Case Document

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CACV 133/2026, [2026] HKCA 709

On Appeal From [2026] HKCFI 451

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 133 OF 2026

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO. 524 OF 2021)

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RE:

MIAH MD MANIK ALIAS MIA MD MANIK

Applicant

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Before:

Hon Cheung JA and Queeny Au-Yeung J in Court

Date of Hearing:	8 April 2026
Date of Judgment:	29 April 2026

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JUDGMENT

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Hon Queeny Au-Yeung J (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.This is the applicant’s appeal against the order of Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Val Chow (‘the Judge’) dated 2 February 2026 ([2026] HKCFI 451) (‘the Leave Decision’) refusing his application for leave to apply for judicial review (‘the Leave Application’) against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (‘the Board’) dated 8 April 2021 (‘the Board’s Decision’), whereby the Board dismissed his appeal/petition against the decision of the Director of Immigration (‘the Director’) dated 21 September 2020, refusing his non-refoulement claim.

2.The applicant’s background, the basis of his claim and arguments advanced before the Board as well as the Board’s reasons for rejecting his appeal are all set out in the Board’s Decision: see [4] of the Leave Decision[1].

3.The applicant is a national of Bangladesh[2]. He claimed to have arrived in Hong Kong on 10 March 2020 by boat illegally from the Mainland[3]. He made a non-refoulement claim on 14 March 2020[4]. The basis of his claim is that as he was affiliated to the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, he would be harmed or killed by members of the rival political party Awami League Party upon refoulement[5].

4.The Judge sets out his reasons for refusing the Leave Application: see [5] – [13] of the Leave Decision. We will not repeat the details herein.

5.By the Notice of Appeal filed on 16 February 2026, the applicant stated:

‘ 1. Failing to consider my claim under BOR 2 and BOR 3 risk, properly that the risk I had stated in my claim for which my life would be at danger upon refoulement.

2. Failing to consider the fact and my fear that my claim is not personal or private. It’s a political matter. Moreover my fear is my enemies still will harm me wherever I hide in my country.

3. Failing to consider or observe the country of origin condition that the Authority of my country would not be able to protect me from my enemies.’

6.In his written submissions lodged on 2 March 2026, the applicant mostly made vague and bare allegations without any specific elaboration as to how any of those submissions relate to the Judge’s decision. He claimed that his fear and risk still subsist upon refoulement, and that the Board had failed to take into account relevant considerations or took into account irrelevant considerations and failed to follow the high standards of fairness in assessing his claim. He further alleged that the Board had erred in law in applying various non-refoulement principles and breached natural justice as he had inadequate opportunity to present evidence and the Board failed to consider his submissions. He also complained that the Board had been Wednesbury unreasonable, irrational, erred in fact-finding, misapplied the burden and standard of proof, failed to consider country information or changed circumstances and failed to consider the principle of proportionality in dismissing his appeal.

7.We heard the appeal on 8 April 2026. A Bengali interpreter was present to provide language assistance. In Court, the applicant only reiterated that he would be killed if he were to return to Bangladesh.

Discussion

8.The relevant legal principles governing appeals in non-refoulement cases are set out in Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14].

9.In particular, in an appeal against refusal of leave to apply for judicial review in non-refoulement cases, the Court of Appeal will only examine the decision of the judge in light of the grounds advanced by the applicant. If no viable ground is put forward to reverse the judge’s decision, the appeal should be dismissed. The Court’s role is not to examine the decision maker’s decision afresh as if it were a fresh application for judicial review. See Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14(6)].

10.In light of the above, it is thus incumbent on the applicant to point out the errors in the Leave Decision with sufficient particulars and specifics.

11.However, nowhere in his Notice of Appeal or submission did the applicant identify any error committed by the Judge with specific particulars. His assertions are all general, bare and vague allegations unsupported by specific particulars or evidence. General assertions of his fear if refouled do not constitute proper grounds of appeal: Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar [2022] HKCA 627 at [6]. The Court will not usurp the role of the Board. Assessment of evidence, country of origin information materials, risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board (and the Director). The Court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board. No such error was demonstrated by the applicant. Clearly, his assertions do not constitute viable grounds of appeal and lack substance. Evidently, the Board had thoroughly considered his claim and evidence on all applicable grounds including BOR 2 and BOR 3 risks[6]. As noted by the Judge, there is no error of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision[7]. We see no basis to interfere with the Leave Decision.

12.For the above reasons, the applicant’s appeal against the Leave Decision has no merit and is dismissed.