Re Satwinder Singh
Read the full judgment text of CACV 56/2026 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 13 April 2026.
1. This is the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan (“the Judge”) given on 15 January 2026 [1] refusing his application for leave to apply for judicial review against the decision dated 29 September 2020 of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dismissing his appeal against the decision dated 12 December 2018 of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) which rejected his non-refoulement claim having regard to the torture risk [2] , BOR 3 risk
Cites 4 cases
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CACV 56/2026, [2026] HKCA 493 On Appeal From [2026] HKCFI 353 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO. 56 OF 2026 (ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO. 2011 OF 2020) _________________
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_________________ J U D G M E N T _________________ Hon Chu VP (giving the Judgment of the Court): Introduction 1.This is the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan (“the Judge”) given on 15 January 2026[1] refusing his application for leave to apply for judicial review against the decision dated 29 September 2020 of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dismissing his appeal against the decision dated 12 December 2018 of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) which rejected his non-refoulement claim having regard to the torture risk[2] , BOR 3 risk[3] , persecution risk[4] and BOR 2[5] risk grounds. Background 2.The applicant is a national of India born in 1995. He entered Hong Kong illegally and surrendered to the Immigration Department on 14 July 2015. He raised a non-refoulement claim on the basis that if he returned to India, he would be harmed or killed by his wife’s family who disapproved of their marriage for religious reasons. Details of the applicant’s claim and the grounds he advanced before the Board were set out in the Board’s decision[6] . We will not repeat them here. 3.The Director rejected the applicant’s claim. The Board heard the appeal against the Director’s decision at an oral hearing held on 15 November 2019. For the analysis and reasons given in its decision, the Board dismissed the appeal. In gist, the Board found the applicant’s account implausible and inconsistent and his explanations for the inconsistencies to be unconvincing. The Board concluded that he was not a credible witness and he had fabricated his claims for the purpose of seeking non-refoulement protection. The Board rejected the entire factual basis of his claim, and concluded that there was no credible evidence to establish that the applicant faced a real risk of prescribed harm under any of the applicable grounds. The Board thus considered it was not necessary to consider and make findings on the issues of internal relocation, state acquiescence or whether there was a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in the applicant’s home country. The Judge’s decision 4.By a Form 86 filed on 7 October 2020, the applicant sought leave to judicially review the Board’s decision. The applicant did not provide any grounds for relief in the Form 86 or his supporting affirmation. 5.The Judge heard the application on 29 December 2025. By a Form CALL-1 dated 15 January 2026, the Judge dismissed the application for the reasons set out in [9] to [14]. In summary, the Judge considered that the Board had given thorough and detailed analysis and reasoning for its adverse finding on the applicant’s credibility and rejection of his evidence, there was no reasonably arguable basis to challenge the Board’s findings, and there was no error of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s decision. The Judge held that the intended judicial review had no prospect of success and refused to give leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review. This appeal 6.By a Notice of Appeal filed on 22 January 2026, the applicant appeals the Judge’s decision to this Court. The grounds of appeal stated that the Board had relied on sources of news which were not officially recognised or were simply hearsay, outdated cases and unreliable information, and consequently made groundless speculations about the applicant’s case. 7.The applicant’s written submissions quoted extensively from judgments on the high standard of fairness and Wednesbury unreasonableness. They also contended that: (1) the decision has the effect of finally disposing of the applicant’s claim rendering him liable to be removed such that the high standard of fairness should apply; (2) the Board erred in its approach and had failed to consider relevant matters such as the country conditions; and (3) the decision-making process must meet minimum standards of procedural fairness. 8.At the hearing, the applicant stated that he had been trying to get some documents from India relating to his case, such as police records and file, but has not received them until now. Our reasons for decision 9.In assessing the merits of the appeal, we shall have regard to the legal principles which this Court has adopted in dealing with appeals in non-refoulement cases: see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14]; Re Md Shohel Sheak [2018] HKCA 714 at [13]; and Re Limbu Birkhaman [2019] HKCA 50 at [11]. In particular, the role of the Court in a judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal. The Court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board. In the determination of an appeal against the refusal of leave by the Court of First Instance, the Court of Appeal will only examine the decision of the judge in light of the grounds advanced by the applicant. If no viable ground is put forward to reverse the judge’s decision, the appeal should be dismissed. It is not the role of this Court to examine the decision of the Board afresh as if the appeal were a fresh application for judicial review. 10.In the present case, the Board found the applicant’s claims and evidence implausible, inconsistent and unpersuasive. The Board pointed to various discrepancies and contradictions in the applicant’s testimony and the applicant’s failure to provide any document to support his marriage with a Christian woman, Miss J, and considered that they undermined the applicant’s credibility. The Board also had regard to the applicant’s claim of not being able to contact Miss J or her close companion, Ms X, and his admission to having made minimal efforts to reconnect with them as lacking in credibility. The Board concluded that the applicant was not in a genuine marital relationship with Miss J and that his claims were fabricated to secure non-refoulement protection. Consequently, the Board concluded his claims were not substantiated under any of the applicable grounds. These are findings of fact open to the Board based on the evidence it received and for the reasons it gave. The applicant had not out forward any ground before the Judge to challenge these findings of the Board. 11.The grounds advanced by the applicant and his submissions in this appeal are general assertions unsupported by particulars. They do not engage with the reasons of the Board in rejecting his evidence and claims. The legal principles cited in the written submissions do not relate to the facts of the applicant’s claim. They do not show any reasonably arguable legal error, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s decision. 12.Equally, the applicant has not been able to demonstrate with particulars any error in the reasoning of the Judge or advance any viable ground of appeal against the Judge’s decision. We are satisfied that the Judge had given proper and adequate reasons for his holding that the intended judicial review has no prospect of success. There is no proper basis for us to disturb the Judge’s decision. 13.Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
The applicant, unrepresented, acted in person. [2] This refers to the risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115. [3] This refers to risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383. [4] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non‑refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. [5] This refers to the risk of being arbitrarily deprived of life under article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383. [6] https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2020/HCAL002011_2020_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf |
Cases cited in this judgment