Belleza Angel Puzon v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office

HCAL 2535/2019

[2026] HKCFI 2086

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 2535 OF 2019

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D E C I S I O N

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Introduction

1.This is the 2^nd Applicant’s application by summons filed on 6 March 2026 for extension of time to appeal the order of this Court dated 12 December 2025 (the “Order”) refusing her leave to apply for judicial review (the “leave application”) of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (the “Decision”).

2.The 2^nd Applicant and her parents are all Filipino nationals.  Her father is the 1^st Applicant in their leave application.  He had worked in Hong Kong in 1999 and had been removed back to the Philippines.  He came to work in Hong Kong intermittently between 1997 and 2011.  He last came to Hong Kong on 23 January 2017 as a visitor and overstayed since 7 February 2017 when he surrendered to the Immigration Department.  He lodged a non-refoulement claim on 15 February 2017.  The 2^nd Applicant had been to Hong Kong on various occasions since 2004.  She last came to Hong Kong with her mother on 11 April 2017 as a visitor.  Then her mother disappeared.  The 2^nd Applicant overstayed since 25 April 2017.  She lodged her non-refoulement claim on 12 May 2017.  Before she last came to Hong Kong, she had no idea of the 1^st Applicant’s claim and the threat he had been subjected to.  Except for one occasion when the 1^st Applicant’s enemy pointed a gun at her when asking her for the whereabouts of the 1^st Applicant, she had never been threatened or harmed by the 1^st Applicant’s enemy.

3.The Applicants’ claims were rejected by the Director of Immigration (the “Director”).  Their appeal against the Director’s decision was dismissed by the Board.  Their leave application to review the Board’s Decision was dismissed by this Court on 12 December 2025.  Then, on 6 March 2026, the 2^nd Applicant applied by summons to appeal this Court’s Order.  Her intended appeal was 2 months and 21 days out of time.  This Court gave her directions to file a statement explaining the reasons for the delay, the circumstances under which the Order and Form CALL-1 were received by her and the grounds of her intended appeal.

The law

4.Under Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, where an application for leave to apply for judicial review is refused by a judge, the applicant may appeal the judge’s order to the Court of Appeal within 14 days after such order.  By the time the summons was filed, it was three months and four days out of time.  In Jagg Singh and Torture Claims Appeal Board/non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office^[1], the Court of Appeal held that in considering whether to extend time for appealing a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the court will take into account: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted.  If the delay is not substantial, it would be readily condoned if there is some credible explanation and an arguable ground of appeal.  If the first three factors are resolved against granting leave, there is no need to consider prejudice to the respondent.

Explanation for the delay

5.The delay of 2 months and 21 days in an appeal period of 14 days is very substantial.  The 2^nd Applicant claimed that she only received the Order and Form CALL-1 on 22 December 2025 and claimed to “attach a copy of the envelope which shows the posting date.”   However, what she attached is just a blank black page which does not show any postmark or anything indicative of the posting date.  According to the Court’s record, the Order and Form CALL-1 were sent to her by post on 12 December 2025.  Even accepting what she alleged is true and taking into account the Christmas holidays that followed, it could not account for the more than two and half months’ delay.

6.Her more substantive explanation for the delay as stated in her statement is that her father, ie the 1^st Applicant, is detained at Tung Tau Correctional Institute and she did not know how to process the appeal.  She had no body to assist her and her only source of assistance is the Justice Centre which was on holiday.  Even generously allow for the Christmas and new year holidays, that could not explain why she took more than two months to file the summons.  It is accepted that she did not know the procedure, but she is not illiterate.  She is a third year student in a university in Hong Kong.  She appeared in court to be intelligent and perfectly fluent in English.  Given this day and age and her educational background, it would not be difficult for her to find out from the internet, including the Judiciary website and resource centre for unrepresented litigants or the receptionist desk.  Her father could counsel her no more than what she could find out herself.  I am not satisfied that she has offered a reasonable or credible explanation for the delay.

Prospect of the intended appeal

7.The 2^nd Applicant raised four grounds of appeal.

8.First, she complained that the judge failed to give proper anxious scrutiny to her position as a young female applicant who was only 17 years old when the claim was made, and that she was under her father’s care and had no ability to support herself.  The 2^nd Applicant gave no particulars of this Court’s failure in its anxious scrutiny of the Board’s Decision under this ground.  She was born in 2000.  She was 19 years old at the time of hearing before the Board.  She was legally represented by the Duty Lawyer Service.  When she appeared before this Court, she was invited to make separate submissions.  All the ten grounds of application, which were probably prepared by the Justice Centre, were considered in paragraphs 10 to 21 of the Form CALL-1.  As noted in paragraph 21 of the Form CALL-1, they are essentially challenges of the Board’s finding of fact on which the Applicants’ claim was based.  That is not permissible in an application for judicial review.

9.Further, as stated in its overall scrutiny of the Board’s Decision, the Court noted that despite its doubts about the 1^st Applicant’s evidence, the Board assessed their claims on the basis of the factual case as the 1^st Applicant asserted, but found as a matter of law they are not entitled to non-refoulement protection under any of the four applicable grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism (the “USM”).  There is no substance under this ground.

10.Second, she complained that the Board’s finding that her claim is “purely a land dispute” and that there is no real risk are irrational.  She submitted that the Board played down the significance that her or her father’s enemy is a retired army officer and drug dealer who had dispensed violence against her father.  This complaint is a direct challenge of the Board’s finding of fact.  The 2^nd Applicant has offered no other claim what the Applicants’ case was, if not a land dispute.  As for the complaint that the Board had not considered the violence dispensed on the 1^st Applicant by his enemy, the Board had considered the alleged violence particularly in paragraphs 49 to 51 of the Decision.  In paragraph 50, the Board referred to the 1^st Applicant’s allegation that he heard gunshots near the land in dispute as evidence that he was being shot at by his enemy.  In paragraph 51, the Board referred to the Applicant’s evidence that his brother told him about seeing someone looked like a gangster driving suspiciously around his brother’s residence in a dark van as evidence of imminent risk.  The Board dismissed such evidence as speculation.  It was on that basis that the Board found in paragraph 49 that apart from the one single occasion in which his enemy threatened to kill the 1^st Applicant if he did not surrender the title deed, his enemy did nothing at all thereafter to indicate he would harm or kill the 1^st Applicant.  All these are finding of facts solely for the Board.  On the evidence, it was open to the Board to make such finding as it did.

11.Third, she argued that the Board or the Court failed to consider that internal relocation is not reasonable or safe for her as a young woman with no support.  The Board had considered relevant country of origin information and the Applicants’ personal background.  It was on that basis that it found, in particular the 2^nd Applicant’s educational background, that she would have no difficulties relocating in the Philippines.  The 2^nd Applicant is a local Filipino national.  There was no particular risk of harm that she would as an ordinary national, albeit a single young woman, suffer in her home country.  Neither she nor the 1^st Applicant had raised that issue on her behalf.  There is no substance in this ground.

12.Fourth, she argued that there has been significant change of circumstances arising from her father’s detention and that she was left to handle this case herself while studying at the university.  It is difficult to see how these matters which occurred after the events on which her risks and fears are based could have improved her claim to protection under the USM.  The fact that she is receiving university education is a positive factor which improves her ability to resist the risk of harm and to protect herself.

13.There is no substance in any of these grounds.  The intended appeal stands no prospect of success.

Conclusion

14.In view of the finding above, there is no need to consider the question of prejudice to the respondent if extension of time is granted.  As the 2^nd Applicant has no reasonable explanation for the delay and her grounds of appeal have no prospect of success, her application for extension of time to appeal is refused.

The 2^nd Applicant is not represented