Nasir Ahmad Alias Nasir Ahmed v. Torture Claims Appeal Board
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 1473/2021 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 15 April 2026.
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 22 October 2021, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 17 August 2021. However, the Board only made one decision dated 30 August 2021 (“the Board’s Decision”) regarding the applicant’s petition against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 24 December 2018 (“the Director’s Decision”). At the oral he
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HCAL 1473/2021 [2026] HKCFI 2088 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1473 OF 2021
Application for leave to apply for judicial review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3) Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
Observations for the applicant: The Leave Application 1.By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 22 October 2021, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 17 August 2021. However, the Board only made one decision dated 30 August 2021 (“the Board’s Decision”) regarding the applicant’s petition against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 24 December 2018 (“the Director’s Decision”). At the oral hearing before this court on 12 March 2026, the applicant confirmed that he put down a wrong date of the decision in Form 86 and the Board’s Decision should be the subject matter of the Leave Application. The Board’s Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink: 2.The Board found that the applicant was unable to make out his claims for non-refoulement protection on all the applicable grounds (except Torture Risk[1]) under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“the USM”). Thus, the Board rejected the applicant’s petition and confirmed the Director’s Decision, which rejected the applicant’s non-refoulement claim. 3.The applicant had previously made a torture claim and his claim was rejected by the Director on 4 October 2013. He appealed against the Director’s decision and subsequently withdrew his appeal on 14 March 2014. The Board confirmed his withdrawal on the same day, with the torture claim finally determined under section 37V(2)(b) of the Immigration Ordinance. Thus, the applicant’s Torture Risk had been finally disposed of, and it was not necessary for the Board to consider this risk again in the Board’s Decision. Amendments 4.In Form 86, the applicant named the Board as the putative respondent but spelt the Board’s name wrong. He also named “immigration department TouRTuRe claim” as the putative interested party, when the Director should be so named. 5.As aforesaid, the decision in respect of which relief is sought should be the Board’s Decision. 6.Thus, this court makes an order on its own motion to amend the name of the putative respondent to “Torture Claims Appeal Board”, the name of the putative interested party to “Director of Immigration” and the decision in respect of which relief is sought to “Torture Claims Appeal Board’s decision dated 30 August 2021”. The applicant’s case 7.It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s Decision, which can be viewed in the hyperlink above. 8.In sum, the applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because if refouled to Pakistan, his life would be in danger from members of a prominent political family, namely Wasif Shah (“Wasif”) and Wasif’s son, Baqar Shah, in his home area. The applicant claimed that nine of his family members were murdered in 2005, and he strongly believed that the killings were carried out by Wasif, as his family had no other enemy. 9.Although the mass murder was reported to the police and the case was filed, the police refused to name Wasif in the report. When the applicant went back to the police station to enquire about the investigation, he was arrested on the accusation that he had killed his family members in order to take their properties. 10.After being granted bail, the applicant received repeated telephone calls from an unknown person asking him not to pursue the investigation of the murders as, if not, he would also be killed. The applicant, his mother and his sisters then left for Lahore. Although nothing had happened to them in Lahore, life was unbearable as they remained in hiding. The applicant and two of his sisters decided to leave Pakistan in search of a normal life. Oral hearing 11.The applicant requested for an oral hearing of the Leave Application. His case was heard on 12 March 2026. 12.At the hearing, this court asked the applicant for the grounds of his intended judicial review. However, the applicant merely replied that he had told the Board that it was not safe for him to go back, and the Board still dismissed his petition. Grounds for judicial review 13.The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016). 14.The applicant did not advance any grounds for his intended judicial review in Form 86, nor in his supporting affirmation dated 22 October 2021. 15.What the applicant said at the oral hearing could not amount to any grounds for judicial review either. Discussion 16.The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm, availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation. The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way of judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness, or irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524). 17.Thus, despite the fact that the applicant did not advance any ground for the intended judicial review, this court will scrutinize the Board’s Decision as aforesaid. 18.In assessing the petition by the applicant, the Board held an oral hearing on 26 May 2021. The applicant was present and was represented by Mr Edward L.S. Chow, duty lawyer assigned by the Duty Lawyer Service. Thus, the applicant was given the chance to present his case to the Board through his legal representative. 19.As can be seen from the Board’s Decision, the Board had thoroughly analyzed and considered the applicant’s claims and all the evidence. The Board found that the applicant’s claim was a bare claim unsupported by any documentary evidence. The Board concluded that the applicant’s claim was not credible and laid out its full reasoning for such conclusion in paragraphs 84 to 105 of the Board’s Decision. 20.In gist, the Board found that:-
21.Thus, the Board found that the applicant’s credibility was completely compromised by the fact that Wasif did not exist, and concluded that the claims surrounding Wasif amounted to no more than a mere exaggeration by introducing him as the main protagonist, a supposedly powerful, influential and vindictive politician who was entirely fictitious. The applicant’s failure to produce any documentary evidence of the mass murder after he had been in Hong Kong for 15 years also undermined the claim to the point that it was not credible. The applicant’s change of story to state that he was not being sought by the police, and his statement that his father was murdered in 2009, instead of being one of the nine victims in the alleged mass murder in 2005, all pointed to a claim that did not stand up to scrutiny. 22.The Board also considered the concern raised by the legal representative of the applicant about returning the applicant to Pakistan without protection from a vaccine for the then Covid-19 pandemic. The government had announced that it had extended vaccinations to non-refoulement claimants on the day of the Board’s hearing and the applicant indicated that he would take the vaccine. Thus, the concern was disposed of. 23.In the circumstances, the Board found that the applicant was unable to make out his claims on all the applicable grounds under the USM. 24.The Board did not consider availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation. However, as the applicant’s claims and the matters giving rise to his claims for non-refoulement protection were rejected in their entirety, it is not necessary for the Board to consider the availability of state protection. 25.As to internal relocation, it is a well-recognised principle that the decision-maker only needs to consider internal relocation if the applicant has established that he qualifies as a refugee pursuant to Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention (see Robinson v SSHD & Anor [1997] EWCA Civ 3090, dated 11.7.1997). In other words, internal relocation only arises if the applicant has established a real risk of persecution in his home area (see Gardi v SSHD [2002] 1 WLR 2755). 26.As it is the Board’s finding that the applicant had no real risk of any of the proscribed forms of harm, it is not necessary for the Board to consider internal relocation. 27.The finding of facts, including assessment of evidence, COI and risk of harm, was solely within the ambit of the Board. The Board was entitled to make its own decision. This court finds nothing wrong or unreasonable in the way the Board reached its conclusion. 28.Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board had correctly set out the law and key legal principles relating to the applicable grounds under the USM, the burden of proof and the standard of proof. The Board also correctly identified the issues and observed a very high standard of fairness. This court could detect no errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The Board’s Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test, ie it is not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational for the Board to reach its decision. 29.As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court that the applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence leave must be refused. Conclusion 30.For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application is dismissed. Dated the 15th day of April 2026
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
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