Iqbal Nadeem v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 2014/2020 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 10 April 2026.
1. By a “Notice of application for leave to apply for judicial review” in the prescribed Form 86 filed on 7 October 2020, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“ Leave Application ”). The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“ Board ”) dated 25 September 2020 (“ Board’s Decision ”) dismissing the applicant's appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“ Director
Cites 8 cases
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HCAL 2014/2020 [2026] HKCFI 1878 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 2014 of 2020
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3) Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Levy: The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed. Observations for the Applicant: Introduction 1.By a “Notice of application for leave to apply for judicial review” in the prescribed Form 86 filed on 7 October 2020, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“Leave Application”). The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“Board”) dated 25 September 2020 (“Board’s Decision”) dismissing the applicant's appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“Director”) dated 4 January 2019 (“Director’s Decision”) rejecting the applicant's non-refoulement claim on all applicable grounds[1] except the risk torture ground which had been previously dismissed by the Director on 17 June 2013. The Board’s Decision can be viewed at the following hyperlink: - 2.The basis of the applicant’s claim was that, if refouled to Pakistan, he would be harmed or killed by his uncle over a land dispute. The Board’s reasoning and findings were set out in detail in the Board’s Decision and it is not necessary for me to repeat them. Unless otherwise specified, I shall adopt the Board’s abbreviations and descriptions stated in the Board’s Decision. 3.At the applicant’s request for a hearing of the Leave Application, this court scheduled a hearing on 19 March 2026. The applicant attended the hearing in person. After having heard from him, this court informed him that the decision would be reserved, and be sent to his updated address. Discussion 4.The Leave Application operates as a ‘filtering’ process and there is no requirement or expectation to give elaborate reasons for my decision.[2] It is sufficient to state my observations after considering the Board’s Decision and the applicant’s materials adduced. 5.In a proper Form 86, an applicant is required to identify the grounds of judicial review clearly and succinctly[3], and further to make full and frank disclosure of all material facts to be verified by an affidavit. The Form 86 and the supporting affirmation contained no such grounds at all. 6.At the hearing, this court asked the applicant whether he had any grounds he wished to submit in support of the Leave Application. The applicant stated that he had been in Hong Kong for a long time. However, justice had not been done. He would have no future in Pakistan. When the court asked him to specify any mistake the Board had allegedly made. He said the only mistake the Board had made was that it did not give him any respect, as he wanted to stay in Hong Kong. 7.As the Courts have repeatedly stated, a finding of fact is exclusively within the realm of the Board, which a court in a judicial review will not interfere with unless such finding involved an error of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality.[4] In the present case, while the Board accepted the applicant’s account in relation to the land dispute between his father and uncle, it however found the critically important parts of his claims and evidence not credible. It found that his uncle had no adverse interest in the applicant such that he would target him for harm of any kind which necessitated non-refoulement protection. Thus, it concluded that the applicant would not face any risk of serious harm if refouled. The Board further found that both state protection and internal relocation were reasonably available. These are findings of fact, which the court in a judicial review will not interfere with, subject to there being any public law errors. 8.Bearing in mind the enhanced standard that should be adopted in scrutinizing the Board’s Decision, this court is satisfied that the Board correctly applied the law relating to all the grounds and observed a high standard of fairness. The applicant has not provided any valid grounds, whether written or oral, in support of the Leave Application. The applicant has not shown any errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The applicant’s intended challenge to the Board’s Decision is not reasonably arguable with realistic prospects of success such that would enable this court to grant leave[5]. Order 9.The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.
Dated the 10th day of April 2026
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1
[1] The applicable grounds are risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance (“torture risk”) , BOR 2 risk (this refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under Art. 2 of s.8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383 (“HKBOR”), BOR 3 risk (this refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Art 3 of HKBOR) and persecution risk (This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Art. 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol) under the USM (This refers to the Hong Kong Government’s Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”) implemented since 3 March 2014 to process claims for non-refoulement protection. For a detailed description of the USM, see the judgment of Zervos J in HKSAR v Vu Thang Duong & Anor [2015] 3 HKC 293. [2] Re Zunartyah [2018] HKCA 14 at [23]. [3] Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21/2015, 22 December 2016 at [142]. [4] Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328; Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524. [5] Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676
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Cases cited in this judgment