Case Document

100%Judiciary

CAMP 56/2023, [2026] HKCA 608

On appeal from [2022] HKCFI 825

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 56 OF 2023

(ON AN INTENDED APPEAL FROM HCAL 243/2019)

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RE:

UNENGSIH

Applicant

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Before:

Hon Chu VP and Barma JA in Court

Date of Judgment:

9 April 2026

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Barma JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.On 11 July 2024, this court (Chu VP and Barma JA) handed down a judgment dismissing the applicant’s application for extension of time to appeal against the decision of DHCJ KW Lung dated 28 March 2022 refusing to grant leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review. The applicant had sought to review the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board dismissing her appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration rejecting her non‑refoulement claim.

2.The facts and issues in the applicant’s application, as well as the court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in our judgment.[1] We will not repeat them here.

3.The applicant subsequently applied, by a Notice of Motion filed on 19 July 2024, for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. In the Notice of Motion, the applicant stated, inter alia, that this court was wrong as a matter of law for not having applied “the principle of procedural unfairness” and “the principle of irrationality” to the decisions below.

4.In her written submissions lodged on 5 August 2024, the applicant referred to the well-established principles in ST v Director of Immigration (sic)[2] [2014] 4 HKLRD 277, Secretary for Security v Sakthevel Prabakar [2005] 1 HKLRD 289, R v Home Secretary, ex parte Doody [1994] 1 AC 531 and R v Home Secretary, ex parte Bugdaycay [1987] 1 AC 514.

5.Having considered the applicant’s Notice of Motion and written submissions, we see no reason to depart from the usual practice of determining an application of this kind on the papers. We have, therefore, determined the applicant’s application on the basis of the documents filed.

6.The matters stated by the applicant do not constitute grounds for granting leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. The applicant has failed to identify any question of great general or public importance for the Court of Final Appeal to determine, as required by section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484. Nor is any such question apparent to us from the matters she has raised.

7.The Notice of Motion failed to provide any particulars in the supposed errors in our judgment and it raises no ground that is reasonably arguable before the Court of Final Appeal.

8.Further, there was no attempt by the applicant to elaborate on whether and, if so, how the trite principles referred to in her written submissions had not been applied in the consideration of her claim and appeal.

9.We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b).

10.For these reasons, the Notice of Motion dated 19 July 2024 is dismissed.