Dr Seyed Masoud Sajjadi Alehashem v. The Hong Kong Polytechnic University and Others

Read the full judgment text of HCIP 48/2024 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 27 April 2026.

1. This court granted the application of Ds for security for costs and dismissed the application of P to strike out Ds’ said application with costs to P by a decision handed down on 13 January 2026 (“ the Decision ”). P now applies for leave to appeal against the Decision to the Court of Appeal by summons dated 26 January 2026 (“ the Summons ”).

Cited by 1 case · Cites 1 case

Case No.HCIP 48/2024[2026] HKCFI 2376
Court
High Court CFI
Date27 Apr 2026
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

HCIP 48 /2024

[2026] HKCFI 2376

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROCEEDINGS NO 48 OF 2024

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BETWEEN    
  DR SEYED MASOUD SAJJADI ALEHASHEM Plaintiff
  and  
  THE HONG KONG POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY 1st Defendant
  DR WAI-KEI AO 2nd Defendant
  DR DUO ZHANG 3rd Defendant
  DR ZI-YU TAO 4th Defendant

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Before: Deputy High Court Judge Kent Yee in Chambers (paper disposal)
Dates of Written Submission: 11 February 2026 and 10 March 2026 (the Plaintiff)
24 February 2026 (the Defendants)
Date of Decision: 27 April 2026

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DECISION

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Introduction

1.This court granted the application of Ds for security for costs and dismissed the application of P to strike out Ds’ said application with costs to P by a decision handed down on 13 January 2026 (“the Decision”). P now applies for leave to appeal against the Decision to the Court of Appeal by summons dated 26 January 2026 (“the Summons”).

2.I have given the parties direction to lodge their respective written submissions for the purpose of paper disposal of the Summons. I have read all the written submissions and this is my decision.

3.In this decision, I shall adopt the abbreviations used in the Decision. The Decision contains all the background facts relevant to Ds’ application and I shall not repeat them here.

Relevant legal principles

4.The general principles relating to applications for leave to appeal are well-established and not in dispute. Leave to appeal is not lightly granted and the court must be satisfied that the intended appeal has reasonable prospect of success or there is some other reason in the interests of justice that the matters should be heard on appeal: section 14AA(4) of the High Court Ordinance, Cap 4 (“the HCO”). A reasonable prospect of success means an appeal with prospects that are more than fanciful without having to be probable: SMSE v KL [2009] 4 HKLRD125 per Le Pichon JA at §17.

Grounds of Appeal

5.I have perused the written submissions of P.  P submits that I have made 5 errors of law.

6.First, P says that I fail to address his application to join Mr Yi Qing Ni as the 5th defendant.  He says that I did not refer to the application in the Decision and I fail to determine his application properly.

7.As rightly pointed out by Ds, P’s summons for his joinder application has been, by consent, adjourned to a date to be fixed before this court with two hours reserved.  The hearing date is yet to be fixed by the parties.  I was not concerned with P’s summons for his joinder application at the hearing of Ds’ Security Summons at all.  

8.Second, P alleges that this court appears to have adopted Ds’ submissions without adequate engagement with his case and evidence.

9.This allegation is untenable and unmeritorious.  I do not accept that it has any validity.

10.Third, P says that I erred in finding that he is ordinarily resident outside Hong Kong in a manner material to the exercise of my discretion on security for costs.  He says that at the material time, he resided and worked in Hong Kong though now his present employment is in the Mainland on a fixed term basis.

11.Clearly, P misunderstands O.23 r.1(1)(a). This court is concerned with P’s present residence and not his residence at the time when his cause of action arose.

12.P further says that by virtue of the Arrangement on Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters by the Courts of the Mainland and of Hong Kong (“the Arrangement”), effective on 29 January 2024, any costs orders made in these proceedings could be enforced in the Mainland and this reduces the risks that Ds may obtain an empty costs order.  P asserts that security for costs should not be granted by reason of the Arrangement.

13.I do not think P can derive any assistance from the Arrangement. Ds’ solicitors draw my attention to Liu Zuo Bin v Liu Ying Ting [2025] HKCFI 3097 where a master dealt with a similar argument. The master concluded that since the plaintiff had not identified any certain and readily available assets in the Mainland for satisfying a costs order, the existence of the Arrangement and/or ease or difficulties in enforcing a costs order with the Arrangement are irrelevant to whether security should be ordered.

14.In the present case, apart from the assertion that he has a fixed-term employment, P has failed to identify any assets, let alone readily available assets, in the Mainland. His reliance on the Arrangement is baseless and misplaced.

15.Fourth, P takes issue with my observation that his claim based on his allegation of misrepresentation faces insurmountable hurdles. P thinks that his claim is strongly arguable with reasonable prospect of success.

16.I have explained my assessment of the merit of P’s claim in the Decision.  I do not think that my analysis is flawed.

17.P says that I should not come to such an evaluative conclusion when the issue is whether his claim has a high degree of probability of success.

18.There is nothing in this complaint. In the course of assessing the degree of probability of success, it is plain to me that P’s claim is, in fact, fraught with difficulties.

19.Fifth, P points out that security for costs applications made by institutional defendants against individual litigants especially in intellectual property disputes arising from publicly funded research must be approached with caution.  He submits that I have failed to balance cost protection against the overriding objective of access to justice.

20.I do not find any substance in this complaint. I determined the Security Summons in accordance with the established principles applicable to all litigants regardless of their status.

21.Lastly, in the reply submissions, P impresses upon this court that an order of security for costs would stifle his genuine and arguable claim.

22.I have dealt with the same submission in the Decision and I have nothing to add.

Conclusion and order

23.For the reasons given, I am of the firm view that P’s intended appeal has no reasonable prospect of success.  Nor is there any reason in the interests that this matter should be considered by the Court of Appeal. I refuse to grant leave.  The Summons must be dismissed.

24.There is no reason why costs should not follow the event.  Ds have provided to me a statement of costs asking for HK$73,517.  I agree that to save costs this is an appropriate case for summary assessment. Taking a broad-brush approach, Ds’ costs is summarily assessed at HK$40,000.  I make a costs nisi that P should pay Ds’ costs in the amount of HK$40,000.

  (Kent Yee)
Deputy High Court Judge

The Plaintiff, was not represented, acting in person

Messrs Ellalan, for the 1st to 4th Defendants

Other Judgments in This Case

Further hearings and rulings under HCIP 48/2024