCFI 1277
Court
High Court CFI
Date24 Mar 2026
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

HCAL 198/2021

[2026] HKCFI 1277

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 198 of 2021

BETWEEN

  Yadali Butt Applicant
  and  
  Torture Claims Appeal Board / Putative
  Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office Respondent
  and  
  Director of Immigration Putative
    Interested Party

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)

Following:

    consideration of the documents only;            or
   consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the Applicant in open court;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge Levy:

1.  The Form 86 be amended on the court’s own motion.

2.  The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.

Observations for the Applicant:

Introduction

1.By a “Notice of application for leave to apply for judicial review” in the prescribed Form 86 filed on 22 February 2021, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“Leave Application”). The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“Board”) dated 10 February 2021 (“Board’s Decision”) dismissing the applicant's appeal against the decisions of the Director of Immigration (“Director”) dated 29 September 2020 (“Director’s Decision”) rejecting the applicant's non-refoulement claim on all applicable grounds[1]. The Board’s Decision can be viewed at the following hyperlink: -

https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2021/HCAL000198_2021_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf

2.In his Form 86, the applicant stated “certiorari to reject and review the decision made by the immigration department on my case 29/9/2020” as the proposed respondent and the immigration department as the interested party. As the Board should have been the proper respondent and the Director the interested party, the Form 86 shall be amended accordingly on the court’s own motion.

3.The basis of the applicant’s claim was that, if refouled to Pakistan, he would be harmed or killed by the father of the daughter whom the applicant helped to elope with his best friend. The Board’s reasoning and findings were set out in detail in the Board’s Decision and it is not necessary for me to repeat them. Unless otherwise specified, I shall also adopt the Board’s abbreviations and descriptions stated in the Board’s Decision.

4.At the applicant’s request for a hearing of the Leave Application, this court scheduled a hearing on 13 January 2025. The applicant attended the hearing in person. After having heard from him, this court informed him that the decision would be reserved, and be sent to his updated address.

Discussion

5.The Leave Application operates as a ‘filtering’ process and there is no requirement or expectation to give elaborate reasons for my decision.[2]  It is sufficient to state my observations after considering the Board’s Decision and the applicant’s materials adduced.

6.In a proper Form 86, an applicant is required to identify the grounds of judicial review clearly and succinctly[3], and further to make full and frank disclosure of all material facts to be verified by an affidavit. The applicant provided no such grounds in either the Form 86 or the supporting affirmation.

7.At the hearing, the applicant said that he had nothing to say despite having been reminded that he had provided no written grounds in support of the Leave Application.  The applicant stated that as he was in detention since November 2024 and was only released on 15 December 2025, he was unable to prepare any written grounds.

8.As the Courts have repeatedly stated, a finding of fact is exclusively within the realm of the Board, which a court in a judicial review will not interfere with unless such finding involved an error of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality.[4]  In the present case, the Board found that the applicant was not a witness of truth and that he had fabricated claims in relation to the purported relationship of Nadia and Faisal. After having considered the applicant’s claims both individually and cumulatively, the Board did not consider that the applicant had faced a real risk of suffering if refouled. The Board further found that both the state protection and internal relocation would be reasonably available. These are findings of fact, which the court in a judicial review will not interfere with, subject to there being any public law errors.

9.Bearing in mind the enhanced standard that should be adopted in scrutinizing the Board’s Decision, this court is satisfied that the Board correctly applied the law relating to all the grounds and observed a high standard of fairness. The applicant provided no grounds, whether written or oral, to support the Leave Application. The applicant’s reason that he was not able to provide written grounds due to his detention is not valid. He had more than 3 years to prepare written grounds before he was arrested in November 2024. All in all, the applicant provided no reasonably valid grounds at all in support of the Leave Application. The applicant has not shown any errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The applicant’s intended challenge to the Board’s Decision is not reasonably arguable with realistic prospects of success such that would enable this court to grant leave[5].

Withdrawal application

10.On 24 February 2026, the Removal Assessment and Litigation (Removal and Deportation) Section (2) of the Immigration Department faxed a letter to the court, informing the court that the applicant would like to withdraw his judicial review application. Enclosed with the said letter was the applicant’s signed letter in English together with the signature of an interpreter dated 12 January 2026. In the letter, the applicant stated that he would like to withdraw the Leave Application as his issues in his country had been resolved and he could return home.

11.Apart from the application to withdraw the Leave Application referred to above, there is nothing outstanding in this action. In the circumstances, I make an order to dismiss the Leave Application, and hereby order the dismissal of the Leave Application: see Re Manik Md Mahamudun Nabi [2022] HKCA 471; Ngo Xuan Tuyen v Torture Claims Appeal Board [2024] HKCA 1140.

Orders

12.The Form 86 be amended on the court’s own motion.

13.The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.

Dated the 24th day of March 2026

  ( Alfred CHAN )
for Registrar, High Court

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence




Notes for the Applicant:

If leave has been granted, the Applicant or the Applicant’s solicitors must:

       
a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A);

b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and

c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).
  Sent to the Applicant
on 24/3/2026

Yadali Butt

Applicant’s ref. no:
Nil.
  Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on 24/3/2026

Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
Putative Respondent’s ref. no.:
USM 17282/20/10/31/P3385

Director of Immigration
Putative Interested Party’s ref. no.: QA T/C 389/20 (formerly as RBCZ 10338/20)

Department of Justice,
Senior Assistant Law Officer
(Civil Law)
(Civil Litigation Unit 2)



Form CALL-1



[1]  The applicable grounds are risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance (“torture risk”) , BOR 2 risk (this refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under Art. 2 of s.8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383 (“HKBOR”), BOR 3 risk (this refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Art 3 of HKBOR) and persecution risk (This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Art. 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol) under the USM (This refers to the Hong Kong Government’s Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”) implemented since 3 March 2014 to process claims for non-refoulement protection. For a detailed description of the USM, see the judgment of Zervos J in HKSAR v Vu Thang Duong & Anor [2015] 3 HKC 293.

[2]  Re Zunartyah [2018] HKCA 14 at [23].

[3]  Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21/2015, 22 December 2016 at [142].

[4]  Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328; Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524.

[5]  Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676